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One key to CSR’s success has been its fuzzy definition, whereby its meaning is 
constantly (re)defined by practice and through the dialectical relationship 
between companies and their stakeholders.  This thesis focuses upon the 
influence of MNOCs’ socio-political field upon their CSR (rather than upon 
specific CSR projects), from a critical realist perspective, contributing to existing 
research in three key ways.  Firstly, I present original explanatory models that 
outline the practice of CSR in Colombia and Venezuela.  From these models, I 
develop further models that categorise the types of CSR practiced in each 
country.  I argue that Colombia follows a conventional model of private-led CSR; 
by contrast, the Venezuelan model pushes the boundaries of more traditional 
CSR definitions.  Given the government’s dirigiste approach, I categorise the 
Venezuelan model as an example of a new form of CSR, that I call Regulated 
CSR (RCSR), noting the inherent contradictions of regulating to increase 
responsibility.  Secondly, I produce original research on MNOCs’ CSR reports, 
examining how MNOCs’ agency is affected by global socio-political discourses.  
Paradoxically, whilst CSR is an important element of corporate communication, 
many MNOCs only disclose limited CSR-related information.  Thirdly, this thesis 
contributes to the growing discussion of CSR’s role within the neoliberal 
paradigm.  I argue that CSR is not and cannot be a panacea for social absences 
and can have negative social effects.  Therefore, appropriate regulation is 
necessary, starting with greater corporate transparency at an international level 
to level-up MNOCs’ practices, and national oversight of MNOCs’ CSR budgets 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This introduction is divided into two parts: i) the aims of the thesis and its 
relevance; and ii) the framework used to conduct the research.   
1.1 Thesis overview: purpose and relevance  
1.1.1. The research question, research objectives and the contribution 
of this research to the existing academic literature 
In this thesis I set out to answer the following question: How is MNOCs’ CSR 
influenced by the socio-political field in which MNOCs operate? 
To answer this question, I examine the dialectic relationships between 
MNOCs and their surrounding socio-political fields and how these determine 
MNOCs’ CSR, using Colombia and Venezuela as case studies and MNOCs’ 
CSR reports.  More precisely, I identify the space occupied or left by/for 
MNOCs to determine and execute CSR programmes, whilst locating the 
causal mechanisms that underpin and explain the status quo with regards to 
CSR in each country.  This thesis is thus concerned with the relationships 
that ultimately alter MNOCs' practice of CSR.  I do not focus upon specific 
CSR projects or upon an individual company, but mostly refer to MNOCs as 
a group, although various companies and projects are discussed throughout 
the thesis.  
In order to show how different structures and agents interact to produce 
certain types of CSR, I present original explanatory models that illustrate how 
the practice of CSR differs in Colombia and Venezuela and why this is the 
case.  From these models, I develop further models that categorise the types 
of CSR practiced in each country.  I argue that there are two distinct models 
in operation in both countries: i) the Bolivarian, Venezuelan, state-led model 
of CSR (which I refer to as regulated or ‘R’ CSR); and ii) the neoliberal, 
Colombian, laissez-faire model of CSR (private-led CSR).  I show why these 
models are distinct by identifying the causal mechanisms that underpin them.  
Whilst the Venezuelan model pushes the boundaries of what can be 
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considered as CSR (as the Venezuelan government has increasingly defined 
its own specific CSR model and reduced the space available to MNOCs), I 
show that this still qualifies as CSR.  By contrast, the absence of government 
interference in Colombia may question the existence of a local CSR model.  I 
argue, however, that this is in-keeping with a wider neoliberal, laissez-faire 
paradigm, and, as such, that a CSR model exists.   
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in the following ways.  I have 
conducted an extensive review and analysis of the existing academic 
literature and debates with regards to the oil curse and CSR, alongside 
reviews of the literature on Colombia and Venezuela.  This thesis uses 
critical reaIist analytical tools to discuss several key theories covered in this 
literature, showing their relevance and explanatory power to analyse social 
phenomena in these fields.  I also offer an original critical analysis of 18 
MNOCs’ CSR reports to illustrate how companies portray their practices and 
how global discourses influence their CSR.  Moreover, I have produced 
original primary research collating feedback and perspectives on MNOCs’ 
CSR practices in Colombia and Venezuela.  Building upon the literature 
reviewed and my own field research, I have created two sets of models.  The 
first illustrates the dialectical relations between MNOCs’ CSR and the socio-
political field in which MNOCs operate in Colombia and Venezuela.  The 
second categorises the types of CSR being practiced in these countries.  
Considering the identification of RCSR model with its specific features, I have 
also expanded the domain of research on CSR models and on companies’ 
practices. 
1.1.2. Structure  
The first chapter of this thesis is used to establish the framework of this 
research, outlining the research methodology and philosophical 
underpinnings.  Chapters 2-5 offer a critical review of the literature on oil and 
its social impact, CSR, Venezuela and Colombia to situate the research 
question in the context of the different debates surrounding these topics.  
Chapter 6 contains an analysis that I conducted based upon my own survey 
of 18 MNOC CSR reports.  Chapter 7 offers an analysis of the data I 
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collected in the field and contains the two models that I have created to show 
the dialectical relations between MNOCs’ CSR and the socio-political field in 
which MNOCs operate in Colombia and Venezuela.  It also introduces the 
concept of RCSR.  Chapter 8 outlines my conclusions.  
This thesis results from a non-linear, self-reflexive research process.   As 
such, the format and order of chapters 2-5 are chosen primarily for 
convenience.  The reader is invited to read these chapters in whichever order 
is most helpful, although I recommend reading chapters 2 and 3 before 
chapters 4 and 5.  These chapters also contextualise the data analysis and 
provide an understanding of the conclusions reached that may not be clear 
from a cold reading of the data-analysis chapter alone.   
Outline of each chapter  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The remainder of this chapter introduces this research and discusses its 
methodological and philosophical framework. 
Chapter 2: The oil curse as the outcome of presence and absence: rentier 
states, civil violence and societal challenges for MNOCs   
Chapter 2 presents and critiques the academic literature on the oil curse in 
oil-abundant, developing countries.  I take from this literature that the 
paradox of plenty is essentially a paradox of the presence of significant oil 
income and the absence of oil-led development that benefits the citizens of 
oil-rich countries.  I discuss the causes of the curse suggested in the 
academic literature, ranging from the weak state of institutions and poor 
governance to greedy rebels, community grievances and the mere feasibility 
of conflict.  The phenomena discussed in this chapter thus help to explain 
some of the rationale for the development of CSR, as a means to redress 
social absences, in addition to the challenges that MNOCs can face whilst 
operating in oil-rich, developing countries.  I conclude that there is no 
consensus in the literature as to how to solve the oil curse and show that 
attempts to remedy the curse that do not account for local cultures and open 
systems are likely to fail. 
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Chapter 3: The evolution and discourse of CSR 
This chapter argues that the elusive concept of CSR is part of the dominant 
neoliberal response that is proposed at an international level to remedy the 
oil curse, but that it is insufficient to do so within a neoliberal context.  Indeed, 
I will show that MNOCs not only have various motivations for conducting 
CSR, but that CSR and the profit-motive can induce a corporate 
schizophrenia, whereby companies can contemporaneously negatively 
impact their surrounding environment through their operations and yet be 
committed to CSR that focuses upon positive social development.  In this 
context, I will argue that existing voluntary standards are insufficient to 
significantly change corporate behaviour.  Moreover, appropriate regulation 
has a role to play, starting with greater corporate transparency at an 
international level to level-up MNOCs’ practices, and national oversight of 
MNOCs’ CSR budgets and practices.  
Chapter 4: Case study 1: Neoliberalism, Colombia and CSR 
In chapter 4, I argue that the Colombian government’s US-backed, neoliberal 
approach to policy-making, has enabled MNOCs to follow a private-led model 
of CSR that fits within this laissez-faire framework.  I also discuss how the 
Colombian socio-political field has been marked by (i) neoliberal policies, (ii) 
violence, and (iii) the presence of various protostate actors, which 
contextualise the emergence of the Colombian CSR-model.  In Colombia, 
mechanisms linked to the greed/grievance duality have causally linked oil to, 
for example, conflict onset and duration, clientelism, corruption and a 
changing social fabric in oil areas.  However, I show that they are insufficient 
to explain the complex conflict dynamics that have emerged within the 
country.  In this context, I contend that the Colombian government cannot 
rely upon CSR, as it is currently practised to provide social welfare needs, 
social justice or repair the damaged social fabric in remote oil areas.   
Chapter 5: Case study 2: Bolivarianism, Venezuela and CSR 
In this chapter, I argue that the Venezuelan governments’ distinctly Bolivarian 
approach to policy-making has captured CSR as a state-led programme and 
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significantly diminished MNOCs’ autonomy to implement their own CSR-like 
projects.  Moreover, it has transformed both the socio-political field in which 
MNOCs operate and their relationships with this field.  Venezuela is a 
textbook example of an oil curse sufferer and I show how Bolivarian 
governments have taken steps to reduce inequality, whilst Venezuela still 
remains oil (and thus international market) dependent and characterised by 
clientelism and corruption, amongst others.  I note that the Venezuelan socio-
political field has been marked by: (i) the project to create a new socialist 
society; (ii) the nationalisation of the oil industry; (iii) the delegitimisation of 
private initiative; and (iv) the re-branding of CSR.  These factors have in turn 
created the context in which the Venezuelan CSR model has developed and 
led to a regulated form of CSR, which I refer to as RCSR and discuss in 
chapter 7.  
Chapter 6: How do MNOCs portray their CSR? An analysis of 18 MNOC 
CSR reports 
By critically analysing the discourse found in the CSR reports of 18 MNOCs, I 
will show the increasing importance that MNOCs attach to CSR, although the 
CSR related practices they set out are often inadequately described and 
indicative of: i) the appropriation of discourse as speech-act; and ii) the 
piecemeal and ideologically-determined nature of CSR and its unsuitability as 
a means of welfare within a neoliberal context.   
Chapter 7: Two models: agents, structures, policies and the dynamics of 
CSR  
Whereas chapter 6 illustrates the influence of socio-political discourses at a 
global level upon MNOCs’ CSR-related agency, chapter 7 more specifically 
addresses how MNOCs’ CSR is affected by the field in which they operate in 
Colombia and Venezuela.   In this chapter, I present two models that I have 
created to explain the dialectical-relational dynamics of MNOCs’ CSR in 
Colombia and Venezuela (i.e. the ways in which MNOCs’ CSR affects and is 
affected by MNOCs’ dialectical relations with their socio-political fields in the 
Colombian and Venezuelan contexts).  It uses data that I collected during 
field trips to these countries, alongside the materials found in previous 
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chapters, to create these models.  I have identified and analysed four levels 
to each model beginning with: i) the analysis of the agents in the models that 
affect MNOCs’ agency; before moving on to ii) the policies that impact 
MNOCs’ agency; iii) other observable structures and mechanisms that 
influence MNOCs’ agency, the presence/absence of other agents within the 
models and the practice of CSR; and iv) the causal mechanisms that 
underpin these models.  Based upon my research, I identified 
reasons/causes that describe the patterns of agents/structures interaction in 
both countries, using a process of abstraction that sought to consider and 
resolve some of the tensions in the academic literature discussed in 
preceding chapters and the field data that I collected.  Moreover, based upon 
these models, I developed further categorisations of the types of CSR 
practiced in both Colombia and Venezuela.  I identified a set of patterns in 
Venezuela that led me to identify the existence of a type of regulated CSR, 
which I refer to as RCSR. 
Chapter 8: General Conclusions and Future Work 
The concluding chapter draws together important elements from the previous 
chapters to address the question of how MNOC’s CSR is influenced by the 
socio-political field in which MNOCs operate, whilst also looking at the 
advantages and disadvantages of each model in this light.  It also offers 
recommendations for further research in this field. 
The key findings can be summarised as follows:  
1. Different CSR models prevail in Colombia and Venezuela, which reflect  
the existing socio-political field:  
i) In Colombia, the CSR model is private-led and CSR activities are 
conducted voluntarily.  The causal mechanisms that underpin this 
model are neoliberalism and a struggle for sovereignty.  
ii) In Venezuela, the CSR model is state-led.  The causal 
mechanisms that underpin this model are a drive for emancipation, 
caudillismo and capitalism. 
iii) The CSR model prevalent in Venezuela, which I have labelled 
RCSR, has specific features that differentiate it from what is 
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generally described as CSR in the neoliberal paradigm; these 
features include mandatory social contributions, a disconnection 
between the funding of CSR and the decision to fund projects, and 
the active role played by the state. 
iv) I show that appropriate regulation is needed: i) as a first step, at an 
international level, to apply transparency requirements to MNOCs 
in view of creating a level playing field and levelling-up MNOCs’ 
CSR practices; and ii) at the level of oil-producing countries to 
empower national governments to exercise oversight of MNOCs’ 
CSR budgets and practices in their countries. 
v) My analysis of corporate CSR reports shows that MNOCs 
appropriate language from other international agents, affecting 
both their corporate communication and their praxis.   
2. The key recommendations for policy-makers and for future research are:  
i) Research is needed to determine the success of new international 
transparency measures and to see where they could be improved. 
ii) Research is needed to enable national governments to choose 
between different models of CSR (e.g. private-led CSR v. 
regulated CSR), determine appropriate CSR-related legislation, as 
well as on how governments could enforce this legislation on a 
case by case basis.    
iii) Future research should be done on CSR reporting and the 
changes in corporate reporting over the coming years. This would 
enable an understanding of how MNOCs are affected by outside 
discourses and new transparency legislation. 
My conclusions are neither air-tight nor definitive in a social world that is 
dynamic and changing (Danermark et al., 2002:54).  In this vein, research is 
a never-ending process.  It should be noted that my interpretation of the data 
exists in the real, but it is epistemologically relative.  As Fairclough (1989:24) 
states, analysis comes with: "(...) what people have in their heads and draw 
upon when they produce or interpret texts, including their knowledge of 
language, representations of the natural and social worlds they inhabit, 
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values, beliefs, assumptions, etc.".  Thus, I invite the reader to critically 
assess what I have written to further this research in the future. 
1.1.3. Relevance  
Corporate (ir)responsibility and the normative acceptability of the corporate 
profit-making motive have gained increasing attention in light of the recent 
financial crisis, but viewed as an ethical or moral crisis.  Businesses' social 
legitimacy has plummeted to levels unseen in recent history (Porter & 
Kramer, 2011:4).  Whilst the media and political leaders have conveniently 
emphasised the moral hazard of bankers placing their personal greed before 
the interests of those they represented, the financial crisis has also brought 
to the fore the importance of the real (non-financial) economy of which the oil 
industry is an important actor and the weaknesses of capitalism to bring good 
governance, social justice and healthy and equal power relations. 
I argue that Corporate Social Responsibility has been a key means for 
industry to communicate to the outside world that beyond its cold, capitalist 
exterior, it ultimately cares.  However, amidst redundancies and reduced 
CSR budgets, as the debate turns towards whether profit-driven companies 
with transnational value chains do care about their impact upon the societies 
in which they operate, Fleming and Jones (2013:337) herald the end of CSR, 
noting that at, "the very moment that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
appears to be more needed than ever, its legitimacy, credibility and broader 
appeal has reached an all-time low".  As many left-wing voices globally take 
advantage of public interest in the crisis to advocate a solidaristic rather than 
a greed-driven approach to modernity, CSR increasingly highlights the 
Achilles heel of capitalist ideology, in that irrespective of a company's 
intentions, it cannot consistently submit its need for profit to broader social 
ethics.   
I argue that the oil industry epitomises such weakness.  As a commodity, oil 
is essential to the capitalist economy's survival and to the sustainability of the 
major global powers' geopolitical advantage.  Whilst oil companies work to 
discover new reserves and invest heavily in developing alternative energy-
sources, global oil demand will remain strong.  Oil is a finite resource; 
9 
 
whereas supplies were once funnelled to the West, growing economies such 
as China now want their share.  Moreover, oil extraction and transport have 
always been highly polluting activities as evidenced by accidents such as 
Deepwater (2010) reminded the general public.  As conventional oil reserves 
decrease, industry is increasingly prospecting in previously protected wildlife 
conservation areas for non-conventional oil.  Oil not only has an economic 
and environmental impact, but also a political and social impact as 
controversial reports on, for example, the Niger Delta have shown (see 
chapter 3).  Such reports of corporate malpractice imply that CSR is primarily 
a public relations' exercise.  This is compounded by the fact that many 
companies have placed CSR within their public relations departments (Ilieş, 
2011).  
Is CSR over?  The answer is both yes and no.  As Fleming and Jones (2013) 
assert, it never began whole-heartedly due to the profit-motive.  CSR 
initiatives can positively benefit communities, but CSR's existence can serve 
as window-dressing that detracts attention from wider social problems.  It is 
important to be clear that the goal of CSR is not to act as a panacea that 
cures social ills.  Such CSR is illusory and has never existed.  However, as 
Crane and Matten (2007:208) argue, dismissing CSR as merely PR is to 
reject all business ethics management; highlighting the tensions in this field 
and the relevance of researching this topic.  Despite the recent global trend 
for companies to cut back on CSR, internationally, it is still actively practiced 
and remains an essential element of most MBA and management courses.  
Moreover, there has been an increase in the corporate uptake of global 
reporting and of wider-ranging CSR with companies such as Statoil entering 
trendier and broader areas such as human rights (see chapter 2).  The 
current practice of CSR will not disappear overnight.   
From the outset of this research, I was interested in the extent to which 
MNOCs' CSR was influenced by local ideologies and conflict dynamics.  I 
was curious to determine whether MNOCs' corporate CSR standardisation 
processes were stronger than their localisation processes in both content and 
form of delivery, especially amidst physical violence.  Moreover, I was 
interested in questions of legitimacy, for example, the reasons why MNOCs, 
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which have no democratic legitimacy, take on certain state functions and 
whether this is generally accepted or resented by actors on the ground.  I did 
not set out to expose or denounce the negative causal effects of oil 
multinationals that have been much publicised, sometimes without taking into 
consideration the environments in which these companies operate, nor to 
produce a piece of neoliberal propaganda, but to untangle and portray the 
relationships between different actors that define the scope of MNOCs' social 
action.   
As the research progressed, I became increasingly aware of the importance 
of the divergence in approach to CSR between the Venezuelan and 
Colombian governments i.e. that these approaches were not merely 
rhetorical, but real and causal of further divergences in practice.  In this 
context, the Chávez' government in Venezuela took a more critical stance 
vis-à-vis MNOCs' CSR and its reforms of MNOC praxis (see below), 
following a model of RCSR, which received vast popular support.  The 
significance of these measures becomes more obvious when contrasted with 
neighbouring Colombia under former President Uribe, which saw MNOCs 
conduct more traditional CSR, adapted to survive amidst the Colombian 
violence.  
From my own normative standpoint, MNOCs, to the extent that they 
determine and execute CSR programmes, cannot claim to be responsible by 
simply implementing practical projects (content of CSR), but they should also 
consider their dialectical relationship with the socio-political framework within 
which they conduct these projects (form of CSR).  
Comparison between the Venezuelan and Colombian CSR models is often 
highly political.  On the one hand, neoliberals, who despite the financial crisis, 
argue that capitalism remains the best system with no other viable alternative 
conceived to date, may argue that the Bolivarian model of governance and of 
society, is doomed to fail as it cannot escape the global effects of the 
capitalist market.  On the other hand, however, left-wing supporters, who 
prefer a model with larger state intervention, unconvinced that the market 
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should be left to provide welfare, often disagree with the Colombian model 
and find that they can more readily accept the Venezuelan model.   
This thesis transcends such basic normative foundations to uncover the 
causal mechanisms that have led each government to choose the CSR 
models that they have chosen, more purposefully in Venezuela (RCSR) and 
rather passively in Colombia (private-led CSR).  By identifying causal 
mechanisms that underpin the models, it enables a discussion of each 
model’s foundations and finds that both have elements which are beneficial 
to, and elements that hinder, the potential of MNOCs’ CSR to contribute to 
human flourishing.  
I am aware that some readers will pre-judge the outcome of this research as 
they may adhere to the political orientation or ideologies that prevail in either 
Colombia or Venezuela.  Bhaskar (1993;2000;2002) rightly asserts that 
ideology is based on false consciousness or lived illusion.  As such, I would 
ask each reader to attempt to critically challenge their assumptions and 
biases, exercising epistemic relativism and judgemental rationality.  My 
research even shows that neither ideology is perfectly practised without 
some contradiction within the country that champions it.  My hope is that as 
an underlabourer for science (Locke, 1690; Bhaskar, 1998), I have not only 
produced an original piece of research, but research that is useful to policy-
makers, companies or academics investigating similar questions.  
1.1.4. Case selection 
This PhD is not a strict comparison between Colombia and Venezuela, where 
one country would serve as the reference point to measure the other one.  
Rather, each country has been chosen because it displays a relevant 
characteristic: i) in Colombia, MNOCs perform their CSR activities in areas 
suffering from violence, whilst the official economic and political line fervently 
supports neo-liberalism; and ii) in Venezuela, MNOCs operate within a 
political context that is more influenced by left-wing Bolivarian discourse and 
in which the state has placed MNOCs’ social legitimacy in question.    
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I first became interested in the social field of the oil industry's operations on a 
visit to Barrancabermeja in Colombia in 2003 when I began to ponder the 
ability of the oil industry to operate, let alone conduct CSR, amidst the 
obvious physical and structural violence.  Contemporaneously in Venezuela, 
the coup attempt against President Chávez, the latter's anti-Western 
discourse and the paralysis caused by the strike of PDVSA's oil workers 
heightened my interest in Bolivarian socialism.  
Prior to commencing this research and looking at patterns across different oil 
countries, it was apparent that a macro-level approach would be necessary 
to discuss the impact of oil (in its widest sense) upon individual states, 
focusing less upon internal corporate decision-making habitus (although I did 
collect some data on how CSR is determined within a company) or upon the 
precise content of specific CSR projects and more upon the field in which 
companies operate.  This is due to: i) the cross-border nature of multinational 
oil companies' agency; ii) the macroeconomic features of the oil trade; iii) the 
interests of third countries vis-à-vis oil; and iv) international power balances.  
Interestingly, despite similar external pressures, the internal structures and 
agents have not responded in the same way in both Venezuela and 
Colombia.   
These countries lend themselves well to comparative study and were 
selected due to their similarities as much as their more recently mediatised 
contrasts.  They are both considered to be two of Latin America's oldest 
democracies.  They shared military dictatorships until the late 1950s, pacted1 
transitions, the appearance of democratic stability and violent challenges to 
the government.  Whilst Venezuela has more significant oil resources, both 
countries invited MNOCs to operate in their territories in the early 1900s, 
developed oil cultures, suffered from elements of the resource curse and 
peacefully established NOCs within nine years of each other (Ecopetrol in 
1951 and PDVSA in 1960).  As neighbours, they share common problems 
and Venezuela has been affected by the Colombian left-wing struggle, in 
terms of the drugs and arms trades amongst others, whereby Venezuela is a 
                                                          
1
 I refer to political transitions that took place in each country due to a coinciding of elite 
interests and that were held together due to the agreement (‘pact’) of powerful elite groups. 
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key pipeline.  Their paths have diverged in terms of the prevailing democratic 
governance paradigms over the past decade.  Moreover, MNOCs face 
different challenges in each country.  Whereas Colombia welcomes US 
intervention and foreign investment activities, Venezuela has been cautious 
about non-socialist intervention by imperialists.   
My field research was conducted pre-financial crisis in Venezuela under 
Chávez (2007) and in Colombia under Uribe (2008).  In hindsight, I was 
fortunate in the timing of my research.  The data was collected when 
government support and oil prices were strong in both countries, enabling 
both governments to follow policies in line with their political positions.  It has 
been interesting to note that despite presidential change, the financial crisis 
and fluctuating oil prices, there is a continuum in terms of the oil policies 
followed by both countries under Presidents Maduro and Santos.  From the 
current literature on these two countries, it would appear that the underlying 
mechanisms driving the two models of CSR and causing powers to emerge 
(or not) in both countries have not yet significantly changed since the 
research was conducted.  
1.1.5. Defining CSR 
In this research, I use the term CSR to refer to the non-core-business related 
projects and actions that MNOCs' undertake within the communities 
surrounding their operations to show that they care about their external 
stakeholders.  It is not used here to describe companies' internal policies that 
affect internal stakeholders. 
As there is no universally accepted definition of CSR, it is often determined 
through corporate practice (see chapter 2).  Whilst Colombian CSR initiatives 
have not been consistently socially responsible, there is greater ambiguity 
surrounding whether what MNOCs do in Venezuela is real CSR or whether it 
is CSR by means of a speech act.  It could be argued that what MNOCs do in 
Venezuela, in an RCSR model, no longer constitutes CSR, but is rather tax-
driven with MNOCs as mere passengers of government welfare.  I show that 
MNOCs actions still constitute CSR.  Reasons for this include: i) MNOCs, the 
state and other stakeholders refer to this action as CSR; ii) MNOCs still have 
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some input in this process, however limited; and iii) from a legal perspective, 
there are grounds to claim that it is not a tax as it is mostly paid to PDVSA 
and not to the state budget and spent without the comprehensive oversight of 
a representative body. 
1.2. Thesis overview: introducing the methodological framework 
1.2.1. Philosophical underpinnings: critical realism  
Below, I explain the critical realist philosophical parameters that underpin this 
research, thereby guiding my methodology by determining: (i) its underlying 
social ontology; (ii) what is acceptable as social explanation; and (iii) my 
choice of research/analytical methods.   
I chose Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of Critical Realism as it is more systematic 
than that proposed by other realist authors (Price,1997:4) and suited to 
research in a real world that is dynamic and changing; i) avoiding the 
epistemic fallacy2; (ii) offering conceptual tools that enable the study of real 
social objects and their relationships; iii) advocating a critical, judgmental 
rationality vis-à-vis the object(s) studied; and iv) encouraging an 
emancipatory drive focused upon human flourishing.  I have incorporated 
elements from CR’s three main phases: (i) Basic Critical Realism (BCR); (ii) 
Dialectical Critical Realism (DCR); and (iii) the Philosophy of meta-Reality 
(PMR), as each of these stages enriches and deepens the former (Hartwig, 
2009:xiii).  BCR and DCR provide the primary foundations for the (i) 
ontological; (ii) epistemological; and (iii) methodological assumptions in this 
thesis.  However, I also use some insights from PMR.    
As Hartwig (Bhaskar & Hartwig, 2010:206) states, CR comes from the 
tradition of the left, but wants to transcend left/right oppositions.  Bhaskar 
advocates a “critical realist embrace” of engaging with, learning from and 
working with scholars from different philosophical traditions (Bhaskar & 
Hartwig, 2010:78).  As such, CR is being applied by scholars to diverse 
spheres to encompass different perspectives (Danermark et al., 2002:1; 
                                                          
2
 This epistemic fallacy refers to the analysis or definition of statements about being in terms 
of statements about our knowledge of being (Hartwig, 2007:173).  
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Bhaskar & Callinicos, 2003).  Since its conception, CR has been adapted and 
interpreted by various scholars including Archer (et al., 1998; et al., 1999; 
2000; 2003; 2007), Collier (1994), Cruickshank (2002; ed.2003; 2004), Harré 
(1989), Harré and Madden (1975), Hartwig (2007; et al., 2010), Sayer (1992; 
1995; 2000) and Patomäki (2002), and the field is growing.  However, to the 
best of my knowledge, this is the first study that uses Critical Realism (CR) to 
underpin a comparative analysis of Colombian and Venezuelan socio-
political phenomena and of CSR in these countries.  
1.2.1.1 Ontological realism 
CR sees the world as “structured, differentiated, stratified and changing” and 
proposes a stratified ontology to deal with the social world in which social 
reality is emergent, constituted prior to our knowledge and understanding of 
it, and partly unknown to the social scientist (Danermark et al., 2002:5).  This 
unique ontological approach includes and distinguishes between: (i) the real 
generative or structural domain; (ii) the actual; and (iii) the empirical 
(Bhaskar, 2008:13).  Objects or noumena are located in the real alongside 
their structural and causal powers, generating what actually takes place, 
whilst existing independently of actual patterns of events (Baert, 2005:93).  
The actual reality refers to what happens if powers are activated and is 
composed of events, behaviours and happenings in the world, i.e. that which 
actually takes place, despite how we experience or interpret occurrences 
empirically.  The empirical is defined as the domain of experience, perception 
and impression of the events, behaviour, and occurrences in the world.  
Thus, causal mechanisms exist in the real, events in the real and the actual 
and experiences in the real, the actual and the empirical (Bhaskar, 2008:56).  
CR claims that social scientists commit the epistemic fallacy if they allow the 
ontological, that which exists, to be simply reduced to the epistemic, our 
knowledge of what exists, when it should be the other way round (Hartwig, 
2007:173-175; Bhaskar, 2008:37).  Thus, CR refutes ontological relativism or 
arguments based upon an anti-realist acceptance of the empirical world 
(Bhaskar, 2008:28).  This concept primarily responds to epistemological 
questions of what one can know about the world, yet it causes an unresolved 
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ontological tension that has divided logical positivism3 and actualism4; neither 
acknowledges the real or generative domain, nor do they distinguish between 
events and the often unobservable underlying mechanisms that generate 
those events (Archer et al., 1998:6).  Many post-positivist approaches also 
fail to resolve these tensions and having rejected positivism still accept its 
empiricism; relativist approaches go further and posit that since an external 
world neither exists nor is accessible to us, it should neither be postulated 
nor considered (Robson, 2005:23).  Relativists, thus, limit reality to what 
people interpret as being in the world, thereby undermining scientific practice 
as the facts alongside scientists’ assumptions of reality are reduced to 
surmisal.  Bhaskar (1998:123) claims, for "the positivist, science is outside 
society; for the hermeneuticist, society is outside science".  Such 
anthropocentric accounts of a mind-dependent reality not only overlook the 
underlying existence of intransitive (non-perceived) objects, but they also 
challenge the meaning of knowledge and truth, which become subjective.  As 
a result, new approaches are not always analysed in terms of their predictive 
power, explanatory value or ability to identify truths, but rather by their ability 
to interpret meaning, experience and behaviour (Robson, 2005).  Thus, 
critical realists reject arguments by social constructionists that omit an 
underlying intransitivity (Westerhuis in Hartwig, 2007:419-420) and, thus, 
omit any concept of alethic truth or the “undoing of oblivion” (Bhaskar & 
Hartwig, 2010:130).   
DCR adds to the epistemic fallacy and ontological actualism, the problem of 
ontological monovalence, whereby everything positively exists.  Bhaskar, 
argues that “[a] world without absence, without boundaries, punctuations, 
spaces, and gaps between, within and around its objects would be a world in 
which nothing could have determinate form or shape, in which nothing could 
move or change, and in which nothing could be differentiated or identified” 
(Bhaskar & Hartwig, 2010:15).  Indeed, if everything exists, one cannot argue 
                                                          
3
 The "death" of positivism (Passmore, 1967:52-57) and rise of post-positivist approaches in 
the social sciences is much documented and, thus, will not be re-addressed here.  For a 
more detailed account of the different strands of positivism see Ayer (1959) or Smith (2003). 
4
 Actualism recognises both the domains of the empirical and the actual denying “the 
existence of underlying structures which determine […] events, and instead locates the 
succession of cause and effect at the level of events” (Collier, 1994:7). 
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that something does not exist, much less claim that its absence is causally 
efficacious (Bhaskar, 1993:234; Norrie, 2010).  As shown, for example, in 
chapter 3 on oil, both sides of the absence/presence and scarcity/abundance 
dualities are important in establishing causality. 
1.2.1.2 Epistemological relativism 
Based upon its ontological assumptions, science is seen as an evolving 
process to discover ever more strata of a transient reality, some of which are 
not directly observable (Bhaskar, 1989:13).  Whereas relativism explores a 
subjective reality void of fundamental truth and positivism reasons that the 
goal of science is to uncover the truth, critical realism argues that science 
must aim to uncover the truth about reality, even if this cannot be accurately 
done in a constantly changing world (Robson, 2005:41-4).  CR agrees with 
positivism that science can help to discover knowledge, that all scientifically 
acquired knowledge is fallible and that scientists should build upon other 
scientists' work, criticising existing statements to challenge their validity 
(Sayer, 2000:2).  Nevertheless, critical realists claim that knowledge is not all 
equally fallible (Danermark et al, 2001; Sayer, 2000:68).  Scientific laws are 
statements about the characteristic patterns, activities or tendencies of given 
mechanisms, which are not expressed at the level of an event (Bhaskar, 
1989).  Bhaskar (1989:185) claims that “the most significant epistemological 
feature of the social sciences is that social phenomena only ever occur in 
open systems”.   Assuming that research is conducted in open systems with 
unobservable phenomena, Humean causal laws, based upon constant 
conjunctions of events, cannot be sustained (Neuman, 2000:67).  
Resultantly, experimental designs that manipulate independent variables to 
see whether dependent variables change are irrelevant in the real world of 
multiple causal mechanisms (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Moreover, CR 
argues that the existence of objects independent from human observation is 
a critical transcendental condition for the possibility of science (Potter, 
2000:204).   
Despite positivists’ claims of objectivity, the empirical cannot exist objectively 
and critical realism incorporates epistemological relativism, arguing that 
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objectivity in social science is a false, unattainable aim.  This relativism is 
moderated by judgmental rationality, whereby one can distinguish claims to 
knowledge and their validity (Bhaskar, 2008:248).  As Archer et al., (1998) 
assert, facts do exist and not everything is relative, ambiguous and open to 
multiple interpretations as in post-modernism.  Nevertheless, observations, 
and indeed the foundations of science, are viewed as theory-laden and 
scientists, as humans, are inherently biased by their cultural experiences, 
prejudices, misgivings etc. (Dean et al., 2006:7; Hughes, 1990:158; Robson, 
2005:20-21).  Indeed, individual scientists are not naturally objective, 
abandoning personal biases and beliefs, and no individual can see the world 
perfectly as it really is (Dean & al., 2006:6).  Scientists have to contend with 
the existent episteme, which offers an apparently self-evident interpretation 
of the world and taken-for-granted beliefs about what constitutes this world 
and how it works, which Foucault refers to as the "positive unconscious" of 
knowledge (Foucault, 1966).  Thus, I, as a social object, even as a subject 
conducting research, do not exist independently from social phenomena and 
approach research with linguistic, cultural and past experiences alongside my 
own social constructs.   
For post-positivists, scientific reasoning and common sense reasoning are 
essentially the same process.   There is no difference in kind between the 
two, only a difference in degree (Harvey, 1990:5).  However, for critical social 
scientists there is a need to integrate social criticism into social science and 
thereby to challenge what may have previously been identified as common 
sense.  Whilst critical realists argue that phenomena have to be interpreted 
by starting from the researcher's own frames of meaning, they also 
acknowledge that these generally exist independent of a researcher's 
interpretations of them (Sayer, 1992:6).  Thus, critical realists argue that it is 
important to follow some procedures to assure that common sense 
observations are verifiable, accurate and consistent, even in areas of social 
activity where much can be taken for granted (Harvey, 1990:5).  Critical 
realists should have a critical relationship vis-à-vis the foundations of science 
and aim to ensure that their facts are beyond dispute (Robson, 2005:32).  
Due to the large number of potential variables involved in social studies, it is 
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almost impossible to make valid generalisations.  In this research, the data 
collected on Venezuela and Colombia is time and country specific research.  
Therefore, restraint should be used when applying this research to infer wider 
generalisations outside of these spatio-temporal boundaries.  Such 
specificity, rather than indicating methodological weakness, should be viewed 
as an epistemological strength, demonstrating the attempt to make social 
research scientific.   
Can social scientists know the truth? Bhaskar argues that “science gives us 
knowledge of truth” (Bhaskar, 1994).  This may appear hubristic until its 
meaning is unpacked.  Bhaskar’s alethic truth is much misunderstood and 
falsely taken to imply a metaphysically-based, epistemological absolutism 
based upon a belief in an ultimate truth that we can know and that will set us 
free.  However, despite his spiritual turn, this is not what Bhaskar means.  
For Bhaskar (1994:251), alethic truth is: “a species of ontological truth 
constituting and following on the truth of, or real reason(s) for, or dialectical 
ground of, things, as distinct from propositions, possible in virtue of the 
ontological stratification of the world and attainable in virtue of the dynamic 
character of science”.  Thus, alethic truth, as the “real reason(s) for”, appears 
to be synonymous with the underlying process, real essence or the 
generative mechanism in the non-sensate world that gives rise to an event in 
the sensate world (Groff, 2004).  In the Bhaskarian view, such a truth is 
possible due to ontological stratification, given that causality can only be 
explained in the real.  The goal of identifying powers at ever-increasing depth 
presupposes exactly the model of scientific progress that he has proposed, 
although what is now considered to be an alethic truth (a causal mechanism), 
counter-intuitively, may turn out not to be 'truth' given the fallibility of social 
science (Groff, 2004:74).  This is especially the case given the dynamic 
nature of much knowledge (Harvey, 1990:3). 
1.2.1.3 CR’s Methodological considerations 
Given CR’s ontological assumptions, critical realists differentiate between 
methodological approaches for natural and social science (Smith, 2003:297; 
Robson, 2005).  Indeed, social scientists relate to social phenomena before 
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researching them in ways that natural scientists cannot and deal with open 
systemic phenomena (Robson, 2005:34).  The goal of critical realist research 
is to study and understand research objects that exist in the real and possess 
real internal mechanisms that can be actualised to produce certain 
outcomes, whilst remembering that their essential nature may vary over time 
and space (Bhaskar, 2008).  As these objects can and do produce a range of 
effects, research is an ongoing process that is irreducible to the identification 
of a coincidence between an independent and a dependant variable 
(Robson, 2005).  Mechanisms may exist, but go unactivated, unperceived or 
be counteracted by other mechanisms (Baert, 2005:93).  The inability to 
detect or measure a mechanism, or the non-realisation of a posited 
mechanism, is insufficient to signify its non-existence and room must be left 
for absence.   
Critical realism encourages the critical examination of the intransitive and 
transitive objects of research (Bhaskar, 2008).5  In critically examining an 
object, it is useful to establish whether social phenomena have essential and 
accidental properties and how to differentiate between these aspects.  For 
example, regarding groups as essentially having the same properties is risky 
(Sayer, 2000:86).  As the world is dynamic and social phenomena change, 
these can be subject to reinterpretation.  However, where phenomena do 
have essential properties, and are prone to act in certain ways as a function 
of their basic structure, this can help to explain causation. 
Understanding social phenomena and gaining access to the meanings that 
guide behaviour requires critical examination, as these are infused by social 
meanings such as intentions, motives, beliefs, rules and values (Hammersely 
& Atkinson, 1995:8).  Social phenomena such as actions, texts and 
institutions are concept-dependent and subject to causal explanation, even if 
they are not concept-determined (Danermark et al., 2002:38).  
Methodologically, from this conceptual framework, objects should be 
                                                          
5
 Science needs intransitive objects that exist and act independently of our descriptions 
including real structures, processes and mechanisms, which are mostly independent of us to 
avoid the epistemic fallacy (Archer et al, 1998:292).  Transitive objects include models, 
theories and methods used to acquire new knowledge (Bhaskar,2008:21; Hartwig, 2007:263-
265).   
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criticised in their existent and potential forms, their preconditions, reliance 
upon another object and what enables the object to do specific things (Sayer, 
2000:16).   This is complicated as objects can be physical or structural and 
can generate activity and events (Sayer, 2000:11), so that objects are “often 
themselves the subjects of power struggles over who may control the rules, 
relations and resources that constitute them in the first place” (May, 
1997:35).   
Individual decisions lack the predictability of actions in the natural sciences.  
Agency is both facilitated and constrained by social structures, some of which 
are a necessary condition for human agency (Bhaskar, 1989), determining 
the conditions for action and yet also requiring reproduction (Cruickshank, 
2002:1; Robson, 2005).  Archer (2007) offers an interesting contribution on 
the structure-agency dilemma, elevating the importance of an often neglected 
agential reflexivity in deliberately responding to certain structures, which links 
macro and micro scale social theorising.  This is directly applicable to the 
selected case studies in explaining deviance from prevalent universally 
received ideological stances and the development of counter-ideology.  It 
also highlights the importance of not taking for granted a structure's influence 
over an agent.  Whilst structures are formed of their constituents, they may 
exist without generating regular patterns of events (Sayer, 2000:11).  
Moreover, structures may precede and be unobservable to an agent and yet 
the agent, when given knowledge of them, may continue to (re)produce them 
through his/her activity or decide to dismantle them (Fay, 1996; Cruickshank, 
2004:574; Sayer, 1992:122-123).   
Bhaskar (1998:37) notes that an “ontological hiatus” exists between 
structures and agents as neither is reducible to the other and both are real 
independently. Social structures are emergent properties as they birth 
through individual agency and thereafter become causal powers themselves 
(Cruickshank, 2004:574).  Underlying strata can also combine to create new 
objects with their own structures and powers known as emergent powers 
(Danermark et al., 2001:60).  Sayer (1992:89) usefully distinguishes between 
external or contingent relations and internal or necessary relations.  In the 
latter, individuals or groups are so intrinsically linked together that “the 
22 
 
existence of one necessarily presupposes the other”.  Such relations (which 
in the context of this thesis include those between MNOCs and stakeholders) 
are for Bhaskar (1998:41) the main focus of social explanation, and help to 
explain power balances between agents.  Importantly, in this context, some 
agents are more powerful than others.  As Harré (2009:134-135) notes, “The 
next state of the world does not just happen- it is brought about by the activity 
of powerful particulars”; hence the prime rule in science: “Cherchez la 
puissance!” 
Whilst critical realists do not propose a handbook of methods, nor favour 
intensive or extensive research design, many critical realists have argued for 
methodological pluralism in order to deal with the complexity in the world 
(Sayer, 2000:21; Olsen, 2009:14; Carter & New, 2004).  In order to take a 
truly critical approach, however, methods must be critically selected in order 
to appropriately fit their object and conditions of study.  In uncontrolled 
research conditions, the methods selected should enable social scientists to 
critically cross-examine data.  In choosing methods, researchers should try 
not to disturb the social world being examined in order that data are not 
affected by their presence (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995:6).  It is also 
important that a researcher uses methods that best help to identify underlying 
social issues or conditions, which acknowledge both conscious and 
subconscious motivations of the researched (Bhaskar, 1989).  Given the 
complexity of agency and the plurality of unequally weighted causal powers, 
reliance upon quantitative or qualitative data alone does not appear to 
suffice.  Quantitative research alone can restrict experience (Bhaskar, 
1986:30-31).  Over-reliance on quantitative methods may hinder the 
capturing of a real meaning of social behaviour, failing to grasp the social 
nature of acting individuals with wishes, perceptions and interests.  Agency 
cannot be explained by quantitative methods alone.   
In CR, immanent critique and knowledge are intertwined in a way that has 
emancipatory potential (Harvey, 1990:3; Sayer, 2000:18; Bhaskar, 1993:335; 
Hartwig, 2007:24-27).  Critical realists argue that it is important not just to 
observe the world or acquire knowledge for the sake of knowledge, but they 
re-inject Kantian moral duty into research (Hostettler & Norrie, 2003).  In this 
23 
 
sense, CR is not just a philosophy, but aims to promote freedom by enabling 
individuals that inhabit social structures to consciously reflect upon them and 
choose whether to maintain or transform the actions that produce them, 
using knowledge from social scientific research (Bhaskar, 1986:170).  
Indeed, Bhaskar proposes that in order for knowledge to emancipate, the 
researcher should depend on research to explain what is, why it became so 
and how it ought to be.  Hume stated that ought cannot always be logically 
derived from is and, indeed, it is difficult to always understand what is socially 
beneficial (Hammersley, 2002:42).  Whilst emancipation is not the central 
thread that ties this thesis together, nevertheless, DCR’s emancipatory pulse 
with its notion of human flourishing has enriched my reflexive process, 
providing me with a conceptual measuring stick against which to view social 
agency and praxis, and encouraging me to reflect upon how things could be.   
1.2.2 Research methodology: collecting real data 
Regarding research methodology, this research did not begin with a 
hypothesis.  Given the number of independent variables involved, a 
hypothesis seemed reductive and my research aims evolved during the 
research through a process of self-reflexivity with a critical realist logic of 
reality and research objects.  Thus, in answering the research question, I 
have engaged with a real and dynamic world, where objects are viewed as 
both causal and produced by causal mechanisms.  As such, I consider that 
social objects are not in themselves a starting point for research, but that it is 
necessary to focus upon relationships (Bhaskar, 1989;1993). 
I began this research with certain empirical insights into MNOC agency and 
field relations based upon actual events and the personal experience of 
having spoken to people in the oil industry and Colombian and Venezuelan 
diplomats.  In seeking to establish the real underlying causal mechanisms 
that underpin these relations, I deployed both intensive and extensive 
methods simultaneously.   
The main data I have used in this thesis comes from interviews, academic 
literature and MNOCs’ CSR reports.  I have approached these through an 
iterative process of data reduction, display and conclusion drawing (Miles & 
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Huberman, 1994:10-12) and critical analysis of the CSR discourse 
(Fairclough, 2010a; 2010b) in order to enable abstraction that focused upon 
understanding and explaining the social processes surrounding CSR.  As 
Miles and Huberman (1994) and Fairclough (2010a; 2010b) advocate critical 
realist approaches, their methodologies leant themselves to use in this work. 
I used multiple measures and observations to help to reduce error and 
improve the quality of theoretical construction.  My impression, before 
conducting the field research, was that qualitative methods may be best to 
abstract the causal mechanisms, which quantitative methods overlook.  On 
the other hand, quantitative analysis offered a practical means of comparing 
respondents’ answers.  Indeed, by researching the different facets of a 
concrete phenomenon through a combination of methods, this enabled later 
comparison and triangulation that could better establish the practical 
adequacy of the causal mechanisms identified.   
I also faced the challenge that MNOCs' CSR is a sensitive, value-laden issue 
that engenders polarised reactions based on individual political persuasion 
and/or worldview in both countries studied.  Thus, I had to consider the 
ideological constructs that this topic could evoke when identifying appropriate 
methods to gain knowledge of the objects under investigation and to identify 
elements of a social reality of agency, strata, structures and causal 
mechanisms in accordance with a CR approach.  The methods used to 
respond to the research question and to analyse the collected data are 
discussed below. 
This research does not offer in-depth discussion of specific MNOCs’ CSR 
projects in Colombia or Venezuela.  The reasons behind this decision are as 
follows:  i) such research had already been conducted (and was being 
conducted) by other scholars in both countries, providing me with critical 
academic material on specific oil companies’ CSR projects.  These works 
have been cited throughout the thesis and the outcomes of the more recent 
research are used to illustrate projects in chapter 7 in particular; and ii) the 
existence of available previous micro-level research enabled me to take a 
different approach and to focus my research differently to look at a more 
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macro level, looking at MNOCs as a collective group in both countries, whilst 
not reducing them to each other.  Indeed, my reasons for choosing Colombia 
and Venezuela as case studies were based upon my interest in the 
overarching CSR policies and the ways in which competing ideologies may 
impact CSR.  I was also interested in the fact that MNOCs may change their 
CSR discourse and stakeholder relations based on the country in which they 
operate.  I should note that I was able to see examples of CSR in Venezuela 
and to meet people who had benefited from CSR in both countries.        
1.2.2.1 Constructing theory and abstraction  
Critical realist abstraction, involves theoretical construction given its need for 
verstehen and its focus upon causality and consequent emphasis upon 
erklären (Sayer, 2000:17; Fairclough et al., 2010: 205).  As Fairclough (2010: 
356) argues, “Social research proceeds through abstraction from the 
concrete events of social life aimed at understanding the pre-structured 
nature of social life, and returns to the analysis of concrete events, actions 
and processes in light of this knowledge”.  Thus, I engaged in a process of 
devising and developing theory throughout this research, based upon a 
constant reflection and critique in order to better understand MNOCs’ CSR 
and be able to explain this social practice.  As Sayer (1992:88) argues, 
"neither objects nor their relations are given to us transparently, their 
identification is an achievement and must be worked for".  I did not adopt a 
given theory about MNOCs’ CSR practices at the outset of this research 
project, as to do so could be deemed uncritical and/or produce an attempt to 
fit the real world into a theory rather than the development of a theory that fits 
the real world.  Instead, theory has constantly evolved throughout this 
research process.  
Abstraction is one of the most used methods in critical realist research and 
theory development (Sayer, 1981), which unlike positivist methods that order 
appearances and reify them, goes further beneath the surface of a 
phenomena identifying structural relationships (Harvey, 1990:21).  In this 
thesis, abstraction and conceptualisation were used to help to identify real 
powers and mechanisms and to isolate them from other phenomena, 
26 
 
especially as facts/values were at times polarised and did not accumulate 
within a steady conceptual framework.  Abstractions have been conducted 
throughout the research process, from the initial stages of literature reviews 
to the field research and data analysis.  Abstraction is a retroductive process 
of thinking through the components that compose social phenomena and 
analysing how the diverse facets of an object might associate and interact 
with each other, thereby making sense of the object (Sayer, 1992:87).  It 
"moves from a description of some phenomenon to a description of 
something which produces it or is a condition for it" (Bhaskar, 1986:11).  
Thus, abstraction formed a key part of the research process as I attempted to 
ascertain the causality at the heart of the field, in which structures and agents 
operate, that make MNOCs agency possible in its current form.  It involved 
moving beyond the stereotypical/surface descriptions of MNOCs to trying to 
understand them and from descriptions of their CSR programmes to 
identifying what these are and what appears to be their scope and limits.  In 
this vein, I was careful to differentiate between the MNOCs and their CSR.  
Having identified the latter, further abstraction and reconceptualisation were 
necessary to better understand the possible formal and informal aims of 
MNOCs' social action programmes in Colombia and in Venezuela and the 
influence of supporting and/or competing aims within the field.   
As indicated above, MNOCs are generally referred to as a group in this 
thesis.  However, they vary in terms of factors such as origin, company 
culture, years of operation and views of CSR.  Thus, even though I was 
interested in a whole group with similar characteristics, abstraction was 
necessary to identify the constituent parts of the concept of MNOC, 
beginning with the concrete phenomena and stripping it back.  Understanding 
the nature of MNOCs therefore involved understanding key differences 
between them, in particular, regarding their CSR practices, the factors that 
impact their choices and the scope and limits of their action.  
The research question has a relational logic and so my reflections have 
focused upon the relational and dialectical logic of MNOCs’ CSR agency 
within the social field.  In analysing the practice of CSR, dialectic has been a 
useful tool.  Notably, intentional action is dialectical as it seeks to eliminate a 
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want or relieve a need whatever its rationale (Bhaskar & Hartwig, 2010:127).  
Moreover, in Bhaskar’s dialectical Transformational Model of Social Activity 
(TMSA), agency depends upon transitive underlying relations rather than 
transitive positive objects.  In immanently critiquing the literature and 
constructing my own models (shown in chapter 7), I have sought to examine 
the preconditions of existent problems, shifting analysis away from overly 
simplistic patterns of cause and effect towards the identification and analysis 
of such underlying relations.   
In this context, I analysed the structures present in both countries to 
determine the substantial relations between the main object under study and 
other objects and to identify where they have real or formal relations.  
Isolating necessary relationships is key to rational abstraction and to avoiding 
what Sayer (1992:88) refers to as “chaotic conception”, which fails to 
recognise an external or an internal relationship between noumena or 
mistakenly identifies essential or incidental properties of an object.   
Abstractions have been systematically revised and refined throughout the 
research process, in order to produce realistic concepts or categories that left 
the realm of the chaotic behind and grasped the concreteness of objects 
(Hartwig, 2007:71).  The process ended when the causal mechanisms 
seemed to be “practically adequate” to explaining the concrete phenomenon. 
“To be practically adequate, knowledge must generate expectations about 
the world and about the results of our actions which are actually realised [and 
it must be] intersubjectively intelligible and acceptable in the case of 
linguistically expressed knowledge“(Sayer, 2000:69).  In order to form the 
models outlined in chapter 7, therefore, I inspected the explanatory power of 
the theory produced vis-à-vis the social phenomena discussed in order to 





1.2.2.2 Approaching texts  
Whilst it has been argued that research data should be collected and 
analysed before researchers examine existing field literature, so that a 
researcher remains objective and uninfluenced by reading materials (Witt, 
2001), this approach is unrealistic in practice (Flick, 2006:59).  Indeed, some 
prior knowledge of Colombia and Venezuela was important in this research 
given the levels of violence present in both countries.  Moreover, it would 
have been unproductive to hold interviews with people working in and around 
CSR without knowledge of the prevailing discourses or comprehension of 
their work and it would have seriously stunted the flow of discussion and 
acquisition of information.  Pre-interview, I used the literature and multi-modal 
texts on the topics being researched to prepare my data collection methods 
as thoroughly as possible.  These served as a useful source of concepts, 
ideas and historical background amongst others and by critically studying 
official and non-official positions and opinions, conflicting interests or 
agendas embedded within the texts began to emerge.   
Due to the sheer scale and interdisciplinary nature of the topic, reading the 
literature on oil and conflict, CSR, Venezuela and Colombia, in particular, 
proved useful in pinning down a research question as well as the questions 
to be asked in the field during the interviews.  As I began an initial analysis of 
the texts to conceptualise and produce theory, I was able to identify 
connections and patterns that I, at first, noted down and then critiqued as my 
understanding grew, i.e. on the greed/grievance duality (see chapter 3).   
In approaching the topic of CSR, I borrow from Fairclough’s (1989; 2010a; 
2010b) work to show and analyse the dialectical relations of the discursive 
and social practice of CSR.  Thus, chapter 2 discusses the CSR literature, 
the prevailing neoliberal political and business order of discourse6 and its 
relationship to counter-discourses, before proceeding to analyse MNOC 
agency as outlined by 18 MNOC CSR reports.  In so doing, I use 
                                                          
6
 Fairclough (2010a:164) describes orders of discourse as “particular configurations of 
different genres, different discourses and different styles”.  
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Fairclough’s (2010b:7) method of textual analysis, based upon the dual 
character of texts as: i) interdiscursive (analysing genre, discourse and styles 
drawn upon in a text and their articulation, although these categories also 
relate to the order of discourse in which the texts are situated); and ii) 
linguistic.  In this vein, I look at the extent to which the reports indicate that 
discourse has been inculcated by MNOCs as new ways of being or enacted 
as new ways of (inter)acting with other social actors (Fairclough,2010a:165).  
However, the literature alone would not have sufficed to answer the question 
at hand.  The use of extensive methods, including comparative case study 
research and interviews in the field, helped to deepen my understanding of 
the literature, its motivations and its use in portraying reality.  Whilst in the 
field, I encountered various slogans, murals and advertising/propaganda, 
especially in Caracas, as to the exploitation of Empire and the current use of 
the oil monies; this visual text also informed my research.   
1.2.2.3 Approaching comparative research 
I used case study as a method and looked at MNOCs’ agency in both the 
Colombian and Venezuelan contexts.  Case study is not without its particular 
challenges.  Porter (1970:144) noted that it “is surprising, for all that has been 
said about the value of comparison that a rigorous comparative methodology 
has not emerged.  The reason for this lack may be the great difficulties that a 
rigorous comparative method would impose”.  Indeed, this still appears to be 
the situation forty-three years later, yet the value of some comparative 
analysis of causal mechanisms across sets of cases is no less in doubt 
today.  As such, I have applied the term comparison loosely in this research 
as it is not possible for two sets of social circumstances to ever be exactly the 
same, meaning that a strictly explanatory comparison of two different models 
may not have the scientific predictive power to be able to generate a 
normative conclusion that a better model from one society should be 
imposed upon the other society. 
However, case study provides a useful framework for loose comparison and 
facilitates a non-linear, multi-method approach (Robson, 2005; Huberman & 
Miles, 2002).  As stated above, due to the specific and yet complex aspects 
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of the study, no single method could provide the information needed to 
explain the phenomena addressed.  Practically, case study helped me to 
reduce the scope of research from too general into a workable size for data 
collection, enabling in-depth analysis.  In this thesis, theoretical knowledge is 
based on fact-based research and not merely on a priori knowledge.  Case 
study reduced the problem of how many independent variables to include, 
allowing for the inductive identification of variables as well as their deductive 
specification within the given contexts.   
1.2.2.4. Conducting interviews 
As Gillham (2000:59) argues, interviews are an indispensable part of case 
study research.  Indeed, they offer insight from other agents' on the research 
topic and are necessary to abstract the causal mechanisms of which Sayer 
(2000:22) claims statistical methods alone can only offer formal rather than 
substantial association.  In this research, interviews have been conducted, 
using both open and closed questioning techniques, starting with pre-set 
questions that provided structure to the interview and followed by open 
questions prompted by the responses of the individuals to earlier questions.  I 
was also fortunate enough to be able to informally address a group of 
approximately forty NGO representatives in Caracas to learn from their 
experiences and I met representatives of a communal council, who explained 
how they were benefitting from oil monies.  Interviews were conducted 
predominantly in Spanish, but also in English, when the interviewee felt more 
comfortable using this language.  I have translated any interview material 
cited in chapter 7 into English.   





TABLE 1 INTERVIEWEES 
Venezuela Colombia 
Closed Questions/Open Questions Closed Questions/Open Questions 








National Oil Company 4/4 1/1 
Government Experts 2/3 2/2 
United Nations 0/0 1/1 
European Union 1/1 1/1 
Western Embassy Oil 
Experts 
4/4 0/0 
Trade Union 1/1 3/3 
Oil Consultant ½ 1/0 
Oil Journalist 0/1 0/0 
University 0/1 1/1 
Church 2/2 0/1 
NGO   
Environment 2/2 1/1 
Human Rights 2/2 5/5 
Indigenous Rights 0/0 1/1 
Monitoring Oil Industry 
Activites 
0/0 1/1 
Social Development 10/9 5/5 
Transparency 1/1 1/1 
Total Interviewed 43/47 37/42 
 
For the closed, opinion-based questions, respondents were asked to indicate 
a numerical response, based on a Likert scale of 1-7, where 1 is completely 
disagree, 2 is strongly disagree, 3 is disagree, 4 is neither agree nor 
disagree, 5 is agree, 6 is strongly agree and 7 is completely agree.  The 
quantifiability of these questions/responses enabled their easy comparison 
post-interview.  Robson (2005:293) notes that “people often enjoy completing 
a scale of this kind”; this is important as respondents who want to participate 
are more likely to consider their responses.  The decision to number the 
scale from 1-7, instead of for example 1-5, was taken to enable more 
nuanced responses and 4 sat as a middle point for answers with which 
respondents did not want to either agree or disagree.  The pre-set questions 
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dealt with attitudes about the oil industry and its social action, which social 
issues MNOCs' focus upon and why, who most impacts the decision-making 
process surrounding MNOCs’ CSR and which agents are most involved in 
the execution of social action programmes.  The open questions that 
followed: i) allowed in-depth answers where appropriate; ii) enabled me to 
pose/omit sensitive questions freely, in a way which a questionnaire would 
not; iii) enabled me to pose new questions that arose from previous 
questions asked; and iv) gave interviewees the opportunity to add anything 
they thought I may have overlooked.  The open questions aimed to collect 
information that would help me to understand the potential underlying 
mechanisms that affect MNOCs' relations with other actors including the 
state, civil society and its components, other companies, MNOCs' overseas 
headquarters and international institutions regarding CSR.  These questions 
were posed based on the interviewees’ responses to the closed questions 
and the role and work experience of the interviewee. 
I was aware that I needed to gain information about an object that is 
independent of that which exists in the mind of those who, as subjects, 
experience it.  Thus, I wanted to interview a wide-range of actors.  In the end, 
I conducted 89 interviews.  In selecting interviewees, I used purposive 
sampling.  I began by listing each category of person that I wanted to meet, 
based on their relevance to the study.  From this list, I tried to locate as many 
people directly corresponding to these criteria as possible, whilst trying to 
maintain a balance and ensure that a good number of each category were 
represented.  To ensure balance amongst the different categories of 
interviewees, as interview requests were accepted, I kept a tally of the 
sectors to which interviewees belonged and subsequently focused my efforts 
towards obtaining interviews with relevant actors from other sectors.   
Before conducting field research, I established contact with people in 
Brussels who work in NGOs, trade unions, MNOCs and the Colombian and 
Venezuelan embassies in order to refine my interview questions and to 
acquire the contact details of potential interviewees.  This helped me to 
establish sets of accepted terms, meanings and norms for interaction.  It also 
meant that on arrival in Colombia and Venezuela, I had already arranged 
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several interviews in both countries.  In each country, I contacted MNOCs’ 
CSR representatives, NOC representatives, trade unionists, international and 
national NGO workers, church leaders involved in human rights work, 
academics, journalists, embassies from MNOCs home governments, 
politicians from opposition parties, government officials and oil 
consultants/specialists.  Regarding the CSR representatives, I interviewed 
representatives from both newer and traditional MNOCs.  The NOC 
employees that I interviewed in each country were working on, or had worked 
on, CSR.  I also contacted the main oil company unions and the trade unions 
dealing with oil workers to gain a wider picture of the corporate responsibility.  
NGOs too were able to provide me with this information.  I selected NGOs 
based upon: i) their topic of focus; ii) their having worked with oil companies 
to determine or execute CSR; iii) their monitoring of oil companies; iv) their 
support/opposition to oil companies’ CSR; and v) their size.  The NGOs 
selected were thus chosen to cover these categories in a balanced way.  The 
categories chosen also broadened once I was in the field.  For example, in 
Venezuela, given the importance of oil to its international relations, several 
Western embassies had staff working on oil policies.  Whilst I was aware of 
their potential political biases, and of the potential influence a home 
government can have on MNOCs’ actions, these interviewees offered very 
interesting insights into oil operations.     
As a rule, I interviewed all relevant people who accepted to meet me, and 
this allowed me, for example, to interview representatives of the vast majority 
of MNOCs and oil companies operating in the country at the time of my 
research.  I also established contact with the Instituto de Estudios Superiores 
de Administracion (IESA) in Caracas, which allowed me access to their 
facilities during my stay in Venezuela.  Moreover, I had help from a couple of 
friends in both countries who were well placed to facilitate initial interviews.  
Venezuela, in particular, is a country where personal connections are 
important.  In this vein, I was fortunate to have contact with a well-connected 
businessman, who facilitated introductions with the first CSR and NGO 
representatives that I met.  This was useful in terms of establishing my 
legitimacy and credibility.  The first CSR representatives that I met facilitated 
34 
 
meetings with at least one other CSR representative and an NGO partner.  
Subsequent interviewees were contacted through cold calling or by 
subsequent recommendations from other interviewees of contacts working in 
the same or in other sectors.  In each interview, I asked the interviewees 
whether they could identify anyone else with whom I should speak.  For 
example, it was on the recommendations of one of the NGO interviewees 
that I contacted a politician with experience of working on MNOCs’ CSR.  In 
Colombia, I was able to tap into an existing network of personal NGO 
contacts, which helped to facilitate meetings with people of interest.  
However, most of the interviews were obtained by cold calling, preceded by 
an e-mail explaining the objectives of my research. 
Given the sensitive nature of the topic, interviewees did not wish to be 
recorded.  Thus, I took notes during the interview process and typed her 
notes onto a computer immediately after each interview had taken place.  In 
terms of confidentiality, I promised each interviewee that their name would 
not be linked to anything they said during interview without my expressly 
receiving their permission first.  Some interviewees were happy for me to 
mention the name of their organisation, others were not.  I also reminded 
each interviewee that they did not have to participate and that they could stop 
the interview at any time.   Access to the data collected is strictly controlled 
and the names of those interviewed are stored separately from the data itself.  
At interview, I tried not to share my personal opinions with those being 
interviewed.  Equally, in constructing the interview questions, I avoided 
potentially leading questions.  As Harvey (1990:12) argues, researcher-
respondent relations are generally hierarchically structured with the 
researcher directing the information flow and exchange.  However, 
interviewees have no obligation to present the objective truth (Berry, 
2002:680).  Not only may they lie, or suffer from memory loss/bias, but their 
reasoning may be framed by hidden (i.e. political/ideological) agendas.  For 
example, several interviewees illustrated their arguments by recounting 
events at which they were not present.  This raised issues of reliability and 
validity.  Indeed, as I interviewed, for example, MNOCs' CSR 
representatives, I had the impression that some of them had used the time 
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between having accepted the interview and the interview itself to prepare a 
list of company success stories.  For example, one CSR representative had 
arranged to show me a promotional video to better understand the 
company's social action before I was able to interview them.  Most others 
were armed with promotional materials as some CSR representatives wore 
the double-hat of CSR and communication.  Whilst these representatives 
were very amiable, knowledgeable and offered detailed answers, which 
made them appear more credible, it was apparent that they approached the 
interviews with something they wanted to say.  From this perspective, the use 
of both closed and open questions was useful.  I reminded interviewees that 
the numerical values they provided would be aggregated and were to reflect 
all MNOCs and that I had no intention of conducting a witch-hunt to vilify any 
particular company.  This visibly relieved a few of the interviewees, even if I 
still had to remain critical of their subsequent statements.  I also encouraged 
interviewees to differentiate between their own organisation and those 
around them and to critique their own case, by asking why people might hold 
specific views, different to their own, thereby distancing interviewees from 
their own somewhat pre-determined perspective without appearing to be 
sceptical of what they were saying as suggested by Berry (2002:680).  In 
essence, however, the most helpful technique in this regard, was in selecting 
a wide-range of interviewees with (radically) different viewpoints to further my 
own critical analysis of the information.  Following each interview, I tried to 
determine where I needed further clarification on certain points or where I 
was unsure of the validity of what had been said and made prompt notes to 
remind myself to ask other interviewees questions on the same or related 
points. 
1.2.2.5. Analysing data  
As a critical approach is taken vis-à-vis the research, analysis is a process 
that continues throughout the PhD process.  The overarching approach to 
data analysis in this thesis uses three analytical processes: (i) data reduction; 
(ii) data display, and; (iii) conclusion drawing and verification (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994:10-12).   
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I reduced data from the beginning of this process by choosing a research 
topic, refining the topic, deciding who to interview, which questions to ask at 
interview, how to code the data, what to display, what to write and how to 
organise all of the material.   I also used different formats to display the data 
such as lists, graphs and charts to provide different overviews of the data and 
reveal patterns between interviewee responses.  Conclusion drawing 
occurred in a basic form rather early on in the research process as I started 
to assemble useful literature and to sift through it, deciding what to discard 
and what to read.  Later on in the process, I drew and discarded conclusions 
to explain the data as I examined patterns in the literature, the interview data 
and from personal observations, in order to identify potential structures and 
mechanisms that were either verified or rejected as the research progressed.  
These processes of data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing as 
outlined above are used for both qualitative and quantitative data collected 
throughout the research process and alongside data collection form a 
continuous iterative process (Robson, 2005:476).  
Throughout the process, I took notes as I read relevant articles and books 
that helped to identify that which I still needed to understand.  In analysing 
such qualitative data, I aimed to incorporate discourse into theorising without 
reducing real social life to discourse (Fairclough, 2010b).  During the data 
collection phase in the field, I took notes of what data was already collected 
and noted where further clarification was still needed to help to avoid “death 
by data asphyxiation” (Pettigrew in Huberman & Miles, 2002:17) and to better 
deal with the quantity of data.  Having collected sufficient data, I started to 
devise coding categories for the qualitative data in interview transcripts in 
order to manage the information collected.  I began by analysing the 
interview transcripts manually, applying first stage descriptive coding to the 
transcripts based upon the themes and ideas that emerged.  These were 
then entered into the computer software NVivo 8, which has been used to 
help facilitate further coding and analysis of quantitative data into categories 
that tackle the research question.  In terms of the quantitative data, I initially 
stored it in a large table, from which numerical responses were compared.  In 
helping to identify patterns in the quantitative data, the statistical software 
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package SPSS 17 was used.  This enabled the comparison and display of 
data in a manageable way.  These tools proved useful in keeping track of the 
research and in terms of understanding the data for theory construction. 
As I conducted all of the interviews personally, the data analysis process 
started in the field in the interviews.  Inevitably, post-interview, interviewees 
are unable to speak for themselves in the final thesis, but can, as objects of 
the research, only speak through my interpretation of them even if their 
words are not reducible to what I convey.7  Nevertheless, I have tried to 
contextualise any quotations used.  In selecting interview quotes, equally, I 
assessed them in context, critically examining them against data collected 
from other social actors with similar and different agendas and looked for 
common patterns between the different pieces of interview data.  Thus, I 
selected quotations based upon their representativeness and consistency 
with regards to statements from other interviewees and/or scholars.   
As Price (2007:107) notes, the idea of the transitivity of truth is useful in 
analysing social data such as interview transcripts, as whilst there may be 
different ways to interpret a text (transitivity), some interpretations are better 
than others (intransitivity).  In terms of assessing the quality of data collected, 
i.e. the validity and reliability, I checked the data's representativeness by 
triangulating the quantitative and qualitative data (Robson, 2005).  What is 
necessary in the process of triangulation is to compare and contrast different 
sources of findings that address the same phenomenon.  The closed 
questions in the data set collected at interview lend themselves well to this 
process as different actors answered the same set of questions with 
statistical responses that can be compared and contrasted.  To this end, I 
looked at the answers of different categories of respondents independently 
and together in identifying patterns.  Thus, the view of reality is more reliable 
and the conclusions showing what is happening in reality are more accurate. 
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The oil curse as the outcome of presence and absence: rentier states, 
civil violence and societal challenges for MNOCs 
This chapter presents and critiques the academic literature relating to the 
oil curse in oil-abundant, developing countries such as Venezuela and 
Colombia.  I take from this literature that the paradox of plenty is essentially 
a paradox of the presence of significant oil revenues and the absence of 
oil-led development that benefits the citizens of oil-rich countries.  These 
same dynamics are present in the literature that focuses upon the antonym 
of plenty, i.e. oil scarcity.  This literature centres upon the consequences of 
certain oil importers’ scramble for available oil, whereby consumer 
countries prioritise the benefits of oil-led development in their own countries 
over the effects of the oil curse in oil-exporting countries.  To this end, the 
underlying energy security discourse, framed by neoliberalism, illustrates 
both a disregard for oil producers’ interests and the current unsustainability 
of the global powers' material transactions with nature.  I argue that it is a 
fallacy to examine abundance without acknowledging scarcity, as these 
phenomena are coexistent and causally related, even if they are irreducible 
to each other.  Indeed, the relationships of dependency and 
interdependency cannot be understood by focusing upon the oil abundance 
literature, given its lack of attention to capitalist superstructures and 
interests, which are somewhat fuelled by oil.  Unfortunately, such absences 
directly influence the chain of causality within the oil curse literature and 
lead certain authors to propose inappropriate solutions to address the 
problems.  Thus, this chapter uses the logic of Dialectical Critical Realism 
(DCR) to provide a framework that moves from the initial stages of 
scarcity/abundance or absence/presence and difference to discuss 
structural emergence, constraint, power relations and agential action in 
analysing the oil curse.  It also draws from the philosophy of meta-Reality 
that the world should be understood in terms of the primacy of the non-dual 
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(peace) over the dual (conflict) state in understanding conflict within oil 
abundant countries.8  
Whilst this thesis focuses upon MNOCs’ agency, this chapter does not 
(although I note that their agency is generally under-examined within the 
greed/grievance literature), but rather it seeks to contextualise MNOCs’ 
actions within oil-rich countries and the wider global framework.  It 
highlights the ethical tension that exists between MNOCs' need to be 
physically present where oil reserves are located and the challenges of 
operating amidst varying levels of structural and physical violence in order 
to gain access to oil reserves.  Whilst MNOCs only control 10% of the 
world’s conventional oil resources and 25% of its total production, they still 
attract significant international attention as, amongst others, they have 
increasingly had to focus on projects that NOCs cannot undertake without 
them.  These are often high-risk exploration and production (E&P) ventures 
that require significant capital outlays, advanced technological capacities, 
and project management capabilities that NOCs do not always possess.  
These projects are often located in environmentally challenging, sparsely 
populated areas, and/or where indigenous, tribal and minority groups 
reside.  This can lead to a disconnection between governemental plans and 
the aspirations of local communities, whose potential claims on the land are 
often side-lined by national governments (Wasserstrom & Reider, 2013:77). 
This trend is also relevant more generally to the mining and other extractive 
industries in Latin America.  
MNOCs have, thus, caused, sustained and perpetuated negative structures 
and adverse causal mechanisms (discussed below), which has led certain 
authors to denounce MNOCs' CSR as hypocritical.  Moreover, in this 
context, CSR is in part viewed as a way for companies to compensate 
communities for certain oil curse effects.  These discussions, which have 
explanatory power in both Colombia and Venezuela, are more thoroughly 
dealt with in the subsequent chapters. 
                                                          
8
 Peace can exist without war, but war cannot exist without elements of peace.   Thus, the 
non-dual precedes the dual state (See: Bhaskar, 2002).   
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The chapter is divided into two main sections: 
The first section discusses scholars’ claims that oil states, when compared 
to similar non-oil countries, are more susceptible to negative trends such as 
slow economic growth, inflation, low saving levels, a poor investment 
climate, increased unemployment, weak property rights, unstable export 
earnings, poor human development levels, poverty, corruption, institutional 
inertia, poor public bureaucracy and increased conflict dynamics (Torvik, 
2009:243; Rosser, 2006; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003; Kolstad & 
Wiig, 2009:5321; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Fearon, 2005:491; Pendergast et 
al., 2008; Le Billon, 2003:413; Petermann et al., 2007; Karl, 1997).   Thus, 
this section examines the reasons why these phenomena may be caused 
by oil access and revenues, showing that the entrenched patterns and 
constellationalities9 of spacio-temporal dependencies, power structures and 
agencies are not restricted to national boundaries.     
The second section discusses solutions that have been suggested or 
attempted in praxis to decouple oil from the resource curse.  Gaspar (2011) 
notes that international law accepts that a country’s resources should be 
exploited to benefit its people.  However, as is shown below, abstract 
universalities10 often prevail within and outside of these countries impeding 
transformative praxis. 
2.1 The paradox of plenty: a dialectical approach 
This section introduces the emergence of the resource curse problematic 
and shows, using Bhaskarian dialectic, that the paradox of plenty is 
primarily a paradox of absence and presence.  Karl (2007:3) posits that 
"countries that depend on oil for their livelihood eventually become among 
the most economically troubled, the most authoritarian, and the most 
conflict-ridden in the world".  These three elements of: i) negative economic 
growth; ii) poor governance linked to political institution or regime type; and 
iii) conflict are the most frequently cited signifiers of the resource curse 
(Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009:651-2; Bannon & Collier, 2003; Berdel & 
                                                          
9
 Constellationality is a critical realist term used to describe the coincidence of real 
distinctions and connections in the world (Hartwig, 2007:79). 
10
 The justification of an action to suit one’s own goals. 
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Malone, 2000; Ross, 2012).  Essentially, these factors are all causally 
related and are addressed in turn in this section.   
2.1.1 Bhaskarian dialectic 
Before applying this model as a framework for this chapter, this sub-section 
introduces the four stages of Bhaskarian dialectic.  This section uses the 
first two stages to identify a second paradoxical element of the paradox of 
plenty: that is the idea that, in oil rich countries, the resource curse stems 
not only from abundance of oil or oil revenue, but also from absences and 
differences that underline and permeate the social fabric of oil rich 
countries.  Absences and differences are defined as scarcities and 
inequalities regarding tangible benefits or absences created by 
environmental and other types of harm.  It then uses the Transformative 
Model of Social Agency, situated at step three of the dialectic, to explain 
how the first two steps are key to bringing resource-driven social 
transformation away from inequality towards the “human flourishing” of all 
(Bhaskar, 1993:284).  The fourth level is emancipatory praxis.  As Bhaskar 
notes, "it is the task of the emancipatory project to transform or eradicate 
the oppressive social structures we inherit from the past” (Bhaskar in 
Hartwig, 2010:83).   
Dialectical critical realism (DCR), which rejects parmenidean monism, is 
based upon the four stages of non-identity (1st Moment) and negativity 
(2nd Edge), or absence and difference from which emerge totality (3rd 
Level) and praxis (4th Dimension).  Whereas Hegel begins with identity, 
submitting it to negative critique before showing how negativity can be 
resolved in totality, Bhaskar starts with the real absence and difference in 
the world (non-identity), before moving to negativity and contradiction.  
Unlike Hegelian or Marxian dialectic, Bhaskarian dialectic, as an open 
process, does not end in a closed totality, reflecting DCR's emphasis upon 
open systems that contain geo-historically and spacio-temporally 
dependent constellations, whereby phenomena and noumena are 
interrelated and potentially embedded within each other, and where 
different mechanisms may be concomitantly operational.  Absence is linked 
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to the structured nature of being, which changes in time and space as it 
transforms and ceases to be what it was.   The third level (totality) is a real, 
open, unfinished totality to which there is a capacity for human agency to 
bring change and, indeed, as in Marx' dialectic, agential ethical praxis is 
needed at this level for positive progress and the overcoming of negative 
constraints (power2) (Bhaskar, 1998; 2008:155; Norrie, 2010:3).  
2.1.2 The emergence of a curse: an economic paradox of plenty 
Standard economic theory suggests that oil-rich countries should benefit 
from high oil prices as large export-driven revenue flows provide 
development investment opportunities through an inflow of foreign 
exchange (Stevens & Dietsche, 2008:57; Karl, 2007:2).  In traditional 
economics, it is the antonymn (non-identity) of abundance (scarcity) that 
has been recognised as the main obstacle to human well-being or 
flourishing as it impedes a balanced distribution of resources (Daoud, 2010; 
Homer-Dixon, 1994).  As Perloff (2012:1) states "most of the good things in 
life are scarce – we can’t all have as much as we want. Thus scarcity is the 
mother of economics". 
In 1995, Sachs and Warner produced empirical evidence showing that the 
opposite was true: resource poor countries were outperforming resource-
rich economies in relation to economic growth.  They found that primary 
commodity abundance could cause economic shocks, due to the volatility 
of global primary commodity prices and national rent-seeking and claimed 
that natural resources are a curse.  Their somewhat counter-intuitive 
findings have been widely critiqued, but nevertheless, triggered a 
substantial body of empirical evidence that questioned the traditional view 
of natural resources as capital, arguing that, when placed at the centre of 
an economic development model, primary commodity dependence slows 
economic growth (Auty, 2001; Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004; Kronenberg, 
2004; Damania & Bulte, 2005).   Subsequent, historical analyses have 
confirmed that the fastest-growing economies of the past decades achieved 
their growth with little natural resource wealth (Pendergast et al., 2008:1; 
Boschini et al., 2007:594; Mehlum et al. 2006:1). 
43 
 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) and Pendergast et al. (2008:3) note that it 
is important to distinguish between resource dependence and resource 
abundance.  Whilst the dependence upon abundance appears to be more 
immediately causal of the resource curse (Alexeev & Conrad, 2009; 
Pendergast et al, 2008:3), in my view, this does not render abundance 
redundant as an explanatory mechanism.  Indeed, when viewed from a 
supply and demand perspective, or more globally from the coexistence of 
presence and absence, it is the absence or scarcity of oil in the world that 
makes it a valuable commodity where it is (not) abundant and it is the 
abundant presence of oil within certain societies that can provoke different 
types of absences.   
In addition, I should note that abundance is, in itself, not an absolute or 
intangible category.  The finite nature of oil reserves from a spacio-temporal 
perspective entails their gradual exhaustion or constant begoing, so that oil 
abundance is doomed to turn, more or less slowly, into oil scarcity.  
Moreover, abundance is relative to the size of a state’s economy and to the 
amount of globally available reserves.  Thus, relatively small amounts of oil 
may create oil dependency, which may therefore be understood as a 
consequence of abundance.  
The most prominent causal link established by standard economic theory to 
explain why certain resource-abundant countries have experienced lower 
growth than their resource-poor counterparts, known as the Dutch disease, 
argues that the presence of a strong oil sector leads to the increased value 
of real wages and oil exports that cause real exchange rates to appreciate 
(Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Sachs & Warner, 1995; Gulfason et al., 1999).11  
The effects of oil-led development create economic distortions that 
encourage primary sector growth at a cost to more advanced 
manufacturing sectors, discouraging entrepreneurship and leading to a 
mono-export of oil commodities, making the national economy more 
susceptible to such factors as macroeconomic shocks (Stevens & Dietsche, 
2008:57; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009:5318; Sachs & Warner, 2001; Barbier, 2003; 
                                                          
11
 Increases in export commodity prices or in commodity export volumes can cause an 
increase in natural resource exports (Pendergast et al., 2008:4).   
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Hausmann & Rigobon, 2002).  The Dutch disease has also recently been 
attributed to the highly volatile timing of in-flowing revenue (Humphreys et 
al., 2007:6), although it does not comprehensively explain the negative 
growth effects when other variables are considered (Kolstad & Wiig, 
2009:5318; Stevens & Dietsche, 2008:57; Rosser, 2006:1; Brunnschweiler, 
2008).   
2.1.3 The political curse: structure and agency based explanations  
As Ross (2012:6) asserts, “the most important political fact about oil [is that] 
the revenues it bestows on governments are unusually large, do not come 
from taxes, fluctuate unpredictably, and can be easily hidden".  This section 
analyses the effects of these properties upon oil-rich countries as 
discussed in political-economy based analyses.  As Robinson (2006:451) 
and DiJohn (2007) assert, whilst many papers ascribe deterministic, 
monotonic causes and effects to oil abundance within petro-states, such 
assertions contradict the reality of cross-country divergences.  At best, the 
mechanisms discussed below are indicative of cross-country trends or 
patterns; however, they cannot be universally applied as law-like 
statements.  The causes cited primarily relate to structural dysfunction and 
agential (mis)behaviour that affect countries’ social fabrics, and the 
consequences are primarily linked to social responses (Stevens & 
Dietsche, 2008; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009:5318; Mavrotas & Murshed, 2011; 
Rosser, 2006; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009:652).  As Alao (2007) argues, 
there is no direct correlation between natural resources and conflict that 
surpasses the structures, processes and agents associated with their 
management and control.  Whilst certain authors focus upon one side of 
government-society relations to explain the resource curse (see below), 
causality in an open-system is complex and multidirectional.  This is 
consistent with the logic of DCR's TMSA, in which structures and agents 
are interconnected in processes, whereby structures enable or constrain 
agents, who simultaneously reproduce or transform existent and emerging 
structures.  The absences and differences that trigger change are now 




Much of the oil-curse literature links government institutions' effectiveness 
with the poor political, economic and social development within oil-rich 
countries that are part of the curse (Auty & Gelb, 2001; Isham et al., 
2005:143; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2003:16; Boschini et al., 2007; 
Colllier & Goderis, 2007; Ross, 2012), although the exact causal 
mechanisms at work are contested.  Countries with abundant resources 
have less incentive to save and invest at the state level, underestimating 
the need to invest in human capital, under-spending on basic public welfare 
as a percentage of GDP and thereby undermining social cohesion and 
hindering the replacement of natural capital by human capital to foster long-
term growth (Pendergast et al., 2008; Bulte et al. 2005:1029; Kurtz & 
Brooks, 2011:748; Le Billon, 2003:417; Karl, 2007:10-11; Gylafson, 2000; 
2001).  Government capacity in managing oil resources is extremely 
important in oil-exporting countries, but many suffer from institutional 
erosion, gradually becoming less competent (Isham et al., 2005:143; 
Fearon, 2005:10).  Whilst several authors link poor institutional quality to 
the oil curse (Auty & Gelb, 2001; Isham et al., 2005:143; Mehlum et al., 
2006; Gylfason, 2001:3) Acemoglu et al. (2001;2003) and Bulte et al. 
(2005) argue that institutional quality may be the curse in resource-rich 
countries.  Leaders of poor, resource-intensive countries may perceive no 
urgent need to modernise or reform their government or civil services due 
to institutional inertia and fail to act (Karl, 2007:16; Ross, 2012:6; Lowi, 
2010:xii; Kojucharov, 2007:480).  Governments in petro-states are less 
dependent upon taxes and can drown out or buy-off demands for reform.  
Luciani (1987) goes as far as to claim that there is "no representation 
without taxation and there are no exceptions to this version of the rule”.   
However, leaders may also actively choose to suppress rather than 
empower their citizens where development is against their interests 
(Dunning, 2005:452; Isham et al., 2005:145; Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2006:115).  Ron (2005:447) explains that leaders of postcolonial states 
often suffer from low political legitimacy, prompting them to engage in 
neopatrimonial policies that bleed development efforts dry.  Reno (1998) 
argues that poverty can result from repressive political power as, to make 
46 
 
patronage work as a means of political control, leaders may prevent 
ordinary citizens from gaining market access to make their lives less secure 
and more materially impoverished.  As Shaxson (2007:1124) notes, 
whatever the conventional wisdom, the trend is against economic 
diversification.  Indeed, diversification and industrialisation policies may 
reduce fiscal volatility and improve aggregate economic performance, but 
they can create alternative independent power bases that may challenge 
the ruling political power, especially during economic downturns or the 
fiscal crises that characterise resource-reliant countries (Dunning, 
2005:452; Bulte et al., 2005:1038).  These arguments support Friedman's 
hypothetical first law of petro-politics that "the price of oil and the pace of 
freedom always move in opposite directions in oil-rich petro-states" 
(Friedman, 2006).   
Furthermore, it is widely argued that the elite in oil-countries are susceptible 
to corruption in various forms including policy distortion, embezzlement, 
kickbacks and oil company bribes (Gaspar, 2011:6,13; Karl, 2007; Stiglitz, 
2007), especially in areas such as defence or infrastructure.  Indeed, oil 
provides governments with cheap money, which can be spent on patronage 
or unproductive projects (white elephants) that bring no growth, but support 
their position (Torvik, 2009:253; Karl, 2007:21).  Ross (2012:3,6) argues 
that petro-states are more secretive than non-oil countries and that oil 
dictators can easily conceal their expenditures and incompetence, for 
example, in state oil companies.  He asserts that "governments often 
collude with international oil companies to conceal their transactions and 
use their national oil companies to hide both revenues and expenditures" 
(Ross, 2012:5).   However, NOCs, such as PDVSA, can also be politicised 
and serve as clientelistic vehicles through which governments can reward 
supporters (Manzano & Monaldi, 2008:79).  The relationship between 
corruption and institutional quality is bi-directional; whilst well-developed 
institutions can reduce corruption, corruption can reduce institutional quality 
(Pendergast et al., 2008:14).   
Poor fiscal management is identified as another cause of the curse.  
Dunning (2005) and Rosser (2006) contend that leaders may pursue 
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strategies for short-term gain, sabotaging domestic growth and expanding 
crippling primary-commodity reliance that renders them vulnerable to 
external shock and reduces their ability to maintain power long-term.  For 
example, oil exploitation rights should rationally be sold to the most efficient 
company, which does not always occur (Van der Ploeg & Rohner, 2011:1).  
Kojucharov (2007:479) notes that revenue volatility complicates 
governments’ ability to plan long-term budgets and follow disciplined fiscal 
policies. 
Throughout the literature, leadership and regime type are identified as 
causal and consequential of the paradox of plenty.  Several cross-country 
analyses have supported Mahdavy's (1970) rentier state theory that 
countries with abundant natural resources are often less democratic 
(Rosser, 2006; Karl, 2007:20; Ross, 2001; 2009; 2012; Papaioannou & 
Siourounis, 2008; Basedau & Lay, 2009:775; Collier, 2007; Tsui, 2010).  
Jensen and Wantcheckon (2004:822-836) show that, between 1970 and 
1995, natural resource dependent countries were more authoritarian, with 
those attempting democratic transitions or consolidation subsequently 
returning towards authoritarian governance, consolidating authoritarianism 
and undermining democracy.  Murshed (2004) and Mavrotis and Murshed 
(2011) suggest that point resources, such as oil, delay democratic and 
institutional development and good governance.  Aslaksen (2010) supports 
their findings, showing a negative correlation between oil and democracy 
when country-fixed effects are included.  Isham et al. (2005:143) also argue 
that oil wealth enables minority rule over a domestic population.  As Gaspar 
claims (2011:9), unaccountable leaders’ ability to remain eternally in power 
thanks to oil revenues is yet another curse, although Haber and Menuldo 
(2011) refute any law-like effect.  Ross (2012:1) asserts that petro-states 
are 50% more likely to be authoritarian than non-oil countries.   
Others question the variables used by these scholars, adding different 
variables or nuances to explain the relationship between oil and regime 
type (Wick & Bulte, 2009; Van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 2010).  Haber and 
Menaldo (2011) find that growth in natural resource income increases 
democracy, arguing that many oil-rich countries had, for example, weak 
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state capacities before oil was discovered and, therefore, may have 
developed authoritarian patterns without oil.  Gurses (2009) argues that 
irrespective of an elites' commitment to democracy, resource wealth can 
enable a new social class to emerge that can pressurise a government to 
consider its requests.  As Ross (2009:2) argues, in Latin America, 
specifically, oil has not inhibited democratic transitions.  Dunning (2008) 
also claims that oil has quickened democratic transitions in Latin America.  
Given its high levels of inequality, the elite, who can afford some 
redistribution to enfranchise the poor, use democracy to reduce the 
expropriation of their wealth.12  However, he argues that without the 
demand for redistribution, leaders use oil rents to engage in corruption, 
reinforcing authoritarianism.   
Similar debate surrounds whether democratic or authoritarian governments 
are better placed to use oil wealth to benefit society.  Andersen and 
Aslaksen (2008:239-40) find the autocratic/democratic dichotomy too 
simplistic, contesting that the resource curse occurs in presidential, but not 
parliamentary democracies.   Torvik (2009:247) argues that presidentialism 
can be a one-man show, captured by special interests, whereas 
"parliamentary regimes with their continuous vote of confidence and 
broader representation in the making of policy, may be better suited to 
putting proceeds from resources into productive use".  Damania and Bulte 
(2003) find that resources have a significant negative effect in autocratic 
countries without political opposition, whereas resources’ impact on growth 
is statistically less significant as democracy increases.  However, Hegre et 
al. (2001:33) offer quantitative evidence to show that partially democratic oil 
regimes spark wars, hypothesising that this is due to their instability and 
weak coercive powers. Nevertheless, it is not always clear in the literature 
which elements of state behaviour constitute it being a democracy; 
electoral aspects or checks and balances.   
                                                          
12
 In Latin America, the elite has much to lose with land redistribution, as its members are 
traditionally large land owners (latifundia patterns of agrarian organisation are not 
uncommon in Latin America).  This has led several countries to promote agrarian reform, to 
favour soil utilisation and empower local farm workers.  Several governments, including 
Brazil, Colombia, Honduras and Guatamala, have been attempting community and market-
based land reform.   Others, like Venezuela, have engaged in large-scale land expropriation 
(Ascher & Mirovitskaya, 2012:12). 
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Importantly, certain authors have challenged the robustness of the 
empirical evidence linking abundance to adverse effects (Brunnschweiler, 
2008; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009:653).  Smith (2004) contradicts the 
predominant perspective in comparative politics, which suggests that fiscal 
crisis and poor economic contraction in petro-states often lead to regime 
change.  Instead, he argues that governments are on average more stable 
than comparable non-resource exporters.  Indeed, governments can use oil 
money to solve welfare problems or reduce social pressures by reducing 
taxation, targeting spending or using popular measures such as petrol 
subsidies (Caselli & Cunningham, 2009; Le Billon, 2003:416; Torvik, 
2009:253; Basedau & Lay, 2009:761; Ross, 2009:22).  As mentioned 
above, petro-states do not always need to forcefully collect taxes to operate 
(Karl, 2007:16).  Additionally, countries with high per capita resource 
income, such as the UAE, can often offset internal conflict using distributive 
policies and well-equipped security services (Basedau & Lay, 
2009:760,774; Lowi, 2010:xii).   
Moreover, Alexeev and Conrad (2011) reject claims that resource 
abundance harms countries, except regarding accountability, which is 
significantly correlated with natural resources.  They argue that by using 
resource abundance rather than resource dependence, a positive 
economic growth effect is found (Alexeev & Conrad, 2009:587).  Indeed, for 
every resource-abundant country that achieves stagnation rather than 
prosperity are the textbook counter-examples of Norway, Canada, 
Malaysia, Australia, the USA and Botswana (Torvik, 2009:241; Karl, 
2007:3; Bulte & Damania, 2005:5; Ross, 2012) so that Haber and Menaldo 
(2010) assert that “roughly twice as many countries have been blessed by 
resource booms as cursed by them”.  Thus, it is important to understand 
when oil becomes a curse.  The empirical literature mostly attributes the 
cause as policy failure resulting from poor governance and institutional 
quality (Cabrales & Hauk, 2011; Karl, 2007:3).  Ross (2012:2) rightly 
asserts that sufferers are generally low and middle income countries.  
However, ascertaining exactly why there are differences between countries 
is challenging.  As Di John (2007:968-969) notes, much analysis is 
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ahistorical, apolitical and selective of its variables.  He asserts that 
generalised arguments about the state neglect the role of collective actors 
within society that can impose domestic conditionality on those in power.  
He highlights the fact that oil abundance does not preclude a despot from 
having developmental aspirations or from sharing wealth with opposition 
groups. 
2.1.4 The curse of conflict: emergence, form and duration  
The literature also shows that petro-states are more conflict-prone.  As 
shown in chapter 4, oil has escalated the Colombian conflict, which has 
also affected neighbouring Venezuela.  As such, the remainder of this 
section addresses mechanisms, present at a regional and global level, 
which may lead oil countries to experience more (or different) types of 
conflict, than their non-oil counterparts.  
2.1.4.1 Conflict emergence 
The "link between natural resources and conflict is probably as old as 
human settlement” (Alao, 2007).  However, as Cooper (2005:465) 
contends, Collier and Hoeffler’s (2001) work instigated an important 
paradigm shift, by identifying economic activity as a primary cause of 
conflict and not merely a consequential or secondary effect.  This thematic 
has permeated the resource curse literature, although how oil generates 
violence is contested (Said, 2004:79).  As shown below, scholars have 
predominantly linked oil to civil or separatist conflict by means of social, 
political and economic causal mechanisms.  In this context, most authors 
focus upon poor governance, and ruling authorities’ inability to manage oil 
wealth, which causes grievances.  Several also make a case for the 
causality of rebel opportunism or greed.  This section discusses both greed 
and grievance in turn.   
Before addressing greed and grievance, I will briefly explain why I reject a 
third possible category, i.e. Collier's et al.'s (2006) Feasibility Theory.  
Feasibility argues that rebellion occurs where it is materially feasible 
without reference to motivation.  In this paradigm, agents rally around the 
first social entrepreneur(s) to provide the group with a political or religious 
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agenda.  Rebellion is viewed as being most viable in weak states with 
features such as favourable geography or low per capita income; it could 
be led by non-rational, potentially insane actors, or even have begun by 
mistake; and it appears to be triggered by the presence of resource 
revenues in countries with weak state-citizen relations (Collier et al., 2006).  
Whilst I agree that war can occur without observable motive or with obscure 
narratives built upon ideological or religious demi-realities, I reject feasibility 
as: (i) from a Critical Realist perspective, I deem it to be a category error to 
class feasibility as a causal mechanism, rather unactuated powers are a 
condition of the world in which we live; (ii) Collier et al. are "holding 
motivation (of any kind) to be irrelevant to any useful understanding" (Keen, 
2012: 766), whereby, the categories linked to feasibility, i.e. the notion of 
favourable geography, may be a determining factor in agents' strategic 
considerations, but in a country like Colombia, this does not remove the 
motives that underlie such strategy; and (iii) it is overly deterministic, if not 
fatalistic. 
The worrying implication to feasibility, however, which is also present in 
Collier's work on greed (see below), is that it is politically convenient and 
delegitimises violence that may threaten existing power structures (Keen, 
2012).  As such, feasibility theory allows for a villanisation of the perpetrator 
who acts without good cause, merely because it is feasible to do so.  In this 
vein, feasibility theory, which implicitly suggests the existence of other 
causal mechanisms such as greed, fundamentally overlooks the primacy of 
the peaceful, non-dual state.  Indeed, as Bhaskarian meta-Reality argues, 
conflict (duality) is sustained by an array of peaceful actions (non-dual) 
(Bhaskar, 2002).   
Greed 
As with feasibility, greed can be a politically convenient cause and can be 
used by a state to delegitimise violence that threatens existing power 
structures (Keen, 2012).  Indeed, rebels join organisations for a variety of 
motivations.  Greed is undoubtedly causal, however, by reducing rebels 
(and, as Collier (2009:122) argues, rebels are invariably the same as 
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terrorists, freedom fighters or gangsters) to greedy and ignoring their 
grievances, there is an implicit moral judgement.  This is not to say that 
individual rebels, or rebel leaders, cannot display atomistic egocentricity13.  
However, greed, one of Dante's seven sins, is generally considered to be 
ethically illegitimate; whereas grievances can be legitimate and/or 
illegitimate.  In Colombia and Venezuela, this distinction is important as a 
rebel could also be considered a revolutionary or vice-versa.  Nevertheless, 
the genuineness of greed as a mechanism is not contested here; indeed, 
atomistic egocentricity is a key driving force of modernity and the capitalist 
system (Bhaskar, 2002), within which the oil curse is embedded.  This latter 
greed is, however, largely ignored in the greed-oil-conflict nexus, despite 
the implications of examining the relationships of dependency between oil-
consuming/producing countries.   
This said, I shall now turn to look at the greedy rebel thesis.  Whilst greed 
may increase the value of a government staying in power to profit from oil 
rents, it is predominantly linked to the likelihood that regimes will be 
challenged for power by greedy rebels (Caselli and Cunningham, 2009).  
Collier and Hoeffler (2005) write that the greater the primary commodity 
dependence, the higher the probability that rebel greed, as opposed to 
grievances, will contribute to starting a civil war.  They broaden the analysis 
to argue that rents can provide large non-tax income for the state, but also 
for any organisation able to control rent-generating territory.  This economic 
finding has been extremely controversial, provoking rebuttals that criticise 
its methodological approach.  Research by Weinstein (2005) supports 
Collier and Hoeffler's (2001) rebel greed analogy.  Weinstein’s approach 
has been widely praised, notably by Collier and Hoeffler (2005).  His key 
finding showed that, whilst primary commodity rents affect the composition 
of rebel recruitment, when able to benefit from resource abundance, 
opportunistic rebel leaders squeeze out ideological leaders.  Weinstein 
asserts that opportunistic rebellion is most attractive under the conditions 
where grievance should be rife and that legitimate grievances are 
contaminated by greed during the recruitment process.  According to Collier 
                                                          
13
 Man’s self-centeredness and failure to acknowledge that s/he is related to other beings. 
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and Hoeffler (2005), ideologically motivated rebellions are less likely than 
opportunistic rebellions to have peaceful outcomes.   
By claiming that rebel greed is responsible for conflict, it is possible to 
purposefully overlook the socio-historical and transnational dimensions of a 
conflict (Lujala, 2010:15; Obi, 2010:483).  Thus, several scholars have 
worked to develop models that establish other causal links between 
resources and rent-seeking (Wick & Bulte, 2006; Dalgaard & Olssen, 2008; 
Bulte & Damania, 2005).   One interesting example is Mehlum et al.’s 
(2006) model, which argues that entrepreneurial agents are either 
producers or rent-seekers, depending on the profitability of these activities 
and the institutional capacity to protect the rule of law.   When a producer 
becomes a rent-seeker, the remaining entrepreneurs’ profitability is 
reduced and the opportunity cost of rent-seeking declines, enlarging the 
displacement effect.  Their empirical data suggests that there are more 
producers where institutional quality is high and more rent-grabbers where 
institutions are weaker i.e. grabber friendly.   Such analyses, however, link 
greed to the more grievance-based arguments of weak institutions.   
Grievances  
Grievances can engender both peaceful and violent responses from civil 
society.  Domestic agents, frustrated by injustice and inequality, may act 
dissimilarly, not necessarily generating conflict, thus adding to the complex 
constellation of dynamics (DiJohn, 2007:965).  For example, the Chàvez' 
government gained power by democratic election, rather than by means of 
a violent revolution, amongst others to transform the use of Venezuela's oil 
wealth (see chater 5).  The identification of grievances in petro-states is 
important as the conscientisation of social inequality can be used as a step 
towards trying to overcome them.    
The grievance-based arguments in the literature place absence and 
emergence at the heart of causality, providing several reasons why state 
(in)action causes grievances that may generate violence.  Cabrales and 
Hauk (2011) show that revolutions or civil wars are more likely in natural 
resource rich countries with bad institutions with rising anomie, whereby 
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people no longer identify with the laws or government structures that 
regulate their societies.14  Hegre et al. (2001:33) argue that as repression 
and political inflexibility increase in these countries, opposition groups may 
perceive no other alternative than armed revolt.  Holsti (1996), amongst 
others, makes the link to civil war, suggesting that neopatrimonalism in 
resource-rich countries creates the distributional conflicts that prompt 
violence.  Cohen et al. (1981) claim that states with access to significant 
resource rents may initiate conflicts by expanding their administrative reach 
and attacking peripheral strongmen, leading to violent reprisals.  A state’s 
military, rather than rebels, could start a civil war, creating protection 
rackets, which stir up opposition and justify elite payoffs (Stanley, 1996:13).  
In these scenarios, resource rents may not generate a direct risk of conflict, 
but they raise the risk of conflict. 
Grievances also emerge from real changes in a country’s social fabric.  
Structurally, new petro-states experience accelerated social change.  
Citizens may perceive that internal and external actors increasingly disrupt 
their way of life (Karl, 2007:25; Obi, 2010:489).   Communities may 
experience negative environmental side-effects from the oil development 
such as spillages, pipeline explosions or flaring.  Governments do not 
always deal with the resultant environmental damage (UNEP, 2011; Radon, 
2007:109).  Moreover, income disparities have increased across many 
developing countries.  As Stewart et al. (2007) note, whilst cultural status-
related horizontal inequalities may bind groups together, socio-economic 
inequality between classes and social groups provides ground for conflict, 
and political inequality provides incentives for rebellion.  In petro-states, 
these tensions have been heightened by the arrival of job-seeking migrants 
from other countries, ethnicities or religions (Karl, 2007:25; Bearce & Laks 
Hutnik, 2011). 
Lastly, grievances can stem from unfulfilled expectations of the oil rents’ 
potential benefits.  Collier and Hoeffler (2005:628) contend that social 
                                                          
14
 Indeed, where asymmetric relations exist between a government and grievance-driven 
rebels, these may confront or overthrow the "top dog" in a Marxist dialectic to bring needed 
social change (see Ramsbotham et al., 2011:24). 
55 
 
grievances are not always caused by state misconduct as volatile growth 
rates from oil complicate economic management, confusing citizens' 
appraisals of government performance.  As Dal Bó & Dal Bó (2011) note, 
capital-intensive oil drilling raises oil prices, which could create grievances 
by increasing the relative capital return and pushing down wages.  
Moreover, in countries such as Venezuela, Western MNOCs’ dominance 
exposed citizens to Western culture and heightened their expectations of 
Western modernisation (see chapter 5).   
For many low-income countries, harnessing resource-wealth is the only 
technically feasible option for growth to middle-income status.  Yet such 
expectations are often politically infeasible and rarely fulfilled, leaving these 
countries with fragile, primary-commodity-dependent, low-income, stagnant 
economies (Humphreys et al., 2007:174; Collier & Hoeffler, 2005).  The 
failure of such promises has led to anti-Western sentiment, grievance and 
conflict in several petro-states (Karl, 2007:15).  Indeed, across Latin 
America, the political liberalisation measures introduced to respond to the 
anti-government riots and protests of the 1980s and 1990s, when oil prices 
crashed, benefitted new neo-liberal elites and further widened inequality 
(Keen, 1998; Lowi, 2010:4; Avilés, 2006:14).   
Moreover, the visibility of oil wealth compounds the problem, especially as 
manpower may arrive from overseas so that society has limited contact 
with the oil sector and perceives a vertical distribution of the resources 
(Karl, 2007:15; Isham et al., 2005:148).  As Karl (2007:16) argues, where 
leaders appear despotic, corrupt or wasteful and local people lose-out to 
foreigners, this is a potent political mix.  Citizens see MNOCs, transnational 
elites and the developed world benefit from the oil, over which they may 
feel some ownership, even if the state, and not private parties, owns the oil 
in most countries (Radon, 2007:103).  Indeed, the local stake in oil 
ownership is often ignored in contract negotiations although local 
communities are increasingly demanding their share of the wealth.  The 
CSR trend (discussed in the subsequent chapter), whereby companies 
make social project commitments and implement these predominantly in 
local communities, has not redressed the oil operations’ negative effects 
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and some CSR projects can have hidden negative impacts (Radon, 
2007:90-106).   
Another interesting perspective on oil and conflict is Reno's (1998) 
contribution on the shadow economy, whereby a shadow state ruler may 
strengthen his position by creating local disputes so that local strongmen 
turn to him for help.  However, shadow trade and non-formal economies 
can also delegitimise leadership and create other grievances and/or greed 
amongst local communities (Berdal & Malone, 2000).   
As the grievance and greed scenarios discussed in the literature show, 
absence and difference in accessing oil and its potential benefits 
correspond to the first steps of Bhaskarian dialectic, whereby discontent 
creates reasons that become central to human agency and are socially 
causal (Norrie, 2010:10).   Masked behind the rather unsophisticated 
greed/grievance headings are real mechanisms, which can unleash a 
constellationality15 of causal mechanisms that are also causal and mutually 
reinforcing.  For example, as Fearon and Laitin (2003:78-9) contend, 
indiscriminate state responses to early stage rebellions can cause the 
formation of fresh grievances.  Indeed, such secondary causal mechanisms 
can also trigger conflict, although these grievances alone do not explain the 
underlying causes.   
2.1.4.2 Conflict form and duration  
The literature not only discusses the origins of violence, but also the 
specifics of conflict type and duration.  Regarding form, most political 
economy based models link the oil curse to civil conflict, which, if loosely 
defined, exists in Colombia (Torvik, 2009:252).  Revising their earlier 
findings, Collier and Hoeffler (2004:580) use logit regression to predict the 
outbreak of civil war, finding that of the potential disaggregations of primary 
commodity export shares in GDP, "only one was significant when 
introduced into our baseline regression, namely oil versus non-oil”.  Fearon 
and Laitin (2003) find that countries with over a third of export revenues 
                                                          
15
 Constellationality is a critical realist term used to describe the coincidence of real 
distinctions and connections in the world (Hartwig, 2007:79). 
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from oil have roughly twice as great an annual risk of civil war onset 
(controlling for income and other co-variables).  Fearon (2005:491) 
contends that oil is the primary commodity risk given its high value vis-à-vis 
its production costs, thus equating higher rents with a greater risk of conflict 
onset.  Ross (2012:2) claims that civil war is twice as likely to occur in an 
oil-state as a non-oil state.   
Collier and Hoeffler (2005:630) suggest that rebellion will almost certainly 
be secessionist if oil is present.  Fearon (2005:10) similarly argues that oil 
exports offer a greater prize for state or secessionist capture, possibly 
leading to civil war.  This view is contradicted by Smith (2004:242) and 
DiJohn (2007:969,980) who note that oil can be linked to increased regime 
stability and thus a lower risk of civil war onset, even if oil can impact 
duration once a war is underway. 
The literature offers several mechanisms that link oil to a particular duration 
and intensity of conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2005; Ross, 2005; Humphreys, 
2005:12; De Soysa & Neumayer, 2007; Lujala, 2010).   Some scholars 
argue that oil shortens conflicts.  Building on a model created by Fearon 
and Laiton (2003), Humphreys (2005:2) catalogues mechanisms that he 
claims prove that natural resources are associated with shorter wars ending 
in a decisive victory for one side.  Collier and Hoeffler (2001) also contend 
that many rebel groups exploiting natural resources lack cohesion, which 
could be a significant factor in shortening wars.  Oil, as a deep shaft 
material and a point resource is difficult for rebel groups to exploit, as major 
capital investment and know-how are needed for extraction (DiJohn, 
2007:966; Le Billon, 2005; Wick & Bulte, 2006, Bulte et al., 2005:1038).  
Given oil’s value, the government may also use greater force to protect 
installations (Lujala, 2009:51).  Indeed, there is a basic financial 
asymmetry, as the state has a better tax handle on oil, more easily 
acquiring revenues to deter or defeat rebellion (Snyder & Bhavnani, 
2005:574; Humphreys, 2005:14).  However, oil wealth is somewhat 
lootable.  In the absence of a coup d'état, rebels may attempt to finance 
their ventures by obstructing oil flow, extortion, kidnapping oil executives, 
stealing, targeting vulnerable infrastructures, oil bunkering and smuggling 
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oil (Ross, 2003; Ross, 2005:5; Le Billon, 2005:36; Kaldor et al., 2007; 
Collier, 2010:1128).   
Interestingly, Ross (2005:10) links booty futures, or exploitation rights to 
natural resources that rebels hope to capture in battle, with the possibility of 
prolonged wars, due to the potential availability of increased revenue to 
continue fighting.  Ross offers the example of ENI, which supplied money 
and arms to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) in exchange for 
future considerations.16  However, as Di John notes, rebel groups cannot 
then promise to equally redistribute the oil to their supporters (2007:966).  
Additionally, the quantity of available oil is often unclear as proven reserves 
is not a geological concept (Snyder & Bhavnani, 2005:574).  Le Billon 
(2005) cites a feasibility mechanism whereby fighting continues as, 
economically, agents benefit from conflict more than peace.  Lujala 
(2009:50-68; 2010:16) notes that oil and gas, when located inside conflict 
zones, substantially prolong conflict and increase its severity within a 
country, where combat deaths more than double.17 
The presence of oil within a country is also linked to conflict intensity and 
duration.  Lujala (2009:52) argues that the most deadly conflicts are 
characterised by two sides of equal strength, but when the rebels are the 
weaker side, conflicts are less intensive.  Beneficiaries of the conflict may 
prefer to keep fighting rather than to finish the war and win (Keen, 1998; 
Collier, 2000).  Humphreys (2005:17) argues that rebel groups make more 
profit in wartime than in peacetime.  If one considers other variables, for 
example, illegal commodities such as narcotics that may contribute to this 
war economy, then rebel groups can thrive under war conditions where law 
and order is less stringent such as in Colombia (Rubin & Armstrong, 
2001:37).   
 
                                                          
16
 Lujala et al.(2005:3) also discuss offshore oil’s impact in fuelling war in Angola, showing 
that rebel groups do not need to control the oil to profit. 
17
 DiJohn (2007:976) challenges battle death figures, which he claims neglect other 
important manifestations of political violence.  
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2.1.4.3 Oil and conflict: a laminated system of local, regional and global 
interconnectedness  
State-centric analyses of the resource curse are insufficient (Berdal & 
Malone, 2000; Duffield, 2005; Rosser, 2006; Obi, 2010; Pugh et al. 2004:2).  
Indeed, without analysing the wider context, as argued in the last section, 
(politically convenient) irrationalities can proliferate within the literature.  
Intrastate agents and structures are not the only forces that affect conflict in 
oil-rich countries and where conflict dynamics are present, the knock-on 
spill over effects impact neighbouring countries, trading partners and 
regions, e.g. the spread of Colombian violence into neighbouring countries 
(Rudra & Jensen, 2011; Studdard, 2004; Rubin & Armstrong, 2001; Reno, 
1998:29).  As Obi (2010) argues, state-centric discourses can over-
emphasise individual leaders, institutions and economic mechanisms, 
detracting attention from socio-historical specificities, transnational factors 
and regional and global interconnectedness.  A geo-historical approach to 
conflict shows that civil war may be triggered by national and regional 
conflict dynamics and the repercussions of such wars are equally unlimited 
by national borders (DiJohn, 2007:981; Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2009:657).   
Contemporary wars are predominantly intrastate wars (Themnér & 
Wallensteen, 2012; Kaldor, 2005).  These wars are distinguished by 
absent, weak or predatory state institutions, the emergence of new and 
overlapping centres of authority, rising poverty and resource competition 
(Duffield, 2005:16; Rubin et al., 2001:6).  As shown above, these same 
qualities have been identified as potentially causal and consequential of the 
resource curse.  However, increasingly, states find themselves embroiled in 
a type of network war that can occur on their own soil, the protagonists of 
which are no longer nation states' conventional armies, but non-territorial 
networks of warlords, paramilitaries, guerrilla and mafia (Pugh et al, 
2004:18).  In this paradigm, new wars can stem from, and reinforce, 
regional conflict formations, whereby conflicting agents form "mutually 
reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region, making for more 
protracted and obdurate conflicts" (Rubin et al., 2001:3).  The rise of such 
economic, military, political and social networks that work through and 
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around states has increased the cases of civil conflict and durable disorder 
in resource-rich countries, leaving those that possess such dynamics with 
the impossible challenge of bringing development without stability and vice-
versa (Duffield, 2005:14-16).  Thus, the desired outcome of a policy-maker 
engaging in such conflict areas is not simply peace, but the transformation 
of deep, transnational links (Rubin et al., 2001:5).  
Oil can provide certain rebel groups, which had benefitted from superpower 
support during the Cold War, with alternative modes of self-financing their 
military objectives (Studdard, 2004:3; Pearce, 2004; Ballentine & Sherman, 
2003:1; Malone & Nitzschke, 2005:1).  Emerging war economies are 
increasingly linked with licit and illicit regional and global trade and finance 
networks (Malone & Nitzschke, 2005:1-6; Ballentine & Nitzsche, 2003:5).18  
In this context, market deregulation has intensified parallel and transborder 
trade, enabling warring parties to forge local and global networks as a 
means of asset realisation and self-provisioning (Duffield, 2005).  However, 
the web of social, political, economic and military networks not only affects 
the behaviour of conflict actors, but it can also profoundly affect local 
civilians.  Marginalised populations on borderlands may have to rely on 
illegal networks and shadow activities for survival during and even after a 
conflict (Studdard, 2004:2-7; Cooper, 2006a:20).   
Klare (2001:35) argues that oil is highly correlated with global scale conflict 
between the world powers and that conflict will rise as oil demand 
increases to outpace supply.  The assumption is that, as new world powers 
emerge on the global markets, this strains world oil reserves and creates a 
global scramble for oil and oil profits.  The current energy security paradigm 
is based upon this fear, securitising crude oil as a national vital interest, 
given its importance for economic development.  Indeed, powers such as 
the US are ready to intervene in oil-rich states to defend their strategic 
interests if their supply is at risk (Obi, 2009:471; Obi, 2010:485; Partlett, 
2010; Rudra & Jensen, 2011:640).  Intervention has involved direct military 
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 The term "war economies" is problematic, as rebels, whilst controlling assets, are 
simultaneously dependent upon external support and supplies and thus do not actually run 
the war economy (Duffield, 2005). 
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use and indirect support of favourable groups within a country (Partlett, 
2010:80; Basedau & Lay, 2009:760; Turner & Pugh, 2006:474).19  
However, future developments in the US’ shale oil exploitation may alter 
the US' current security paradigm. 
Both foreign powers and MNOCs have been accused of exercising anti-
transformative agency.  Foreign powers are primarily blamed for 
intervening in oil-rich countries, providing military assistance or 
manipulating their governments, whilst MNOCs are accused of benefitting 
from asymmetric relations with oil-rich countries within the current global 
framework (Ross, 2012).  Obi (2010:483) argues that the neoliberal 
hegemonic discourse obfuscates the reality of the resource curse’s 
transnational underpinnings and that globalised capitalist relations embed a 
subordination of developing countries' resources to transnational processes 
and elites.  Moreover, he argues that petro-states that allow MNOCs to 
cooperate with them in exploiting their resources, somewhat sustain these 
transnational ties with global powers, enabling MNOCs to take advantage 
of them (Obi, 2010:487).  Oil companies may also benefit from instability in 
corrupt conflict-ridden petro-states, receiving support from home 
governments and international institutions (Radon, 2007:89).  As shown in 
the subsequent chapter, not only have several major MNOCs been 
implicated in corruption scandals, but some have also actively interfered in 
the internal politics of their host countries, insulating governments from 
democratic pressures to protect their interests (Smith, 2008:80) or 
supported groups that sought to overthrow unfavourable governments 
(Karl, 2007:28).   
2.2 Transformative agency  
Oil is a formidable industry with USD 23 trillion worth of oil and gas pumped 
out of the ground in 2009 and oil by-products representing 14.2% of the 
world's commodity trade (Ross, 2012:3).  Given the current patterns of oil 
production and consumption, the reality that the absence or presence of oil 
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 Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the Colombian government’s alignment with the US, 
Venezuela’s discursive rejection of US imperialism and accusations of US attempts to 
destabilise the Chávez government.  
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may be directly or indirectly responsible for the emergence of causal 
mechanisms that negatively affect the flourishing of citizens in developing, 
oil-rich countries, gives rise in the literature to normative and practical 
questions surrounding how to break these patterns.  This section discusses 
proposals in the literature that aim to overcome the resource curse and the 
transformative potential of these suggested measures.  CSR as an 
instrument of transformative praxis is discussed in a subsequent chapter.   
2.2.1 Transformative interests in a neoliberal paradigm 
Transformative praxis implies replacing an existent model with a better 
alternative.  In the oil sector, there is no consensus as to what could 
constitute this model; agential perspectives differ depending upon their 
worldview, interests and positions vis-à-vis the oil or oil-rich countries.  
Therefore, whilst some agents' interests may lie in transforming the status 
quo, others may combine a rhetorical commitment to transformation with a 
praxis geared to a maintainance of the status quo or the strengthening of 
their own interests.  These agents are, however, not transformative agents 
and operate primarily within the first stages of Bhaskarian dialectic.  As 
Rosser (2006:1) argues, most policy suggestions are not even politically 
feasible.  Moreover, successful attempts by policy-makers to respond to 
particular challenges of the resource curse in one environment are not 
necessarily transferrable or applicable to another.  As such, Stevens and 
Dietsche (2008:63) argue that a dynamic element is missing to explain how 
certain countries have triggered positive institutional change and mitigated 
the resource curse’s effects whilst others have not.  I have not found such 
an element within the literature; indeed, the evidence in this section points 
to a complex, multilevel problematic that requires a multifaceted and 
context-tailored set of politically supported solutions in order to alleviate 
these effects.   
When viewed as a problem stemming from within a petro-state, the 
tendency is towards external solutions.  As Stevens and Dietsche (2008) 
argue, if oil mismanagement is agency based and endogenous, normative 
appeals to political leaders to transform their behaviour are useless.  
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Instead, externally-driven solutions may be beneficial, whereby 
international regimes impose constraints on countries or find an 
international body to manage their resources.  Equally, if natural resource 
wealth has a structurally deterministic impact upon political regimes, then 
domestic change without structural transformation is hopeless.  They argue 
that this is "close to proposing that well-endowed countries with the wrong 
political regimes should leave their natural resources in the ground, or that 
external forces should drive domestic change" (Stevens & Dietsche, 
2008:57).    
However, such a framing of the problematic is reductive, given the 
exogenous interests and causal mechanisms at work.  As Morrison 
(2011:9) argues, "it is only in a more open world- in which natural resources 
can be exported and borrowed against- that the tremendous revenues 
behind the resource curse can be generated".  Over the past decades, 
developing, resource-rich countries have become more active in the global 
economy, so that international market pressures have increasingly affected 
these countries resource management (Rudra & Jensen, 2011).  Such 
global phenomena as trade revenues (Morrison, 2011), international capital 
flows (Jensen & Johnston, 2011) and immigration (Bearce & Laks Hutnik, 
2011:711) can all exacerbate the curse.  Moreover, world oil prices, 
strategic cartels or drilling and environmental policies in the developed 
world can influence a petro-state's political developmental trajectory, 
including the survival of regimes and individual leaders (Rudra & Jensen, 
2011:649; Ramsay, 2011).  Research has shown that foreign aid and 
external intervention into petro-states have sometimes exacerbated internal 
tensions (Shaxson, 2007:1127).  As such, energy importers cannot 
circumvent this problematic, but, as Ross (2012:3) argues, they must play a 
role in solving it.    
Certain countries’ success stories, despite their resources, have 
encouraged a belief that the curse is corrigible with the right policy mix.  
This optimism permeates some of the academic literature; as Gylfason 
(2001:3) argues "good policies can turn abundant natural resource riches 
into an unambiguous blessing".  The blessing is mostly implicitly assumed 
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to be some form of Western-styled development and democracy.  However, 
it is questionable whether developing countries can sustain the various 
elements of a modern democracy as found in oil-rich Norway,20 particularly 
amidst a global trend of democratic recession (Diamond, 2011).  Where 
democracy is a goal, it requires active effort to endure and no existing 
society has achieved a perfect democracy (Smith, 2008:13).  Moreover, 
state-systems, democracy included, always have room for further 
development (Bhaskar, 2002:61).  Nevertheless, the assumption of 
corrigibility has underpinned the hands-on approach, which is part of the 
dominant neoliberal paradigm of international political economy.  Its key 
proponents include the world's most powerful governments, which are 
predominantly oil importers, transnational corporate actors, supporting 
politicians and the global institutions formed by these actors (Smith, 2008).  
Sklair and Miller (2010) describe these agents as a "Transnational 
Capitalist Class (TCC)" with shared values as opposed to a geographical 
base.   
The gospel of neoliberalism originated in the West and with its holy trinity of 
liberal markets, good governance and democracy, it was marketed by the 
dominant global powers as a wealth-creating panacea for failing states with 
struggling economies, underdevelopment and a predisposition towards 
conflict (Taylor, 2010:158).  In the neoliberal paradigm, oil policies are 
driven by the needs of globalised capital for cheap resources, markets to 
which to sell goods and the provision of a safe and productive environment 
for global capital.  The TINA formation logic suggests that non-compliers of 
this common sense option will end up firmly grounded in third world hell 
(Taylor, 2010:166; Reno, 1998:26).  As neoliberals view markets and 
supply and demand as the most effective tool in allocating resources to 
society and solving emerging problems such as social distribution and 
ecological scarcity, theoretically governments that chose this 
developmental route can focus less upon redistributive policies and social 
welfare (Robinson et al., 2006; Smith, 2008:69-70).   
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 The 2012 EIU Democracy Index lists Norway as the world’s most democratic country.  
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However, attempts in the international arena to socially engineer an end to 
the resource curse within developing countries have not been entirely 
successful.21  The World Bank's management of the Chad-Cameroon 
pipeline illustrates this point.  Chad began to exploit its oil in 2003.  As 
Chad lacked the financial and institutional capacity to exploit its resources 
and place them on the market, the World Bank, together with its lending 
agencies and a consortium of oil companies and international creditors, 
intervened to finance Chad's oil development and to demonstrate that the 
curse could be overturned.   The World Bank developed a set of anti-curse 
policy measures, which they argued would foster a transparent oil economy 
in Chad, within the current neoliberal capitalist framework.  Whilst the 
policies themselves were well aligned with conventional neoliberal 
wisdom,22 they ultimately failed to prevent the symptoms of the curse in 
Chad (Kojucharov, 2007).  As Kojucharov (2007) demonstrates, the curse 
prevailed due to subversive relations between the external and internal 
agents and structures.  The World Bank effectively stripped Chad of its 
sovereignty by imposing policies from outside, placing conditions on Chad’s 
oil revenue expenditure so that the policies lacked local ownership.  
Despite its own recommendations, the World Bank failed to ensure that 
institutional capacity was strengthened and that a well-equipped 
supervisory body was established; notwithstanding Chad’s civil conflict, 
weak civil society, nepotism and corruption, before overwhelming it with 
complex regulatory frameworks and management processes.  Moreover, 
the World Bank failed to foresee the ethnic tensions that arose as the 
dominant Muslim population received more oil money than the less 
influential Christian population situated in the oil region (Kojucharov, 
2007:481).  As Chad moved towards servicing its debt, agitated political 
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 As Cooper (2010:319) notes, certain analyses perceive such social engineering as a form 
of biopolitics, whereby empowerment is the carrot used to lure populations to transform or 
conform behaviourally. 
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 Whereas, Kojucharov (2007) contends that neoliberal policies were not bad in themselves, 
if Chang (2010) is correct, then policy-makers should implement certain policies that 
neoliberals consider bad for economic development such as the "extensive use of selective 
industrial policy, combining protectionism with export subsidies; tough regulations on foreign 
direct investment; active, if not particularly extensive, use of state-owned enterprises; lax 
protection of patents and other intellectual property rights; heavy regulation of both domestic 




leaders gradually installed their own regulatory institutions and policies, 
non-compliant with World Bank policies, thereby escalating the resource 
curse (Kojucharov, 2007:490).  In 2008, the World Bank withdrew, 
recognising its inability to push its agenda forward in Chad.  The question 
remains, however, whether Chad would have been better off without such 
external intervention at that point of its trajectory, instead of becoming one 
of the "dysfunctional hybrids of the liberal peace" (Cooper, 2010:318,323). 
According to the literature, the Chad intervention is symptomatic of a wider 
failure of externally determined and imposed neoliberal policies (Cooper, 
2006b:326; Turner & Pugh, 2006:477; Kojucharov, 2007).  The impact of 
neoliberal models such as the Washington Consensus, which focused upon 
deregulating markets, privatisation, fiscal probity and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) promised to transform dysfunctional, conflict-ridden 
societies into stable, prosperous countries.  However, it ultimately worked 
least for those it was supposed to help and failed to reform the agents and 
structures responsible for the curse (Avilés, 2006:14; Studdard, 2004:9; 
Cooper, 2006a:26).  Moreover, the addition of governance conditionalities 
to this economic package, in the form of the post-Washington Consensus, 
smacks of imperialism.  It impairs developing countries’ ability to determine 
their own trajectory by: i) fostering asymmetric decision-making; ii) offering 
preferential treatment for those who behave; and iii) promoting a holistic 
approach, it creates an interconnected web of policies (Taylor, 2010; 
Turner & Pugh, 2006:473-4).  In addition, as Cooper (2010:318) observes, 
neoliberals keep recycling the same one-size-fits-all problematic and one-
size-fits-all solutions to a variety of developing countries, which ultimately 
fail them.   
The conflation of solidarity and security is a significant part of this 
problematic (Cooper, 2006b:326).  Cooper (2006b:316) argues that the 
security discourse hides an unwillingness to address the problems faced by 
the poor, whilst protecting the rich from imaginary threats under the mantra 
of mutual vulnerability, which links wealthier countries' security with poorer 
countries development.  This is evidenced in the international community's 
approach to conflict trade.  In this context, Cooper (2005; 2010) clarifies the 
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different control strategies that are currently promoted by Western countries 
and used in insecure resource-rich countries to this end.  These range from 
the conditional promotion of liberal values, to prophylactic controls 
(liddism), which contain the insecurity in a particular area, and control-lite 
strategies that acknowledge the role of the developed world as a market for 
and participant in illicit networks, but only target rogue actors and establish 
minimum control mechanisms.   Such control measures keep insecurity 
firmly in the developing world, neither addressing its causes nor the 
structural change that is necessary at wider levels to truly tackle such trade 
(Cooper, 2005; Turner, 2006:383).  This abstract universality23, whereby 
measures are proposed by the dominant world powers that may or may not 
benefit oil-curse sufferers, but which do not challenge the status quo of the 
oil trade, needs to be clear to policy-makers within oil countries.   
Yergin (2008) argues that the dominant neoliberal energy security 
paradigm urgently needs revision.  Kaldor et al. (2007) assert that within 
the context of new oil wars with multiple explanations, attempts to militarily 
control a territory or forcibly re-establish governments in conflict-ridden oil-
exporting countries do not produce greater control over oil supplies or 
prices, but rather greater political and economic instability.  Said (2004:79) 
and Obi (2010) question whether this paradigm is a pretext for global 
powers' commercial and geopolitical interests.   If agents are constrained 
from transformative praxis by a dominant paradigmatic structure of 
neoliberalism and are not enabled by it, then there may be an argument to 
alter the neoliberal (Chang, 2011) or even capitalist superstructure (Taylor, 
2010; Harvey, 2011).  In particular, the expansion of economic policies to 
address socio-political concerns is ultimately an expansion of capitalism 
that should be more thoroughly questioned (Taylor, 2010).  However, 
questions remain as to how this seemingly autopoetic structure can be 
altered and which viable alternatives may exist to replace it.  For example, 
Chang (2011:xv) argues that capitalism is limited and problematic, but that 
the neoliberal version of capitalism must be reformed.   Harvey (2011) 
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 The justification of an action to suit one’s own goals. 
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argues that capitalism itself is crisis-prone and is the structure that needs 
reformation.   
Smith (2008) argues that developmental globalisers, defined as 
transnational networks of dense horizontal connections composed 
predominantly of global activists, pose the main challenge to the neoliberal 
worldview, which they acknowledge as bringing ecological damage and 
widening inequalities between countries.  Democratic globalisers challenge 
the neoliberal focus upon the market, instead seeking to advance 
messages of solidarity and human rights above that of profit maximisation.  
They take the Keynesian view that government intervention is essential in 
regulating capital markets. 
Both the neoliberal and developmental globalisers contest the space at the 
international level and states and interest groups differ in their ability to 
influence global policy processes.  Whilst developmental globalisers are 
active at an international level, they are constrained by neoliberal 
dominance in different sectors and by weak agenda-setting capacities, 
given their lack of coherent aims and difficulty in proposing viable 
alternatives.  Regarding voting power at international institutions, their 
influence is limited.  For example, whereas the UN is arguably the most 
democratic international institution, voting at the financial institutions of the 
World Bank and the IMF is determined by the shares of members’ financial 
contributions.  Thus it is less representative of the world's populations 
(Smith 2008:56,80).    
However, as supplier countries gain more power in the climate of an oil 
scramble, they are more likely to act to protect their own interests and are 
increasingly reluctant to allow external powers to dictate their modus 
operandi (Humphreys et al., 2007; Liou & Musgrave, 2012; Ross, 2012).   
Thus, Ross (2012:4) argues that it is simplistic to blame the foreign powers’ 
intervention or manipulation of oil-rich countries for each aspect of the 
curse.  He asserts that countries such as Venezuela, Iran, Russia, Sudan 
and Burma have been somewhat immune to Western pressure, actively 
defying Western governments, but, nevertheless, they still suffer the same 
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problems.  Equally, he dismisses those who blame the multinationals, 
noting that they have caused many problems, but that their influence has 
significantly waned since the 1970s wave of nationalisations in oil-
countries.  He rightly argues that "if foreign countries were the problem, 
nationalisation should have been the cure" (Ross, 2012:4).  Indeed, certain 
NOCs are richer than the MNOCs since the surge in resource nationalism 
(Obi, 2010:486; Partlett, 2010:78).   
The literature highlights many different national, regional and international 
elements that should be taken into account when devising political and 
socio-economic policies in oil-countries.  It mostly omits that neoliberal 
globalisers at an international level cannot and do not engage in real 
transformative agency within their paradigm, but rather emphasises the 
importance of recognising that powerful international actors have certain 
interests that can align or compete with the interests of a state and its 
citizens.   
2.2.2 Specific policy proposals and their rationale 
This sub-section discusses some of the mechanisms that scholars argue 
could reduce the oil curse.  The policy suggestions are categorised under 
the headings economic measures and socio-political measures.  These 
subsections reflect the current state of the literature, which offers an 
eclectic mixture of measures to solve specific elements of the curse, but 
where efforts are lacking to systemise policies with few holistic policy 
proposals that specifically aim to transform the deeper mechanisms at work 
(Lowi, 2010:xii; Gaspar, 2011; Dunning, 2005; Barbier, 2003:253).  Given 
the difficulty in globally addressing the constellationality24 of causal 
mechanisms linked to the curse, policies are often country and context 
specific.  As Robinson et al. (2006:448-9) assert, political leaders in 
developing countries generally decide relatively autonomously when and 
how much oil to extract and as Lowi (2010) shows they decide the pace at 
which to push reforms forward, so that any solution must be accepted 
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 Constellationality is a critical realist term used to describe the coincidence of real 
distinctions and connections in the world (Hartwig, 2007:79). 
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internally.  This section purposefully omits any critique of the specific 
policies that involve industry participation such as the EITI and the Global 
Compact.  These are discussed in the following chapter. 
2.2.2.1 Economic measures  
Proposed policies aimed at overcoming the oil curse include strengthening 
the financial system (Van der Ploeg & Poelhekke: 2008), economic 
diversification,  maximising and cushioning resource revenues to ensure 
higher long-term revenues, less volatility and added stability against 
external shocks (Le Billon, 2005; Bannon & Collier, 2003:12),25 long-term 
contracts and insurance mechanisms to smooth out revenue flows (Ross, 
2003:24), greater financial transparency in the oil sector, government and 
company reporting and stronger anti-corruption measures (Humphreys et 
al., 2007:324), fairer resource redistribution (Shaxson, 2007) and longer 
planning horizons (Robinson et al., 2006).  Humphreys et al. (2007:325) 
also note that to avoid boom-bust patterns, ways to hedge oil risks should 
be sought and international lenders should exercise caution in allowing 
countries to borrow using potential future rents if they will accrue excessive 
debt.  Collier and Hoeffler (2005:632) argue that contracts could transfer 
more price risk to big companies and less to governments.  As Heal 
(2007:157) claims, oil producers are not rich per se and proper calculations 
of a country’s true national wealth would discourage short-term 
overspending and encourage countries to use capital markets wisely.  
Stiglitz (2007:23) notes that governments should endeavour to get full value 
for their resources.    
Wenar (2008) proposes using international legal action to raise tariffs 
against unethical actors.  He argues that elites, who appropriate the rents 
from sales, steal from their citizens so that MNOCs that buy and sell this oil 
are dealing in stolen goods and should face legal action in countries like the 
US.  He argues that for countries like China, which may seek to replace 
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Western interests in developing countries on the back of such legislation, 
an equivalent anti-theft tariff could be applied on their goods into the West.  
The idea of raising tariffs against unethical behaviour is interesting from a 
normative perspective, although the costs of potential tariff wars should 
also be considered.   Nevertheless, Wenar's analysis raises some 
interesting assumptions.  He assumes that a specific country could be a 
neutral global policeman and that other countries would submit to its moral 
authority.  Wenar is not the only author to assume that Western companies 
are more likely to behave ethically.  Kojucharov (2007:492) claims that 
Chinese oil companies are less worried about the environment, human 
rights abuses and corruption.  However, as Cooper (2010:315-6) asserts, 
Chinese companies are not immune to the costs of corruption or poor 
governance and there is the risk that they become a convenient scapegoat.  
Indeed, the behaviour of Chinese companies needs further research 
(Turner & Pugh, 2006:477). 
Several authors propose emulating the policies of resource-rich countries 
that have avoided the curse.  These policies include: i) the Norwegian 
government's petroleum fund (GPF), which accumulates budget surpluses, 
helping to even out oil revenue spending and balancing the economy; and 
(ii) Botswana's use of a fiscal and public financial management system with 
multiyear development plans to manage diamond wealth.  Kronenberg 
(2004) argues that resource-rich countries should copy such development-
focused investment.  In Norway, he notes that the state invests almost 90% 
of oil revenues into infrastructure, education and foreign pension funds.  
Therefore, Norway mitigates the Dutch disease’s effects by spending only 
part of its oil revenues internally and spreading resource wealth evenly 
amongst the population.  However, as Larsen (2006) shows, such policies 
are country-specific, as several variables are in play that explain why 
Norway appears to have escaped the curse.  For example, stabilisation 
funds only work in countries with strong institutional frameworks, where 
political leaders will not raid them (Humphreys et al., 2007:325).  Moreover, 
Acemoglu et al. (2001; 2002:1231; 2003:76), moreover, argue that 
countries which industrialised first have the best institutional quality and are 
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better prepared to prevent the causes and effects of the resource curse.  
Kronenberg (2004:425) offers Malaysia as a better model.  Indeed, 
Malaysia has managed to diversify its economy, thereby overcoming 
natural resource dependence (Noh, 2013).  Nevertheless, in my opinion, 
the emergence of this Malaysian model is the result of highly contingent 
spatio-temporalities unique to Malaysia and, as such, it may be difficult for 
other oil-rich countries suffering from the curse to duplicate it (see Noh, 
2013).   
The Alaskan redistributive model is also cited as a solution to reduce large 
inequality gaps.  Indeed, Shaxson (2007:1135-9) makes a strong case for a 
direct redistribution of oil revenues and a subsequent tax on income.  This, 
he argues would create horizontal, not vertical, relations and remove 
grievances about oil-money mismanagement.  Whilst such an approach is 
often criticised as assistentialistic, Shaxson argues that it could actually 
break the cultures of dependence found in many petrostates.  There are 
several reasons why redistribution could be problematic as argued by 
Humphreys et al. (2007:15); nevertheless, it clearly recognises the citizens' 
oil ownership and could be relevant to certain countries.   
Several authors argue that oil fund (re)distribution should be organised at 
an international level (Le Billon, 2003:413; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 
2003:18; Humphreys et al., 2007:327).  Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 
(2003:18) argue that the World Bank could potentially play a role in 
transferring oil rents to citizens by using the Alaska Fund model, thereby 
preventing revenues from reaching corrupt officials.  Humphreys et al. 
(2007:327) advocate the establishment of a third-party natural resource 
fund management service in the form of a global clearinghouse, which 
could manage natural resource funds to ensure that strict rules are applied 
to access revenues.  They contend that this would strengthen the 
producing nations’ sovereignty.  In my view, however, they fail to address 
the normative and symbolic questions surrounding the circumstances under 
which selected sovereign powers of a state should be handed to 
international institutions such as the World Bank.  As mentioned above, 
who is to monitor the World Bank's actions?  These aside, a state transfer 
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of powers to an international body is not well-accepted in developed 
democracies (prominent UK politicians’ anti-European discourse is a well-
known example) and it is questionable whether politicians and citizens in 
the developing world would be more inclined to hand over sovereign 
powers, especially considering the scars left by their colonial histories.   
Revenue transparency and accountability are popular themes in the 
literature.  Radon (2007:96) asserts that "transparency is key to achieving 
public acceptance of a contract", enabling civil society to provide checks 
and balances where formal mechanisms are inadequate, dispelling 
concerns over greed and corruption and preventing governments from 
agreeing to terms that citizens would find unacceptable (Radon, 2007:96-
97).  Whilst anti-corruption crusades have often been heralded by Western 
governments, these same governments (such as the UK or US) allow tax 
havens or bearer-share companies, which facilitate corruption, to exist 
upon territories over which they exercise control.  Stiglitz (2004) discusses 
secret bank accounts, which undermine development by facilitating 
corruption.  Humphreys et al. (2007:328) propose the establishment of a 
global office on oil and gas revenue management.  This office would collate 
information on oil and gas contracts in individual countries around the 
world, creating standardised on-line forms for filing contracts and disclosing 
public expenditure, thereby enabling better oversight.  However, 
Humphreys does not suggest who would oversee or fund this body.   
Government and industry revenue transparency with adequate supervision 
are important steps towards change (Collier, 2010:1128; Gary & Karl, 
2003:6; Ross, 2012:10).  As I argue later, transparency alone cannot 
change behaviour, but behavioural change is difficult without transparency.  
The dichotomy of voluntary versus mandatory regulation is also discussed 
in this context.  As I contend, transparency initiatives can help to more 
clearly locate agency in a capitalist system of seemingly nebulous 





2.2.2.2 Socio-political measures 
In addition to the economic measures, authors propose a range of 
governance-based, socio-political measures aimed at altering both 
governance structures and agential behaviour.  These are now discussed.    
It is generally accepted that it is good to improve bad institutions, but it is 
often unclear which strategic institutions to change and how change should 
be implemented (Stevens & Dietsche, 2008:60).  Transformative praxis 
does not generally translate into complete, immediate change, but as the 
TMSA indicates change can be iterative and processual.  Cleaver 
(2001:34) contends that resource management can be improved by 
strengthening existing institutions through a process of institutional 
bricolage, rather than imposing alien structures.  Abstract theoretical ideas, 
however helpful, are insufficient.  As institutional make-up is influenced by a 
conscious scrutiny of some beliefs and an unconscious acceptance of 
others, praxis is also determined by totems and taboos.  Indeed, the 
imposition of modern institutional arrangements may erode, and not build, 
social capital by failing to recognise accepted social and cultural norms.  
Thus, policy-makers should reflect upon such norms to avoid institutional 
reform that may appear costly and illegitimate (Cleaver, 2001:34).   
Institutional reform in oil-rich countries is a major concern in the literature 
as weak institutions struggle to manage oil revenue flow in a fair, 
transparent and pro-development way (Kojucharov, 2007:490; Ballentine & 
Nitzschke, 2003; Bulte et al., 2005:1039).   Of particular concern are the 
issues of corruption, the absence of state-society linkages and the need for 
greater broad-based participation in government decision-making 
(Humphreys et al., 2007:326; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Karl, 2007; Turner & 
Pugh, 2006).  Kolstad and Wiig (2009:5321-2) argue that to encourage 
political leaders to act in the public interest: i) classic taxation methods 
should be used to finance the government; and ii) impartiality-enhancing 
institutions should be established.  However, as Kurtz and Brooks 
(2011:763) argue, this would need to be accompanied by greater public 
policy efforts and human capital spending to truly empower citizens.  
Additionally, Rajan and Zingales (2006) suggest that institutional reform 
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could reduce social inequality if it can be used to gain the support of 
obstructionist constituencies, who otherwise seek to maintain the status 
quo by circumventing institutional constraints.   
Strategic government decision-making regarding oil operations is also 
proposed to tackle the curse.  In conflict areas with oil, Fearon (2005:28) 
argues that governments could even design measures to specifically tackle 
the increase in conflict dynamics, including securing oil pipelines to cut this 
source off from rebel looting, which is logical, but often hard to implement, 
as seen in Colombia.  Ultimately, governments could also decide to only 
admit companies with a reputation of ethical best-practice to their 
territories.  In particular where oil is situated in conflict areas, countries 
could select companies that, for example, refuse to pay extortion (Bannon 
& Collier, 2003:15; Ross, 2002).  Although the non-payment of extortion 
can raise other normative issues concerning employee protection.   
Several authors advocate using diplomacy to help conflict-torn petro-states 
at both a regional and a global level.  Given the nature of regional conflict 
complexes and regional shadow trade, there is arguably a role for improved 
regional cooperation within regional organisations (Studdard, 2004:13).  
Conflict-prone countries often lack law enforcement capacity and have 
insufficient border policing and intelligence.  In this context, policies should 
address the functions that war economies may serve to participants.  For 
example, in order to counter illicit cross-border activities, such as smuggling 
in countries with weak border policing capacities, structural incentives for 
licit trade could be contemplated (Malone & Nitzsche, 2005; Studdard, 
2004:8).  Moreover, Ross contends that enough is known about resource-
inspired secessionist movements to predict where they will occur (Ross, 
2004:329).  Thus, he advocates heightened preventive diplomacy, as once 
resource wars begin they are difficult to stop (Ross, 2002:27).  Ballentine 
(2003:17) argues that it is the international community’s responsibility to 
help policy-makers criminalise activities rather than groups.  Indeed, the 
international community may label a group as criminals that is seen by its 
countrymen as freedom fighters with legitimate grievances.  Malone and 
Nitzsche (2005) discuss the dangers of criminalising such agents in the 
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climate of the war against terrorism, as rebels are relabelled criminal 
terrorists (see chapter 4, section 3).  Moreover, focusing upon pariah actors 
is sub-optimal from a policy perspective, considering the various features 
that drive a war economy (Cooper, 2006a:20).  Indeed, the international 
community also needs to seriously consider poverty reduction, income 
generation and support for non-business sectors as market logic continues 
to fail to provide welfare (Turner & Pugh, 2006:476).   
Another set of proposed measures relate to long-standing environmental 
concerns.   Humphreys et al. (2007:324) argue for the greater use of 
security whereby companies post bonds to anticipate future clean-ups, 
assuming that companies would strive to prevent environmental damage, 
not leaving countries with huge environmental costs.  Le Billon (2005:58) 
goes further, suggesting that international institutions should manage the 
demand for key resources.  Concerning international institutions’ powers, 
he proposes sanctions to address disputes arising from diffuse resources 
and military capture for point resources.26  However, it is debatable whether 
international institutions or organisations have the legitimacy to plan 
countries' economic interests.  For example, at this planning level, a 
country’s interest to leave its oil in the ground until it can be properly used, 
as advocated by Humphreys et al. (2007:15), might be overridden in favour 
of market logic or for what is viewed as the greater good. 
Whilst most authors fail to discuss social agents’ roles in mitigating the 
effects of the curse, civil society has a role to play.  Indeed, inequalities in 
oil wealth distribution do not, once identified, have to lead to individual 
opportunism, conflict or negative development.  These can also generate 
greater cooperation and solidarity (Said, 2004:81).  Social forces with 
emancipatory social agendas can bring agential or structural change.  Their 
role is largely neglected in the natural resource literature, which, as Rosser 
(2006:2) argues, is a major oversight given that: i) social patterns 
fundamentally shape the functioning of state institutions; and ii) citizen 
pressure can impact resource-rich countries.  Damage attributed to the oil 
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 However, as Cooper (2010:312) points out, arms and commodities sanctions are often not 
properly enforced and in practice they are unequally applied. 
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curse paradigm has triggered campaigns for both specific and integrated 
causes involving the building of cross-border and cross-disciplinary activist 
networks and alliances (Said, 2004:77).  Whilst some groups have 
protested, others have monitored local and national governments, and also 
private actors such as MNOCs with a rejectionist or supportive approach to 
globalisation (Alo, 2007; Said, 2004:88).  Moreover, some agents have 
engaged in lifestyle politics, boycotting companies that engage in 
undesirable practices to raise awareness of transformative praxis (Smith, 
2008:ix).   
Chapter Conclusion  
The information discussed in this chapter serves to contextualise each of 
the subsequent chapters.  Indeed, as I will show, Colombia and Venezuela 
have both been affected by the oil curse.  In this chapter, I have shown that 
internal factors such as the Dutch disease, poor governance, corruption, 
clientelism, inefficiency and an uneven distribution of oil revenues can 
contribute to, and perpetuate an oil curse.  I looked at the greed, grievance 
and feasibility theories.  I argued that feasibility is not a causal mechanism, 
but is rather a necessary condition of most intentional action and that whilst 
greed and grievance are causal, their use needs to be refined in each 
specific case to increase their explanatory power and to more 
comprehensively convey the complexity of agents’ motivations and 
structural considerations that link oil to conflict.   
This chapter, moreover, has used DCR’s dialectical logic and the concepts 
of scarcity and abundance to contextualise the agency that surrounds 
international oil relations.  I argued that the oil curse is also externally 
caused and perpetuated, although foreign powers and relations of external 
dependency are not solely to blame.  Indeed, the oil curse can only be 
generated in an open system so that exogenous factors should be 
considered if we are to understand and ultimately tackle the curse.  As 
such, neoliberal approaches to solve this problem, based on an assumption 
of corrigibility, are often reductionist, overlooking the role of neoliberal 
capitalism in creating and maintaining asymmetric relations.  This point is 
further discussed in the subsequent chapter in the context of international 
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support for CSR and also in chapter 5, as the Venezuelan government is 
working to change this status quo.   
Regarding solutions, I argue that none of the proposals above are 
adequate on their own to transform the curse into a blessing.  
Nevertheless, in the subsequent chapter, I make the case that government 
and industry revenue transparency are important initial steps towards 
countering the curse.  Without transparency, behavioural change is difficult 





The evolution and discourse of CSR 
This chapter reviews academic literature-based CSR metanarratives that 
both transcend and affect MNOCs’ CSR discourse and praxis in Venezuela 
and Colombia.  Given its breadth, this chapter does not offer a 
comprehensive overview of the entire CSR literature.27  It discusses: i) the 
elusive and contested concept of CSR and the dialectic between discourse 
and practice that constructs it; ii) why CSR is practiced; iii) standards to 
improve corporate responsibility/behaviour and whether CSR should be 
regulated; and iv) MNOCs’ dialectical relationship with the socio-political field 
in determining CSR.   
Academic opinion is divided on whether MNOCs’ CSR can make a valuable 
social contribution.28  In my opinion, companies can be agents of positive 
social transformation, when individuals within companies make ethically 
empowering decisions.  For example, Saudi Aramco has supported social 
change by employing women in a country (Saudi Arabia) and within a sector 
(extractive) that traditionally exclude women from the workforce.  Regarding 
community development-based projects, these can create asymmetric 
relations of dependency and transport certain ideologies, however 
companies can equally use CSR as part of a more global vision of social 
emancipation to empower local community actors.  Therefore, I do not 
dispute the potential of CSR to do good in this chapter.   
However, regardless of the sincerity of MNOCs’ employees who conduct 
CSR, in a Žižekian sense, by practising CSR, modern liberal communists 
contribute to the maintenance and reproduction of the neoliberal capitalist 
system with its deep-rooted economic inequalities by facilitating intermittent 
                                                          
27
 A Google search that I conducted on 6 June 2013 retrieved 75 million entries on “CSR” in 
0.8 seconds. 
28
 The CSR examined in this thesis is companies’ external social action that goes beyond 
compliance with regulatory norms and regulated behaviour to benefit local communities.  
Internal measures taken by companies to improve employee welfare are not the focus of this 
chapter.  The scope of this CSR is understood as relating to the: i) content domain 
(ideological and categorising); ii) stakeholder identification; and iii) operational diffusion of 
CSR programmes.  
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wealth redistribution amongst those who might otherwise challenge this same 
system (Žižek, 2009).  This is not explicitly addressed by much of the 
contemporary CSR literature.  As I show below, the absence of this 
consideration leads certain authors to incongruously contend that CSR can 
solve wide-ranging, multi-scalar problems that it is unsuited to address.  
Accordingly, CSR-related discourse and language can obfuscate the 
interests of the global elite by making MNOCs’ social action appear 
natural/commonsensical, overlooking the fact that MNOCs are ultimately 
constrained by the profit motive within the current neoliberal capitalist 
paradigm.  This problem is compounded by the absence of a clear definition 
of what actually constitutes CSR and by the legitimisation of the common 
sense discourse by various government, civil society and industry actors who 
dismiss deep-seated tensions regarding CSR’s raison d’être to primarily 
focus upon contingent debates on CSR’s quality, quantity, scope and 
voluntary/regulated nature (i.e. does it matter why companies do CSR if they 
do it?).  In some countries, corporate intervention is currently a necessary 
means to provide essential services not supplied by an absent/inefficient 
state.  Where this is the case, I argue that CSR should not replace 
government welfare.   
3.1 What is CSR?   
After 50 years, the CSR literature is still debating the concrete definition of 
CSR, due to authors’ inability to agree upon business’ responsibilities and 
how CSR should be socially constructed in particular contexts (Herzig & 
Moon, 2011:4; Mitchell, 1995:531-2; Duhlsrud, 2008:6).  Existing definitions 
differ, but largely cover stakeholder, social, economic, voluntary and 
environmental dimensions of company action.  Duhlsrud (2008:5) notes that 
the two most commonly used definitions are variations of: i) "companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interaction with the stakeholders on a voluntary basis" (EC, 2001b); 
and ii) "the commitment of business is to contribute to sustainable economic 
development, working with employees, their families, the local community 
and society at large to improve their quality of life" (Holme & Watts, 2000).  
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Both statements are vague, advocating corporate action that varies in scope 
and content.   
As a research field, CSR lacks a Kuhnian normal scientific paradigm and 
spans different academic disciplines (Lockett et al., 2006:133).  No particular 
narrative has prevailed that resolves conceptual tensions between normative 
descriptions of companies' social responsibilities, CSR’s field of operation 
and how business functions (Crane et al., 2008:4-7; Melé, 2008).  Thus, CSR 
is used somewhat interchangeably or overlaps with other cognate concepts 
such as: i) Corporate Citizenship, emphasising companies' public sphere 
involvement (Birch, 2001; Matten & Crane, 2005); ii) Sustainable Business, 
interlinking business, people and the environment so that their flourishing is 
mutually-dependent (Gladwin et al., 1995; Ramus & Montiel, 2005); iii) Triple 
Bottom Line, referring to companies’ shift from a single financial bottom line 
to encompass social and environmental performances (Gray & Milne, 2002); 
iv) Corporate Social Responsiveness, which focuses upon how companies 
fulfill their responsibilities to stakeholders (Vercic & Grunig, 2000); v) 
Corporate Philanthropy, which emphasises recipients’ inability to demand 
CSR (L'Etang, 1994; Porter & Kramer, 2002); vi) Stakeholder Theory, which 
assumes that values are an intrinsic part of doing business (Freeman et. al, 
2004; Jones et al., 2002; Donaldson & Preston, 1995); vii) Corporate Social 
Performance, which is the configuration of socially responsible principles, 
policies, programmes, processes of responsiveness and observable 
outcomes in companies' social relationships (Wood, 1991; Sethi, 1975); viii) 
Corporate Governance, whereby companies exceed minimum requirements  
upon them (Schwab, 2008:110); and ix) Social Entrepreneurship, which is the 
transformation of socially and environmentally responsible ideas into 
products or services (Schwab, 2008:114). 
Lockett et al. (2006:133) argue that business praxis has primarily determined 
what is understood as CSR, given most definitions’ descriptive inaccuracies 
or unoperationability.  As the literature offers a broad range of theories, 
companies can construct a pick’n’mix version of CSR that pursues a 
particular logic, agenda, strategy and/or interest (Quaak et al., 2006:294).  
Thus, it is the dialectical relationship between discourse and corporate praxis 
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that defines CSR’s meaning and potential future praxis as MNOCs' practice 
negates, reproduces and transforms the status quo and the literature 
theorises and/or criticises.   
Unsurprisingly, as the social discourse of CSR is vague and somewhat 
disconnected from development debates, there are numerous self-identified 
responsible corporate citizens (Egels-Zandén & Kallifatides, 2009:265).  
Contradictorily, Fleming and Jones (2013:6-7) assert that CSR is over and, 
indeed, that it never actually began, as, amongst others, if the corporation 
were truly socialised, there would be significant transformations in business 
and society.  Lynch Fannon (2005:5) notes that much of what is referred to 
as CSR reflects companies' adherence to legal standards that protect them 
from litigation.  However, in my view, legal prudence is not the only factor that 
motivates companies to supersede certain legal requirements in host 
countries and to execute social programmes to benefit/compensate 
surrounding community members.   
In this vein, I would argue that the same conceptual opaqueness that 
appears to leave business greater freedom to choose its path simultaneously 
undermines it.  Indeed, Herzig and Moon (2011:3) state that CSR 
encompasses expectations upon companies to be responsible for society by 
avoiding, reducing or compensating for its social and environmental impact, 
whilst contributing to social welfare and being responsible to society in terms 
of social accountability.  Thus, stakeholders also formulate definitions of CSR 
and judge corporate praxis accordingly.   
Responding to such expectations may not always be possible.  When 
Friedman (1970) argued that CSR is a subversive doctrine, that in 
accordance with individual agreement theory, the role of business is business 
and its sole social, functional and moral duty is to achieve wealth-creating 
profit and employment by engaging in free and fair competition, the premises 
of his reasoning are correct.  Company behaviour is structured by the global 
capitalist framework, which dictates that companies need to make profit, 
provide incentives and stimulate investment in innovation, risk and 
competitiveness to strive and survive.  Companies cannot consistently 
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conduct social action at the expense of profits, as without profit companies 
cannot do anything else (Gray & Milne, 2002; Moon, 2005).  Indeed, 
corporate behaviour is legally constrained by their profit-making 
responsibilities to their shareholders, which must be considered when 
defining CSR.  Shareholders move their money to the best investment, often 
evaluated based on returns, and vote for company directors (Mitchell, 
1995:507,533).  Investors with a short-term perspective may find that social 
and environmental objectives do not always coincide with the marketplace 
reality of business profitability, although in the long-term, community 
investments can also bring value to the company (Millon, 2002:902; Lynch 
Fannon, 2005:1; Doane, 2005:223).  Today, most major MNOCs embrace 
social action projects that are unrelated to their core business, often with 
government and NGO support, although these remain part of their business 
case.   
Current standards do not challenge the logic of profit maximisation, which 
initially necessitated such CSR initiatives (Schwarz & Tilling, 2009:297).  
Mitchell (1995:486,501) posits that wealth maximisation substitutes the idea 
of the good in liberal theory, acting as a legal constraint upon companies, 
who act accordingly, justifying the lower priority given to the consequences of 
their actions upon others.  Whilst companies are legally bound to make profit, 
civil society in particular will remain dissatisfied with companies' moral 
judgments and inability to deliver sustainable development to developing 
countries (Mitchell, 1995:531-2).  In this context, companies like Total will 
continue to reach tenth position in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index, whilst 
NGOs vehemently criticise it for having fuelled oppression in Burma 
alongside the CNOOC (Dow Jones, 2011; Doane, 2005:218; BCUK, 2006; 
AOW, 2008:9).   
Thus, certain authors posit that a new paradigm is needed to replace the 
current neoliberal status quo, a paradigm that decouples the modern 
corporation’s fundamental aims from shareholder profit-maximisation (Doane, 
2005:216; Mitchell, 1995; Fleming & Jones, 2013).  Indeed, the question 
whether companies engage in CSR to promote a more humane capitalism or 
to resolve its contradictions (Sklair & Miller, 2010:473) implicitly recognises 
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the boundaries of this system as the CSR debate lays bare the weaknesses 
of profit-focused, capitalist globalisation as a socio-economic system for 
bringing equality and social justice (Sklair & Miller, 2010:473; Doane, 
2005:216).  The superstructure and the infrastructure are mutually 
dependent.  Whilst the concept of CSR legitimises neoliberal capitalism, by 
assuming a particular status quo in which companies operate as normal and 
give an affordable amount to social action (Blowfield, 2007), nevertheless, 
neoliberal capitalism cannot provide any other form of corporate social action 
than CSR, given companies’ needs.  Therefore, those who expect corporate 
behaviour regulation to tackle wider issues of neoliberalism and corporate 
power will be disappointed, as the neoliberal framework presupposes a 
capitalist realism with a business ontology, or the capture of the social by the 
economic and the needs of the corporation over those of the individual 
(Banerjee, 2007:146; Fisher, 2009). 
3.2 Profit, profitability, PR, norms and pressure as causal reasons 
Friedman’s (1970) argument that companies conduct CSR to further private 
agendas is strong; even apparently selfless philanthropic acts may build 
socio-political capital.  Žižek (2009:19) similarly argues: “In liberal communist 
ethics, the ruthless pursuit of profit is counteracted by charity. Charity is the 
humanitarian mask hiding the face of economic exploitation.”  The 1980s and 
1990s saw Big Oil face revelations of environmental, human rights and 
conflict-related malpractice, so that Western MNOCs needed a makeover to 
win friends and placate enemies; hence Utting & Ives (2006) couple this need 
with CSR’s dynamic rise.  Given the flurry of neo-liberally framed, CSR-
related social events and social structures, this strategy has been 
successfully self-perpetuating.  Indeed, a dialectical movement towards 
cross-sector CSR acceptance has resulted from hegemonic strategising and 
manoeuvring to ward off pressures from below “with laggards gradually 
coming on board the csr bandwagon” (Utting & Ives, 2006:16).  In this 
section, I do not challenge the veracity or even the primacy of the private 
agenda motivation, however, I would argue that viewed diachronically, CSR 
and the causal factors that shape it are accordingly becoming more complex 
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given rising external pressures that encourage MNOCs to act reactively, 
proactively and predictively.  
3.2.1 The business case: profit, profitability and PR 
The primary business argument for CSR is that it increases profit and 
profitability whilst improving company-public relations.  More precisely, it is 
argued that the dichotomy between companies' social and financial 
performance is false and that companies do not endanger their core business 
by using discretionary spending to help needy stakeholders (Porter & 
Kramer, 2002:257; Dunfee, 2008:346-347).  Various studies contend that 
increased social costs can be offset by the financial advantages of reduced 
overheads, tax breaks and boosted revenue growth (ILO, 2005; UK 
Government, 2004; Martin Curran, 2005).  In particular, data has emerged 
linking companies that actively implement efficiency-based, environmental 
initiatives with positive financial results (Frynas, 2008:278; Mazurkiewicz, 
2004:6-7).   
Moreover, profitability, also rests upon intangible assets such as image, 
corporate knowledge, culture and reputation, which although hard to quantify, 
are strategic profit-building assets that increase competitive advantage and 
tangibly translate into sales, permits, subsidies, investments and awards 
(Martin Curran, 2005:22).  A CSR leader may gain political leverage and 
grants, improving its standing with home and host governments and reducing 
political pressure to change by promoting voluntary standards and acts of 
CSR as an attractive alternative to regulation (Lynch Fannon, 2005:20-21; 
Sklair & Miller, 2010:487; Turner, 2006).  As MNOCs essentially sell the 
same core products and compete for limited oil reserves, CSR policies can 
help differentiate individual companies from their competitors by appealing to 
different audiences, without mentioning the potentially controversial origins of 
their products (Frynas, 2009:36).29  
                                                          
29
 Chevron (2010), for example, placed a series of inserts in The Economist, i.e. "We built 
the world's fifth-largest company. Then helped to build 50,000 smaller ones", using their 
CSR for PR.  
86 
 
In particular, targeted, context-focused philanthropy that enables companies 
to leverage other social groups’ and institutions’ expertise can improve their 
commercial advantage whilst bringing social gains.  Contributing to a 
university, for example, may strengthen the local base of particular skills, 
prove cheaper than in-house training and attract future employees (Porter & 
Kramer, 2002:256-62).  CSR has provided companies with a tool to engage 
in surrounding communities to provide a win-win scenario.  Whilst this may 
be a rationale for engaging in CSR, by viewing CSR solely in terms of 
corporate objectives, its potential effectiveness may be reduced where a 
business case cannot be made that a particular policy will benefit a particular 
set of stakeholders (Frynas, 2008:277).   
Companies are not isolated from their surrounding communities, thus they 
may engage in CSR to create profitability, but negative practices, or a failure 
to act in certain circumstances, may harm their bottom-line, resulting in fines 
or litigation, damaging their reputation and future competitiveness (Reich, 
1998).  Environmental negligence that led to accidents such as Deepwater, 
Brent Spar, Piper Alpha and Exxon Valdez incurred financial, environmental 
and reputational costs, exposing their theory-praxis inconsistencies.  MNOCs 
face a greater risk of reputation loss than other corporations with a wider 
range of stakeholders and a reputation and image that crosses borders into 
different political arenas (Zyglidopoulos, 2002; Lynch Fannon, 2005).  The 
appearance of three MNOC funded town halls in one Nigerian village, or 
contributions to the Angolan president's personal charity under the CSR 
banner (Frynas, 2005;2009), are increasingly questioned and reproached as 
the global field changes and agents increasingly urge MNOCs to consider 
development issues, or risk losing social or political capital (Blowfield, 2005).   
Moreover, companies have had to adapt to challenging operational contexts, 
compensating for variables such as regime changes, which can radically alter 
a host countries' political landscape between right and left, democracy and 
dictatorship, secularism and theocracy, pro-business and pro-union, or friend 
and foe of their home country (Bucheli, 2006:1).  Many have faced 
antagonism from agents within host countries, manifested as anti-
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colonialism, communism, economic nationalism or religious fundamentalism 
(Bucheli, 2006:1; Lee, 2006).   
Thus, as a communication tool, CSR can offset a negative image.  This 
serves different functions.  Firstly, it attracts employees from ‘Generation Y’, 
who are disillusioned with big business, enabling them to evoke a Žižekian 
(1989) “enlightened false consciousness” by engaging in CSR (Fleming & 
Jones, 2013:77,88).  Secondly, it provides hard-pressed journalists with 
positive corporate stories (Sklair & Miller, 2010:475),30 although it favours 
concessions and appeasement over tackling anti-business views (Wolf, 
2004:9) or the structural problems underlying them.  Whilst, from a moral 
perspective, genuine altruism should be evidenced by a lack of 
advertisements and media attention, media-avoidance suggests that 
companies are doing too little.  Hence, in the current framework, CSR has 
become an essential part of companies' PR and, thus, its business case.   
3.2.2 Norms and pressures in a globalised world   
Having discussed the traditional business case arguments that shape CSR, 
this subsection discusses the external norms and public, political and peer 
pressures that encourage companies to consider a widening range of 
stakeholders and to assume traditional state responsibilities.  As shown 
below, in the globalisation era, norms and pressure are often intertwined. 
As Lee (2006) states, “we are in the Globalisation era”.  This statement 
describes a dialectically interconnected set of discourses and real material 
transformations (Fairclough, 2010:452).  The private sector’s role in the 
global political economy has changed with the freer movement of people, 
goods, trade, capital, services and ideas (Quiggan, 2005:9).  Neoliberals 
argue that whilst globalisation somewhat constrains national governments, it 
offers unparalleled opportunity to those who comply with its requirements 
(Quiggan, 2005:9; Strahovnik, 2009:210), which Friedman (2000:101-111) 
described as a golden straightjacket.  For MNCs, globalisation has brought 
                                                          
30
 Whilst this example dates back to 1999, notably, amidst smoking-related health scares, 
tobacco giant, Philip Morris, spent USD 75 million on charitable contributions in 1999 and 
USD 100 million discussing it (Porter & Kramer, 2002:256); this illustrates the importance of 
self-serving CSR and PR to the business case.   
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significant opportunities, extending the international dominance of neoliberal 
capitalism and allowing some to surpass states’ wealth-creation (Fairclough, 
2010:452).  
The rise of social accountability is linked to the view that corporations are 
political actors with political responsibilities to contribute positively to global 
governance (Rasche, 2009:192; Sherer & Palazzo, 2008:426; Crane et al., 
2008:6).  However, industry has long been politically active, lobbying 
governments with a powerful and well-skilled interest group that defends and 
promotes its own interests (Cortese et al., 2010:76).  Indeed, between 1998 
and 2011, the oil and gas sector was the sixth largest spender on lobbying in 
the US, spending USD 1.150 billion (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011).  
As Utting (2007:701) notes, CSR’s developmental benefits can be 
counterbalanced by companies' hard lobbying for policies associated with 
deregulation, labour market flexibilisation and fiscal reform that weaken 
institutions and social protection systems.  Studies that have steered CSR-
related questions away from governance fail to face the reality that 
companies already intervene in political processes (Frynas, 2008:279).   
Whilst an unscientific comparison, one indicator of MNOCs’ bargaining power 
with oil producers is to compare companies’ annual turnover with the latters’ 
GDP and oil exports.  According to the Forbes ranking, which accounts for 
sales, profit, assets and market value, ten of the world's largest public 
companies are oil and gas producers.31  In 2010, Royal Dutch Shell, 
ExxonMobil and BP were amongst eight MNOCs in the top ten for sales 
turnover and had the second, third and fourth highest sales turnovers of any 
listed public company, with respective turnovers of USD 368.05 billion, USD 
383 billion and USD 297.1 billion (Forbes, 2011).  Compared with Saudi 
Arabia or Russia, the world's largest oil exporters, whose 2010 oil exports 
amounted to USD 205.4 billion and USD 203.7 billion, and whose 2010 GDP 
amounted to USD 443.7 billion and USD 1,465 billion respectively, measured 
on turnover, MNOCs are weaker but still significant actors.  However, 
compared with oil exporters like Iraq, with 2010 oil exports of USD 50 billion 
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 Although importantly NOCs, which are not taken into account in the 2010 Forbes ranking, 
had access to 77% of global oil reserves (Helman, 2010). 
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and a GDP of USD 82.2 billion, Angola with 2010 oil exports of USD 47.703 
billion and a GDP of USD 85.3 billion or Chad with 2011 oil exports of USD 
3.36 billion and a 2010 GDP of 7.85 billion (IMF, 2011), MNOCs have 
considerable financial weight. 
Globalisation has intensified existing CSR debates (Locke, 2002).  Post-cold 
war, capitalism has increasingly transcended the nation-state and markets 
have often preceded social concerns (Sklair, 2000).  MNCs’ national 
allegiances have decreased as they increasingly disperse value chains 
throughout the developing world.  Consequently, their responsibilities and 
loyalties are less well-defined (Teegan et al., 2004:468; Newell, 2005:546).  
In practice, companies have both mitigated and exacerbated developing 
world problems with some offering emancipating CSR programmes and yet 
simultaneously (in)directly constraining sustainable development or human 
rights (Rasche, 2009:194; Goulbourne, 2003; International Alert, 2005; 
Cannon, 1994:42; Banerjee, 2007:145).  One recent example of 
schizophrenic corporate behaviour is illustrated by PetroChina, which the 
government-mandated Norwegian Council on Ethics found to have 
committed human rights abuses in Burma (EarthRights International, 2011), 
but which simultaneously claimed in its 2011 sustainability report to be 
committed to social and economic development wherever it operates 
(PetroChina, 2011:50).  Nevertheless, public pressure turns from the 
government to companies where governments fail to deliver services, forcing 
companies to act (Fitzpatrick, 2000:292).   
The oil sector provides host governments with substantial payments such as 
royalties, taxes, licence fees, dividends and financing for community projects.  
Oil and gas rents can constitute a powerful budgetary instrument and should 
contribute to socio-economic development, however, they often fail to 
tangibly benefit the population (TI, 2011:5).  Thus, states have increasingly 
enlisted companies’ help in the social sector (Mott, 2004; Sapir et al., 2003), 
although companies may also contribute to their failure (i.e. supporting 
unpopular elites, lobbying governments to reduce taxes, undertaking tax 
avoidance strategies or gaining tax remittances, negotiating unfair contracts 
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or taking money out of the country through transfer pricing mechanisms and 
regulatory loopholes).   
Given diminished governmental capacities, the new global challenges, and 
enlightened corporate self-interest, recent global CSR narratives argue that 
CSR should respond to wide-ranging development issues such as ecological 
stress, environmental unsustainability, poverty alleviation, population 
stabilisation, female empowerment, employment creation, human rights 
observance and opportunity redistribution (Sklair & Miller, 2010:474).  
Business is, thus, expected to bring the benefits of market economics, 
creating wealth, supplying markets, generating employment, sustaining 
competitiveness and treating stakeholders justly (Cannon, 1994:34-35), 
whilst positively impacting international development issues (Blowfield, 
2005). 
As public-private partnerships increase, industry has engaged in more public 
activities, building public infrastructure and developing the complementary 
skills-base, further blurring the public-private sector divide.  As a Nigeria-
based Shell operations manager commented, "Things are back to front here 
[...]. The government's in the oil business and we are in local government" 
(Anderson in Hertz, 2001:170).  As Fleming and Jones (2013:xiii) note, 
regarding a US cable released by Wikileaks showing Shell’s infiltration into 
the Nigerian government, such moves are not aimed at improving 
sustainable development, biodiversity and social justice, but rather serve 
economic influence and control.  Indeed, Shell’s president for sub-Saharan 
Africa told US diplomats in this cable that Shell had "seconded people to all 
the relevant ministries" and, therefore, knew "everything that was being done 
in those ministries" (WikiLeaks, 2012).  Notwithstanding Shell’s precarious 
position in Nigeria, the morphing of public and private spheres raises concern 
about emergent forms of neo-corporatism that enable unaccountable power-
sharing between a few governments, international institutions, companies 
and NGOs that are sometimes unrepresentative of society (Holmqvist, 2009; 
Wolf, 2004; Banerjee, 2007).  As firms assume social responsibilities from 
dysfunctional governments, using market tools unavailable to individual 
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governments, it becomes unclear who will monitor corporate behaviour 
where governments cannot (Wolf, 2004:13). 
Some multinationals hire staff locally to benefit or avoid resentment from 
local stakeholders seeking opportunities to escape debilitating poverty 
(Martin Curran, 2005; Hendry, 2006).  They also subcontract work to local 
partners.  In this vein, certain companies have been (in)directly complicit in 
their partners’ unethical actions (Halme et al., 2009; Haltsonen et al, 
2007:48).   
Indeed, private individuals cannot be left to determine public interest (Martin 
Curran, 2005; Frynas, 2009; Lee, 2006).  Industry managers may lack the 
knowledge, skills, ability or competence to tackle social issues.  Engineers 
often lack the soft skills needed to engage in community dialogue, preferring 
to conduct technical initiatives with quantifiable results (Frynas, 2009; Frynas, 
2005).  Whilst business consultations with local communities are primarily 
qualitative, many result in lists of local requests rather than further discussion 
of developmental challenges, resulting in costly, but ineffective programmes 
(Frynas, 2005).  Moreover, as Fleming and Jones (2013:xv) argue, “the 
assumption that a powerful petroleum firm prospecting for oil in Africa might 
also be a warm, communitarian forum for mutual exchange is somewhat 
fantastical.”   
The term corporate social responsibility implies that the corporation cares.  
However, public acceptance of this fact enables companies to use CSR to 
exert power or control over structures and agents.  Holmqvist (2009:68-70) 
illustrates how CSR activities enable greater corporate control in complex 
areas such as poverty and community welfare where people rely upon the 
company.  He argues that where company and social interests diverge, 
companies may manipulate surrounding communities’ needs to influence and 
more easily predict their behavioural patterns.  Furthermore, greater local 
community stakeholder cooperation can provide political capital when 
discussing community decisions that directly affect a company.  
Globalisation has facilitated the development of activist groups that campaign 
individually and collectively as important counterparts to multinationals and 
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governments in terms of global governance (Teegan et al, 2004:464).  
Technological improvements have enabled the media, civil society activists 
and individual bloggers to raise awareness of poor practices (Dorado 
Mazorra, 2003; MacIntosh et al, 1998:140; Newell, 2005:541; Martin Curran, 
2005).  Civil society groups have pressurised companies by; i) lobbying, ii) 
serving on advisory boards as representatives or experts, iii) conducting 
research, iv) holding conferences, v) staging citizens' tribunals, vi) monitoring 
and exposing (in)action, vii) disseminating information to lay constituencies, 
viii) setting/defining agendas, ix) developing and prompting codes of conduct, 
and x) organising boycotts  (Teegan et al, 2004:467).  NGOs, in particular, 
which vary in size, activity, interrelatedness and networks, power and 
geographic dispersion, can use coercive pressure to influence MNOCs on 
such issues as economic justice (i.e. Oxfam, Transparency International or 
Christian Aid), environmental protection (i.e. Friends of the Earth, 
Greenpeace or EarthWatch) or human rights (i.e. Amnesty International or 
Human Rights Watch) (Aguilera et al., 2005:33).  Moreover, such groups 
have sought business partnerships for social and environmental development 
(Doane, 2005:217).  Thus, civil society, is not solely an advocacy force, but 
advances goals and influences corporate policies by engaging with 
companies in: i) strategic partnerships or cooperation agreements; ii) 
common projects; iii) research cooperation or contracting; iv) certification; v) 
offering employee volunteering opportunities; vi) sponsorship; vii) survey; viii) 
roundtables; and ix) dialogue (Kourula, 2009:395).   
Engaging with civil society can bring risk management, social legitimacy, 
reputational benefits and added value to the company and by soliciting its 
guidance, companies can sometimes avoid negative reprisals (Kourula, 
2009:399; Teegan et al, 2004:475).  Doane (2005:223) contends that 
companies can also misuse stakeholder dialogue as a mechanism to evade 
criticism, as companies communicate their intentions to surrounding 
communities to placate them, whilst moving ahead with unpopular projects or 
deflecting attention from real problems.  Thus, in the end, serious 
responsibilities may be deflected back to the governments (Banerjee, 
2007:146; Doane 2005:218; Newell, 2005:546).   
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Companies’ human rights records are increasingly scrutinised and NGOs, 
international institutions such as the OECD and the UN, national 
governments and academia have all tried to set an agenda that ascribes to 
companies both direct and indirect responsibilities to protect human rights 
wherever they operate (Moon, 2005; McInerney, 2005; Aguilera et al., 
2005:33).  In practice, governments are viewed as exclusive human rights’ 
arbitrators and under national and international law, companies only have 
responsibilities within their spheres of activity or influence, as no customary 
principle exists stating that companies are liable for human rights abuses 
outside of this remit (Ruggie, 2007).   
There are two predominant schools of thought on how companies should 
behave in countries with poor human rights records.  The absolutist approach 
advocates immediate withdrawal from such countries.  The gradualist 
approach, however, argues that the private sector should stay and rely upon 
the liberal economic model and markets to produce pressures for democracy 
and human rights vis-à-vis the state (MacIntosh et al., 1998).  This is 
arguably the most common approach and takes a rather Hegelian dialectical 
view of time and history.  Cynically, it also enables Western countries to 
morally justify purchasing oil from countries where the industry has 
exacerbated the human rights situation and it justifies a lack of action by 
industry in defending human rights in a particular country.  However, such 
behaviour is becoming increasingly visible with modern communication and a 
corporate response is required to ensure business confidence (Doane, 
2005:218), but minimal, tokenistic action still remains a viable alternative to 
proper action.  Certain companies have stayed and lobbied host 
governments for change (Hopkins, 2003:78).  However, NGO activism and 
home government pressures have compelled some MNOCs to leave 
countries where they could not meet these actors’ requests.  Where 
companies leave, others can arrive that face less ethical pressure from their 
home countries (Teegan et al., 2004:473; Turner, 2006:382).  As Newell 
(2005:542) notes, whilst increasing pressure is placed on more responsible 
companies to exceed compliance, irresponsible companies face fewer 
checks and balances. 
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Pressure also stems from emerging new concepts that change views on 
CSR.  The term corporate citizenship, for example, reflects an increasingly 
anthropomorphological approach towards companies in society.  Companies 
have legal personalities with incorporation symbolising their birth, names, 
nationalities, domiciles, the right to own assets, immigrate, be criminally liable 
and to die through liquidation and winding-up.  As the discourse surrounding 
business ethics and CSR expands, companies have characters and are 
expected to behave ethically vis-à-vis other citizens with ethical trading and 
responsible marketing (McIntosh et al., 1998).  Whilst intrasubjective 
reasoning occurs within a company, metaphysically attributing agential 
intentionality and autonomy to the company is ethically dangerous, reducing 
company employees’ responsibility for company actions and moral 
accountability (Banerjee, 2007:162; Mitchell, 1995:521).  Indeed, terms and 
surrounding conceptual frameworks matter when examining CSR and where 
responsibilities lie. 
3.3 Legislated and voluntary standards  
Standards have been created at different governmental and institutional 
levels to pressurise companies to conduct more and/or 'better' CSR in 
developing countries.  Fundamental to these measures is an absence of trust 
that companies will use their considerable power to behave in a moral or just 
manner.  This distrust emanates not only from activists who contest the 
dominance of neoliberalism and neoliberal globalisation, but as shown below, 
liberal governments are increasingly distrustful of corporations,  although 
they actively advocate CSR.  Nevertheless, notwithstanding recent initatives 
to promote financial transparency, states and international institutions have 
adopted a softly-softly approach towards MNOCs, using instrumental, 
relational and moral incentives to coerce them to engage in specific CSR, 
rather than regulating on this topic (Aguilera et al., 2005).  The uptake of the 
resulting voluntary initiatives is concentrated amongst Western firms (Ruggie, 
2007:24), which have pushed for self-regulation rather than state intervention 
as a means to lessen pressures for reform (UNCTAD, 1999; Turner, 2006; 
Knight & Smith, 2008).   
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3.3.1 National governments and regional and international institutions 
At a national level, despite the increasing global acceptance of CSR, the 
CSR roles that companies assume differ amongst countries and remain 
influenced by national institutional frameworks of norms, incentives and rules.  
A country’s political, financial, educational, labour and cultural systems can 
each impact the ways in which CSR is regulated (Matten & Moon, 2008).  
Matten and Moon (2008:411) identify CSR systems as being explicit (more 
private-led) and/or implicit (more state-led) as shown in the following 
diagram:   
 
(Figure 1: Matten & Moon, 2008:411) 
Whereas in explicit systems, corporations have significant autonomy and 
control of CSR, in implicit systems, companies adopt mandatory and 
customary requirements as prescribed by the institutional environment.  The 
explicit liberal market economy system is the current global trend in 
developing countries.  Locating Colombia and Venezuela in this diagram, 
based upon my findings as outlined in chapter 7, they are strongly 
categorised by explicit and implicit systems respectively.  
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Regarding MNOCs' CSR specifically, this is influenced by the taxes and the 
standards and conditions that host governments set.  Indeed, certain 
developing countries stipulate that companies should fund social projects 
either alongside another public body or independently as a condition of 
operation (i.e. Venezuela) (Repsol, 2011:100; Shell, 2011:19).  CSR has not, 
as a rule, been strictly regulated by MNOCs’ home states.  Notably, MNOCs 
may not implement as high standards abroad as in their home countries.   
The UK Bribery Act, which came into force in July 2011, set a precedent 
regarding the scope of pre-emptive, binding legislation that can be imposed 
upon companies' responsible behaviour overseas.  This act reshapes the 
international business’ anti-corruption landscape, as compared to other 
national legislation on corporate behaviour, including its US counterpart, the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), it has a more demanding 
extraterritorial scope, affecting any group with UK business interests.  As 
most major MNOCs have UK offices, they fall under this legislation’s scope, 
regardless of where the corruption (as understood in UK terms) occurs.  
Under this act, companies face unlimited fines if: i) found engaging in bribery 
or corruption; ii) linked to an entity found guilty of corruption; or iii) they fail to 
report instances of bribery and corruption.  This affects multinationals’ 
operations in developing countries, whereby they cannot ignore corruption in 
their surroundings.  However, as Transparency International observes, the 
UK may wish to lead the fight against corruption, but this legislation will prove 
difficult to monitor and successfully implement (TI, 2011).  Moreover, by 
imposing British norms, this legislation could be seen as neo-colonialist.  
Focusing upon transparency may have been more immediately effective than 
corporate behaviour and more respectful of other governments' jurisdictions, 
their conceptions of society and of the rule of law. 
However, mandatory transparency has managed to gain support elsewhere; 
as highlighted at the 2013 G8 summit in Northern Ireland.  In 2011, the 
Deauville summit was heavily criticised for its (in)decision in calling for more 
oil, gas and mining companies’ reporting to be done on a mandatory 
voluntary basis (Oxfam, 2011:1), thus using the term mandatory, whilst 
nothing became mandatory at all.  The fifth point of the 2013 Lough Erne 
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declaration states: “Extractive companies should report payments to all 
governments - and governments should publish income from such 
companies”.  This is a considerable improvement; although an unsurprising 
positional shift, given the recently enacted transparency regulations in the EU 
and the US. 
The US Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act in July 2010.  Section 1504 
requires companies registered with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to publicly report how much they pay governments for oil, 
gas and mineral access.  Final implementing rules were adopted in August 
2012 by the SEC to enforce this legislation.  There has been notable oil 
industry resistance (Global Witness, 2013).     
The 2013 EU Directive on transparency rules for the extractive industry will 
require that, from 2016 at the latest, all natural resource companies that are 
listed in the EU and large EU registered non-listed companies disclose total 
payments made to governments of over EUR 100,000 (Directive 2013/34/EU: 
Art.43; Tran, 2013).  This includes taxes on income, production, profits, 
royalties and licence fees per country and, unlike the Dodd-Frank Act, per 
project. This legislation aims to reinforce the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary, non-binding initiative launched in 
2002 to increase the transparency of extractive industry payments. By 
improving accountability and transparency, it hopes to prevent oil revenues 
from exacerbating poor governance or engendering corruption, conflict and 
poverty. The EITI is voluntary for national governments, however once a 
government signs, all companies within its territory are legally required to 
disclose their payments to it (Ruggie, 2007:23). Strengthening the EITI, by 
extending it to companies with EU interests, fights against the current reality 
that as a voluntary initiative, companies can use it "as a mechanism for 
heading off more rigorous formal regulation" (Cooper, 2006:1).  Not only is 
implementation flexible, but the most pertinent countries are not involved 
(Eldis, 2005).  
Regarding CSR programmes specifically, there have been a few national 
level attempts to regulate corporate behaviour.  Concerning norm-setting, in 
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2000 the UK Foreign Office and the US State Department brought leading 
extractive companies together with human rights and CSR organisations to 
seek common ground on security and human rights issues to establish best 
practice guidelines and created The Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights (VPs) (Tripathi, 2010).  The VPs are voluntary for companies, 
but binding for governments.  According to the IPIECA (2011), companies 
feel pressure to prove that they are not simply endorsing the VP brand.  The 
VPs have been incorporated into various company contracts.  However, they 
lack geographical reach and their processes need to be more transparent if 
more countries are to adopt the normative values they contain (Tripathi, 
2010). 
At a regional level, whilst the EU, for example, advocates a smart-mix of 
regulation and voluntary measures to increase CSR take-up, it does not 
provide legislative content, rather advocating a European CSR award, 
partnerships and multi-stakeholder forum based approaches including the 
business network, CSR Europe's Enterprise 2020 and the European Alliance 
on CSR, based on voluntary membership (EC, 2011).  Similarly to the 
international institutions discussed below, the EU correctly, but not 
disinterestedly, highlights the importance of fostering growth and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in developing countries.  It thereby implicitly or 
explicitly supports the Freedmanian view of profit being a manifestation of 
CSR, although FDI is also a prerequisite for corporate engagement in a 
developing community (Jenkins, 2005).  Accordingly, the EU’s ubiquitous 
competitivity discourse, whereby CSR should bring an all-important 
competitive edge to economic growth, creating an EU pole of CSR 
excellence (EC, 2001a; EC, 2001b), explicitly elevates the business case 
above the normative aspects and implies the continuance of an asymmetric 
global economy without questioning the desirability of this effect.   
At an international level, the UN, the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF 
propose voluntary guidelines and support voluntary approaches.  The UN 
Global Compact and OECD Guidelines have been the most notable.  In 
2000, the UN Global Compact (GC) was established to create an 
institutionalised norm-diffusing epistemic community at an international level, 
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which could generate normative authority through peer pressure, 
competition, dialogue and a shared purpose that may empower companies 
and encourage behavioural change (McInerney, 2004; Ruggie, 2002;2007:2; 
Rasche, 2009).32  It currently proposes ten principles, which can be used to 
promote growth, ethical behaviour and an inclusive global economy (UNGC, 
2013).  These derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
ILO’s Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work and the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, and allow diverse interpretation (Egels-
Zandén & Kallifatides, 2009:266; Rasche, 2009:201).  These cover human 
rights, labour standards, the environment and anti-corruption practices 
(UNGC, 2013).  Adherents have to privately and publically endorse the ten 
principles, implement them in their business operations and complete annual 
Communication on Progress (COP) reports.  Interested parties can also 
report allegations of GC principles’ abuse through a complaints mechanism 
to which companies must respond.  If a company fails to meet GC 
requirements, it is called non-communicating and is eventually delisted; these 
sanctions have been applied (Rasche, 2009:201).   
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, approved in 1976, were 
last updated in 2011 to incorporate provisions on human rights, workers, 
wages and climate change.  Alongside the 2004 Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, they 
provide comprehensive recommendations on corporations by 39 countries.  
They apply to OECD countries and 10 non-member countries from which 
most major MNOCs originate (OECD Watch, 2011a; McLoughlin, 2007:161).  
As with the GC, businesses choose whether to adopt the principles and 
progress is related to information sharing (OECD, 2011).  
Both sets of standards have faced much criticism.  Their legitimacy is 
inevitably linked to the issuing organisation’s legitimacy.  The OECD’s make-
up, as an exclusive rich nations’ club that has prioritised economic over 
social needs and favoured legally non-binding voluntary codes of conduct as 
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 In the 1970s, the UN attempted to establish binding international rules to regulate 
multinationals’ activities as part of a broader regulatory programme called the "New 




opposed to effective legislation, undermines its legitimacy (Banerjee, 2007).  
Regarding the Guidelines, the NCPs' confidentiality clause, mediation 
attempts, lack of investigative authority and links to national governments 
somewhat undermine their legitimacy (Turner, 2006:373).   
The UN’s idealism is critiqued more than its legitimacy.  Activists have 
engaged in an immanent critique of the UN, by noting that the UN’s Norms 
for Business offer a more detailed and stringent regulatory code than the GC, 
which could be used to impose precise obligations and responsibilities upon 
corporations.  They have also criticised the GCs limited ability to impact 
actual practices and the absence of a legal framework to hold companies to 
account for negative (in)action, whilst offering corporate malefactors a public 
relations cover (Knight & Smith, 2008; ERI, 2013).  Indeed, Rasche 
(2009:201) claims that insincere companies could strategically circumvent 
GC principles or comply without changing, as companies choose areas of 
(in)action and their reports are not benchmarked.  Accusations of 
bluewashing are compounded by companies’ poor attendance rates at the 
GC's international forums, despite corporate statements of the GC’s 
influence upon their CSR (Banerjee, 2007:99).   
As Knight and Smith (2008) note, voluntary principles alone will neither 
effectively curb corporate power nor bring the wider systemic change, 
needed to build trust.  CSR, as a practice, effectively promotes relations of 
social dependency that do not require democratic decision-making.  
Moreover, there is an inherent asymmetry of power in tripartite discussions 
between business, governments and civil society.  However, if criticised for 
what they are; i.e. non-binding, policy standards that promote learning and 
dialogue rather than binding principles that sanction participants, then these 
standards are a step towards greater accountability (Rasche, 2009:202).  
Both sets of standards promote dialogue and companies have to report on 
their involvement.  Ironically, whilst most criticism centres upon the GC's and 
the OECD guidelines' theoretical and speculative bite (McInerney, 2004; 
Clean Clothes Campaign, 2001; OECD Watch, 2011b), Egels-Zandén's 2007 
study shows that, in practice, companies and their suppliers may struggle to 
couple business ethics with these principles.  Where companies have strictly 
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applied the GC's principles, they have often encountered other difficulties 
(Egels-Zandén & Kallifatides, 2009:275).  Indeed, local actors may have 
different or competing visions of CSR and may oppose the imposition of 
Western values, especially where these contradict local tradition, 
complicating stakeholder dialogue (Welford et al., 2007:52; Egels-Zandén, 
2007; Egels-Zandén & Kallifatides, 2009:274).   
As shown in the previous chapter, individual companies often have to self-
determine how to navigate the challenges of operating amidst war 
economies, as no international level normative or regulatory regime exists to 
specifically address contemporary war economies (Taylor, 2012).  However, 
the UNHCR’s endorsement of the 2011 Guiding Principles to implement the 
2008 Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework may help to provide the 
foundations for a more coherent approach to control irregular war economies.  
It has given soft law authority to an instrument, which proposes that 
companies’ responsibilities for human rights arise from their activites and 
relationships (impact) and that their human rights practices depend upon 
their implementation of due diligence.  The Guiding Principles define state 
and company responsibilities and practical steps to help ensure business 
respect for human rights in conflict areas.  For countries such as Colombia, 
incorporating parts of this framework into their national legislation could 
provide a means to counter war economies, by supporting companies and 
thereby levelling-up corporate practice, whilst clearly demarcating where 
company responsibilities begin and end (Taylor, 2012). 
3.3.2 Civil society based initiatives  
Civil society has also played an agenda-setting role, by helping to place 
corporate transparency and accountability on the political agenda and 
producing reporting guidelines and voluntary initiatives to sensitise corporate 
behaviour to development, conflict and human rights issues.  Moreover, trade 
unions, consumer groups, certain religious communities, academics and 
NGOs such as Corporate Accountability International, CorpWatch, 
International Alert, Transparency International, Amnesty International 
Business Group, OECD Watch, Global Reporting Initiative, The New 
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Economics Foundation, SustainAbility, Fatal Transactions and Human Rights 
Watch have all reported on corporate behaviour and advocated social justice, 
environmental sustainability or conflict-sensitive business practices.  Non-
governmental actors have developed voluntary ethical auditing standards to 
improve company reporting.  Three key initiatives are the ISO, the SAI and 
the GRI (Cavanagh, 2004). 
The Social Accountability Standard SA 8000, which was established in 1997 
by Social Accountability International (SAI) with the Council on Economic 
Principles Accreditation Agency’s support, uses the ISO framework and 
builds upon human rights conventions to provide a social management 
system that businesses can implement to receive accreditation (SAI, 2011; 
Schwarz & Tilling, 2009:290).  It requires companies to report their progress 
vis-à-vis matters including forced labour, freedom of association, 
discrimination, compensation and management practices.  An advantage of 
SA 8000 is its auditability.  It is monitored by SAI trained auditors and 
standard compliance is checked by third party verification (Schwarz & Tilling, 
2009:290).  Civil society has questioned the commercial relationship between 
audit companies and corporations being audited and moreover economic 
auditors’ ability to conduct thorough social audits.  Some argue that certain 
NGOs could be accredited as auditors (Hopkins, 2003; Schipper, 2004).  
These objections are surmountable.  Complete independence between 
interdependent auditors and auditees is impossible; nevertheless, this does 
not exclude some degree of independence without using NGOs.  In this 
respect, reflections on the standards developed on account auditing and the 
relations between a statutory auditor and the audited company could provide 
answers to such concerns.33  
There is no reason why professional auditors could not be trained to conduct 
social audits and why NGOs could not assist in their training.  NGOs are not 
necessarily more independent than auditing companies (Hopkins, 2003; 
                                                          
33
 Legislators have regulated to address concerns about auditors’ independence post-Enron, 
introducing severe sanctions where collusion is discovered.  The market and professional 
investors expect statutory auditors to be truly independent and lobby companies to this end.     
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Schipper, 2004) and can be co-opted to the corporate agenda (Banerjee, 
2007).   
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) began in 1997.  It provides a widely-
used structure for companies to publicly report their business activities over 
three sets of criteria: economic, social and environmental.  In 2012, GRI 
developed an Oil and Gas Sector Supplement (OGSS) to their sustainability 
reporting guidelines.  The GRI also operates as an environmental reporting 
mechanism for the GC and the OECD Guidelines and supports transparency 
by allowing stakeholders to evaluate companies.  However, it does not offer a 
complaints’ mechanism like the SA 8000 (Rasche, 2009:199).  McIntosh 
(1998:187) argues that reporting should also be third party verified, as with 
the SA 8000.  I agree, as self-evaluating companies may misinterpret or 
exaggerate their achievements, hindering accurate benchmarking.  
Research shows that consumer activism can impact companies’ brand, 
image and reputation (Aguilera et al., 2005: 22; Laing, 2004), and certain 
consumers are willing to pay premiums for socially responsible products 
(Aaronson & Reeves, 2002; Mazurkiewicz, 2004:7).  Indeed, the FairTrade 
movement has raised the demand for ethically-traded goods with a correct 
price, credit terms and a long-term trading commitment for small producers, 
by highlighting workers’ struggles in developing countries (MacIntosh et al., 
1998:140).  As the oil industry cannot duplicate this model of paying small 
producers a fair price given the production scale and expertise needed, a 
different approach is needed to produce or commercialise FairTrade labelled 
oil.  
Whilst no prominent FairTrade oil standard currently exists, Equitable Origin 
(EO) launched its EO100 Standard v.0.50 for Responsible Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Production in May 2011.  The standard works by awarding 
certificates to oil producing sites based on their ethical certification score as 
determined by a range of stakeholders.  Once issued, the certified operator 
can sell its certificates on the EO Exchange to, for example, manufacturers, 
retailers, and transportation companies.  Certificate purchasers can place EO 
certified logos on their products, thereby signalling their commitment to high 
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social and environmental standards in oil and gas production.  They can also 
label products to inform the public of the social projects their purchase 
supported (EO, 2011).  This system is somewhat comparable to the 
certificates used on the European green certificates electricity market.   
Whilst the standard’s efficacy and consumer support remain unclear, by 
increasing transparency, this standard empowers consumers to differentiate 
between supportive and non-supportive companies.  Nevertheless, I argue 
that several risks remain unaddressed.  Firstly, the system enables unethical 
companies to buy their portion of CSR without bringing social justice to their 
stakeholders.  Secondly, MNOCs may receive certificates for sites where 
they promote best practices, profiting from the certificates market, whilst 
negatively affecting stakeholders at other sites.  This could also create undue 
speculation on the certificates market attracting vulture and hedge funds, 
which enter the market for financial gain and whose actions could disrupt the 
market and certificate prices, so that potential customers are no longer willing 
or able to pay a CSR premium.  Thirdly, a certificates market could become 
morally indefensible should it not address the previous points.  Thus, whilst it 
provides practical foundations, this system alone may not lead to ethically 
traded oil.  
3.3.3 Industry associations 
National and international industry associations have established charters 
and guidelines on corporate behaviour and reporting.  In such associations, 
companies collectively discuss concerns, working to establish best practices 
and new benchmarks.  Examples include the Caux Roundtable's 'Minnesota 
Principles', CSR guidelines developed by industry for industry, and the 
Foreign Trade Association's European Business Social Compliance Initiative 
(BSCI) auditing system, which is a commonly used company policy for 
monitoring and improving supplier countries’ social standards (Cavanagh, 
2004; Haltsonen et al., 2007:54).  In the oil and gas sector, associations 
include the Regional Association of Oil and Natural Gas in Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ARPEL), the International Association of Oil and Gas 
Producers (OGP) and the Conservation of Clean Air and Water for Europe 
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(CONCAWE).  Regarding CSR, a key association is the Global Oil and Gas 
Industry Association (IPIECA), which is an intermediary between the oil 
sector and the United Nations (IPIECA, 2011).   
Together with the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP), IPIECA publishes reporting 
guidelines that constitute the principal industry-specific framework for oil and 
gas companies’ environmental, health and safety, and social and economic 
performance reporting (IPIECA, 2011). The IPIECA 2010 Oil and gas 
industry guidance on voluntary sustainability reporting is industry-specific and 
was developed with the API and the OGP and then reviewed alongside the 
development of the GRI OGSS.  This is a positive step as stream-lining 
accountancy and auditing standards diminishes confusion as to what exactly 
a company's compliance to a variety of standards actually covers 
(McInerney, 2004; Rasche, 2009:199).  However, the GRI is more 
comprehensive and provides a specific set of standard disclosures, whereas 
IPIECA’s six-step reporting process is less detailed and more flexible.  
Moreover, whilst the GRI OGSS explicitly requests financial and related 
information (e.g. oil and gas reserves), IPIECA does not guide companies on 
how to include financial information that is provided as standard practice in 
annual reports, suggesting instead that such information is included or linked 
to as required.  The GRI also includes more information and focuses upon 
quantitative disclosure to measure performance, whereas IPIECA offers 
multiple, predominantly qualitative, reporting options.  Similarly, whilst GRI 
disclosure on management approach is separate and incorporates defined 
performance indicator protocols, the broader IPIECA indicators combine 
management approach with recommendations to report specific information.   
Another commonly used set of business standards are those proposed by 
the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), which apply to all 
sectors of activity and companies regardless of size.  The most recognised 
standards are the ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 families.  In addition, the ISO 
26000 specifically addresses globalisation’s negative effects and social 
responsibility (ISO, 2006; 2011; Schwarz & Tilling, 2009:291).  Uptake of the 
ISO standards has been widespread; nevertheless, their effect upon 
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multinationals’ CSR is unclear.  Certification is expensive and potentially 
burdensome for suppliers, from whom larger companies sometimes require 
ISO certification (Banerjee, 2007:81).  Schwarz and Tilling (2009:291) argue 
that as the components of companies' CSR are unclear, these standards use 
the lowest common denominator.  Thus, they contend that companies do not 
need to perform better to receive ISO certification and that whilst stakeholder 
involvement was important in developing ISO 26000, stakeholders from 
developing countries where the guidelines are locally implemented should be 
more involved.  However, as Banerjee (2007:81) argues, ISO is essentially a 
process standard, not a performance standard.  Nevertheless, MNOCs who 
wish to adhere to ISO should consider their suppliers’ ability to comply.  
Unfortunately, the multiplicity of standards makes it harder for report readers 
to understand to what companies are committing themselves, as they need 
to be familiar with the various sets of reporting standards.  Moreover, there is 
concern that industry and industry associations engaging in non-industry led 
standard-setting projects may attempt regulatory capture of the procedures 
(Cortese et al., 2010).  Indeed, it would be naive to assume that where huge 
financial commitments are at stake, industry would not defend its interests.  
Industry has known policy interests and, like other actors, brings its particular 
interests and weight to multi-stakeholder forums and discussions (Ruggie, 
2007:5).  However, as international actors push for greater transparency, this 
should engender a greater harmonisation of praxis.  
3.3.4 Regulating CSR 
Regulating CSR is oxymoronic.  Indeed, in an Arendtian sense, rules can 
reduce responsibility; whilst they may change behaviour, they can undermine 
normative wisdom (Schwartz, 2010).  As Davis (1973:313) argues, "social 
responsibility begins where the law ends".34  However, CSR should not 
substitute regulation or legislation (Lynch Fannon, 2005:6).  Throughout the 
CSR literature opinions differ as to what should be covered by both voluntary 
standards (with minimal state and maximal market intervention) and by 
                                                          
34
 CSR, negotiated with the state as part of MNOCs’ payments for licences to operate, is 
effectively prescribed spending, constituting another form of tax as opposed to genuine 
‘responsibility’ (see chapter 4 on Venezuela). 
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regulation (with maximal state and minimal market intervention).  Proposed 
standards aiming to improve behaviour, accountability, and transparency are 
interdependent, but should not be conflated in the legislative realm. 
I argue that a two-fold regulatory approach is required, both at an 
international and at a national level (both levels are discussed below).  
Starting with the international level, international regulation should aim to: i) 
create a level-playing field where MNOCs that comply with higher standards 
are not penalised compared to less responsible companies; and ii) level-up 
practices.   
Whilst the effects of US and EU transparency legislation remain to be seen, I 
argue that the production of a globally-valid binding set of industry specific 
transparency standards is a logical first step at an international level, to 
increase the pressure upon companies to behave better.  These could 
promote higher benchmarks and increased ethical investment without 
damaging corporate competitiveness, nor revealing core business secrets.  
As with voluntary standards, the impact of transparency initiatives has been 
limited (Cooper, 2005a:5).  A Transparency International (2011) study 
evaluating company transparency illustrates that whilst most major MNOCs 
signed up to the major international voluntary standards outlined above, 
Repsol was the only MNOC to reach TI's top ten for each major transparency 
ranking, which covers topics from anti-corruption to company and country 
level disclosure.  Only eight other MNOCs ranked above average, all of 
which were EITI supporters.  However, subjecting all major MNOCs to the 
same transparency regulation should facilitate greater ethical comparison 
between companies.  This could enable host countries to more 
comprehensively integrate the consideration of each MNOC's social 
responsibility into their decision-making procedures, when granting 
concessions and enabling citizens to question government decisions.  
Whilst transparency legislation should place companies under greater 
scrutiny and should nurture accountability, regulating transparency alone is 
insufficient to address the power imbalances of the business logic’s 
supremacy over the social sphere.  Notably, reporting is insufficient in 
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significantly improving performance and, moreover, voluntary codes and 
management systems are insufficient in changing corporate behaviour 
(Doane, 2005:215; Quaak et al, 2006:293).  Consequently, regulating change 
to corporate behaviour may appear to be an appealing option.  Theoretically, 
host governments can impose behavioural change through regulations 
applicable to all businesses or to individual companies, by raising taxes and 
royalties, or in their conditions when awarding MNOCs licences to operate.  
However, in practice, they cannot always enforce their own regulations.  As 
Turner (2006:365,372) observes, the lack of international sanctions when 
voluntary standards are contravened means that in developing countries 
where the legislative framework is weak, governments may not have the 
political will or the effective instruments to enforce their country's laws.   
Nevertheless, regulating behavioural change at an international level is 
arguably less straightforward than regulating transparency (Dobers, 
2009:186; Cannon, 1994:189).  Given the complexities of social life, and the 
difficulty in quantifying CSR, a reified one-size approach does not fit all.  
Indeed, as different societies understand CSR and development differently 
(Holme & Watts, 2000; Welford et al. 2007:52), companies should be able to 
leave room for indigenous CSR approaches instead of imposing Western-
standardised approaches and instruments (Utting, 2003; Ite, 2004:9; Dobers, 
2009:187).  Equally, companies are not homogeneous, have different 
audiences and possess different capacities and experience in responding to 
local issues (DTI, 2004; ILO, 2005; 2006:3). In addition, international 
regulation should be industry specific and goal orientated, preventing 
irresponsibility rather than focusing upon ideologically imbued abstract 
utopias.     
Another reason why the international level should start with transparency 
requirements is the difficulty in identifying which behaviours should be 
regulated.  Indeed, an international consensus is needed on the role and 
responsibilities of MNOCs in the public sphere.  In this respect, a conflation 
of MNOC and state responsibilities is not merely a theoretical fallacy, but it is 
legally problematic, confusing which actor is responsible for which duties.  
For example, the process surrounding the UN draft Norms on the 
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Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regards to Human Rights failed to determine for which core 
rights corporations should be responsible, showing that assigning greater 
responsibilities to MNOCs is a complicated process (Ruggie, 2007:9-11).  
From a legal perspective, accountability is tightly coupled with liability.  
MNOCs are currently legally responsible to their shareholders, although 
current debate is moving towards their becoming legally accountable to 
stakeholders on social issues.  Problematically, where companies 
appropriate government tasks or enter government partnerships, these 
actors appear undemocratically equal (Banerjee, 2007:157); although it is 
unclear how local people interpret this confusion of public and private 
spheres (Doane, 2005:227).   
Whilst accountability-focused legislation does not aim to place higher 
competitive burdens on Western multinationals than on competitors from 
countries with weaker legislation (DTI, 2002:6), without sufficient 
consideration of its components or side-effects, it may give less responsible 
companies a competitive advantage.  Whilst most MNCs exist in several 
jurisdictions, moving investments or subsidiaries to more legally or financially 
beneficial jurisdictions (McLoughlin, 2007:155), the oil sector cannot move 
oil, its main asset, in this way, even if it can move downstream operations.  
Theoretically, therefore, a country can raise taxation or use sanctions to hold 
MNOCs accountable, although, as discussed above, this depends on political 
will and ability.  Thus, the debate continues as to whether extra-territorial 
jurisdiction should be used to protect, for example, human rights.  Whilst US 
companies such as Chevron, Shell and Unocal were accused of complicity in 
human rights violations in Nigeria and Burma through the US Alien Tort 
Claims Act (ATCA) (McLoughlin, 2007:155; Ruggie, 2007:18; Banerjee, 
2007:94-100), on 17 April 2013 the US Supreme Court decided that this Act 
will not usually apply for violations of international law claimed to have 
occurred outside of the US.  However, as the Supreme Court leaves room for 
interpretation, claimants may still try to start such legal actions in the US 
(Bédard et al., 2013).  
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Therefore, I argue that for the accountability mechanism to bring the change 
advocated at an international level, greater reflection on the spectrum of 
liability is needed so that greater accountability does not merely enrich 
lawyers without bringing social justice to victims of corporate malpractice.  
Indeed, tightly coupling accountability with liability would also severely 
burden companies and end corporate engagement in potentially meaningful 
social action in light of prospective law suits.  As Ruggie (2007:28) notes, "an 
individual liability model alone cannot fix larger systemic imbalances in the 
global system of governance".   
At a national level, looking at CSR activities, I argue that appropriate 
(behavioural) regulations should be enforced or, where necessary, enacted 
by national governments in oil-producing countries in order to: i) ensure that 
CSR activities are conducted in compliance with internationally accepted 
norms, such as anti-bribery and anti-money laundering measures; indeed, 
given the nature of CSR activities and the surrounding discourse, there 
should be no more room for corruption or money-laundering; ii) enable 
cooperation between national governments and MNOCs to ensure that 
MNOCs’ CSR funds are properly allocated and coordinated between MNOCs 
and with social priorities; and iii) monitor and assess CSR projects, 
suppressing or amending those which reproduce assistentialistic patterns; 
such measures would require the political will for governments to step in 
where necessary.   
The enforcement or enactment of such regulations cannot take place 
overnight.  Such an approach requires the identification of suitable standards 
and significant legislative work.  In this respect, national governments could 
find a source of inspiration in the current UN Guiding Principles to implement 
the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework (see Taylor, 2012).  The UN 
also has a role to play in disseminating these standards and in supporting 
countries that are willing to integrate them into their national legislations. 
However, regulatory measures are neither silver bullet solutions nor grounds 
for naïve optimism.  Their successful implementation is contingent upon the 
abilities of national governments and authorities to implement them without 
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creating the conditions in which new forms of corruption could emerge.  
Hence, it is important that international level transparency measures are in 
place to create the conditions in which MNOCs will have no alternative, but to 
cooperate and comply with the new national regulations. 
Lastly, regarding political will, it is important to acknowledge that the network 
of complicity regarding irresponsibility extends back to oil-consuming 
countries, which have received oil supplies and income from value-added tax 
on oil-based products, purchasing oil from MNOCs engaged in pariah states.  
Oil-consumers (and international institutions) have not only largely 
overlooked multinationals' complicity in, for example, fuelling developing 
world conflicts (Turner, 2006:371).  Companies have also sometimes acted 
on behalf of their home governments (Banerjee, 2007:142).  The creation of 
OPEC, for example, was an attempt to reverse dependency and power-
relations between producer and (more powerful) consumer countries.  If 
Western governments had the political will, they could follow a fair-trade 
model or legislate against purchasing oil from countries where its exploitation 
has been unethical.  However, given the costs involved, oil-dependence, 
limited oil supplies, the competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis the East and the 
financial crisis’ impact upon many Western governments, current conditions 
are unconducive to such policies; hence the strategic preference for 
Western-designed voluntary initiatives in practice (Mazurkiewicz, 2004:10).  
Normatively, as McIntosh et al. (1998) argue, regulating should not further 
neo-colonialism, by imposing Western norms on the developing world; nor 
should it give Western governments more positivist power control over other 
countries’ internal affairs.   
Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that:  
The fuzzy definition of CSR provides MNOCs with reasons to engage in CSR 
and stakeholders with reasons to expect MNOCs to take on responsibilities.  
Business is the key driver of CSR and CSR is predominantly self-regulated.  
Nevertheless, companies increasingly choose to conduct external CSR that 
is not linked to their core business.   
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Whilst there is a business case for CSR, there is also an inherent conflict in 
the increasingly symbiotic relationship between CSR and profit.  Without 
profit there cannot be CSR and CSR is an important asset that helps 
companies to remain competitive, win contracts and make profits.  In the 
current global economic framework, however, a company’s profit-making 
core can undermine corporate attempts to be more socially responsible and 
CSR can damage a company's bottom line if its scope is not clearly 
determined and communicated.  In this regard, the areas of accountability 
and liability are not adequately conceptualised to tackle the social impacts of 
the ever-expanding roles that companies are expected to perform.  
A variety of agents have developed narratives and/or standards that propose 
their own corporate responsibility agendas, some proposing a role for 
companies that is difficult to distinguish from that of the state, others trying to 
diffuse new norms that gradually change the field in which companies 
operate.  Globalisation and its effects make it increasingly difficult for 
companies to escape such pressures.  Most companies wish to engage in 
dialogue with third actors and are keen to show that they are supportive of 
important voluntary standards, as a means of building their legitimacy and 
creditability.  However, these standards do not adequately address the lack 
of trust that civil society, in particular, has vis-à-vis MNOCs.   
Thus, I would argue that the new rules enacted by the US and the EU on 
transparency for the extractive sector have the potential to lead to 
behavioural changes, given the scrutiny that MNOCs will face (see above).  
The outcome of these new measures and the effects of their interaction with 
the existing behavioural rules (such as anti-bribery regulations and 
competition rules) will need to be assessed in the short-term in order to see 
how effective they have been in terms of causing positive behavioural 
change and to assess whether the transparency criteria chosen were the 
most effective or whether the regime needs to be amended.  The 
implementation of these transparency requirements would empower the 
governments of oil-producing countries to enforce or, where necessary, enact 




Case study 1: Colombia, Neoliberalism and CSR 
In the previous chapters, I argued that CSR is offered in the neoliberal 
paradigm as a good deed to compensate for the economic and social 
injustices fostered by the capitalist system; more particularly, looking at the 
oil industry and MNOCs’ activities, I contended that MNOCs’ CSR is 
inadequate to redress the imbalances created by oil exploitation, such as the 
relations of dependency between oil producers and oil consumers.   
In this chapter, I present the first of two case studies.  The Colombian 
government’s approach to oil and social policies follows the paradigmatic 
neoliberal logic that prevails today, providing MNOCs with significant 
autonomy in determining and executing CSR.  Indeed, I consider that there is 
a logic whereby neoliberalism may appeal to a weak state that cannot 
adequately provide employment opportunities or social welfare for the 
population and is, thus, ready to welcome corporate intervention.  However, 
the prioritisation of the economic over the social and environmental is a 
worrying welfare strategy, which undermines the state’s authority and, a 
fortiori, democracy.  I argue that CSR and the larger neoliberal development 
and peace agenda, of which it is a part, are inadequate to solve Colombia’s 
most pressing problems, perpetuating asymmetric power relations.  I show 
that in the Colombian context, MNOCs have not only been expected to use 
CSR to compensate for oil operations’ negative effects, but also to replace an 
absent state in areas with high levels of guerrilla/paramilitary violence and 
corruption.  This is not to say that MNOCs’ CSR has not had any positive 
effects, however, in Colombia, it has not led to holistic social welfare, but 
rather detracted from it, providing assistentialism to replace state welfare.   
Colombian CSR offers limited remedy for the oil curse discussed in chapter 
two.  At the time of writing, Colombia is a mild Dutch disease sufferer; 
heightened oil and mining investments have seen the currency appreciate 
and manufacturers and agriculture suffer (Minto, 2013).  Areas of oil 
exploration and exploitation have witnessed higher crime rates and armed 
group presence (González Posso, 2011:33).  Oil operations have primarily 
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served elite-based interests and have both strengthened and weakened the 
Colombian state, democracy, armed groups and peace efforts.  Unlike 
Venezuela, Colombia is not a petrostate, an OPEC member nor a prominent 
international oil actor and it is significantly less resource dependent; 
nevertheless, it is a primary oil producer.  In 2011, although Colombia only 
had proven reserves of 1.9 billion barrels compared to neighbouring 
Venezuela's 211 billion barrels, Colombia produced 938,543 barrels per day 
(b/d) compared to Venezuela's 2,489,242 b/d (EIA, 2013).  In 2011, oil was 
Colombia's dominant exported product (Indexmundi, 2013); of the 656,543 
b/d estimated exports, 422,000 b/d went to the United States (EIA, 2013).     
This chapter underpins the foundations for the Colombian model of CSR that 
I develop in chapter 7.  It is divided into four sections, which contextualise 
MNOCs’ CSR in Colombia.  MNOCs’ social action cannot be understood 
without placing them in the context of Colombian oil policies, special 
interests, social divide and violence.  Thus, this chapter deals with each of 
these factors in turn to address: i) the development of Colombian oil policy 
and the impact of special interests thereon; ii) the weak state and its causes, 
including of social divide, violence and the US’ military influence; iii) 
challenges to democracy and governance following Uribe’s election in 2002; 
and iv) the level of social (ir)responsibility in MNOC’s actions, including their 
role as victims and perpetrators of violence.  To this end, I will show that 
MNOCs’ social responsibilities have evolved over time in Colombia, as well 
as to whom they are responsible, and I will also show the increase of 
businesses’ peace-building activities.  The material in this chapter is 
important in understanding the models outlined in chapter 7 as it 
contextualises how companies’ social responsibilities have evolved over time 




4.1 Colombian oil policy and special interests 
In order to determine how companies’ responsibilities have evolved, it is 
important to first understand the development of Colombian oil policy over 
time and the position occupied by MNOCs in this process.  This is the 
purpose of this section, which chronologically outlines the development of 
Colombian oil policy.  It shows that the US and the Colombian elite have 
been instrumental in consistently shaping oil policy, not always in Colombia’s 
best interests.  Indeed, from their commencement in 1905, Colombian oil 
operations have been marked by a power struggle between Colombian 
nationalism and a mixture of US, MNOC and elite interests (Villegas, 1991).   
Colombian economic life revolved around the export of primary goods long 
before the oil days.   In the sixteenth century, the conquistadors and early 
colonialists exploited indigenous labour, mining precious gems and metals 
and exporting them to Spain; a system that hampered the development of 
domestic industries.  Colombian independence on 20 July 1810, in which 
revolutionary leaders deposed the Spanish viceroy and created a governing 
council of criollos35, did not change the patterns of large landholdings 
(latifundios), which became the predominant mode of production for export 
crops such as sugar, tobacco and, by the 1860s, coffee.  By 1900, coffee 
export tariffs constituted the main source of government revenues, and 
profits from coffee trading were the main source of investment in a newly 
emerging industrial sector that had started to produce basic consumer goods 
(Hanratty & Meditz, 1988).  
Oil operations started in 1905 under the impulse of president Reyes (1904-
1909), who was looking to rebuild the Colombian economy following the end 
of the period known as The Thousand Days War (1899-1902).  This had led 
to significant inflation and a reduction in tax revenues (Bulmer-Thomas et al., 
2006:216), and the secession of Panama in 1903. Given the increased 
interest of the US in the region, Reyes understood that good relations with 
the US were important, however unpopular (Hanratty & Meditz, 1988).  
Indeed, the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine clarified the US 
                                                          
35
 People of Spanish descent 
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government’s foreign policy intentions, by seeking to justify its future militarily 
intervention in Latin America in line with a Realpolitik logic of gaining 
influence, excluding rival powers and advancing the material interests of US 
citizens and firms (Bulmer-Thomas et al., 2006:39).  
The first concessions for oil exploration and exploitation were granted in 1905 
to General Barco and Señor De Mares, members of the Colombian elite.  
After limited success, De Mares sold his concession to the Tropical Oil 
Company, a Standard Oil subsidiary, in 1916, after which the rate of its 
development increased (Bucheli, 2010: 341; Griess, 1946: 245, 247; Wilkens, 
1998: 203; Bucheli, 2006: 11).  During WWI, Western appreciation of the 
strategic value of oil supplies grew.  Immediately following the war, US 
companies, faced with US anti-trust legislation and fears about domestic 
supply shortages, thus joined non-US companies such as Royal Dutch Shell 
in an oil rush to Latin America (Philip, 1982:8-9).   
As a result of domestic policies and the international situation, the Colombian 
economy diversified and developed at the turn of the century.  In the 1910s 
and 1920s, it became more integrated into the global financial and 
commercial markets.  Renewed relations with the US during the Marco Fidel 
Suárez’ administration (1918-1921) invited more foreign exchange and 
investment.  Colombia started exporting oil in 1921 and began to play an 
important role in international petroleum markets as of 1926, when oil exports 
began on a commercial scale (Griess, 1946:247).  In Latin America, the 
general trend until 1928 was that governments enjoyed little returns from 
foreign oil investment, unlike oil companies who benefited disproportionately 
(Philip, 1982:21,40).  Indeed, in 1927, Jersey Standard’s first year of 
commercial operation in Colombia resulted in a profit of USD 6.9 million on 
its investment of USD 23.3 million (Philip, 1982:19).36  
Moreover, MNOCs enjoyed significant Colombian elite and US government 
support.  As the elite benefitted from the oil sector, it opposed legislation that 
                                                          
36
 However, it should be noted that in order to achieve such profits, MNOCs had faced 
significant operational and legislative obstacles in Colombia that had hindered oil discovery 
(Griess, 1946:246; Wilkens, 1974:443).     
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might threaten its interests or antagonise the US (Saenz-Rovner, 2002; 
Bucheli, 2006:13).  From the early days, the US government also 
occasionally lobbied to defend US MNOCs (and its own) interests, actively 
counterbalancing Colombian nationalism by: i) using the Panama secession 
as a bargaining tool for MNOC interests, postponing the ratification of the 
Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, by which it admitted its role in the secession of 
Panama, and laid out reparations worth USD 25 million to Colombia (Bucheli, 
2006:8) and ii) intervening against the 1919 reform of Colombian subsoil 
laws, which aimed to prevent the division of its territory amongst foreign 
companies (Bucheli, 2010:341; Bucheli, 2006:9)37, so that Jersey Standard 
received needed concessions to build a pipeline to the coast (Bucheli, 
2010:341; Bucheli, 2006:9).  Another example is that of the 1928 emergency 
oil law, which was passed to tackle fruitless speculative activity by cancelling 
all post-1919 concessions, many of which lay abandoned across the country 
(Griess, 1946:245-6; Wilkins, 1974:446).  The Minister of Industry, José 
Antonio Montalvo, nullified both the De Mares and the Barco concessions in 
which Gulf Oil had stock, exposing the Tropical Oil Company in the press for 
not having complied with its contractual undertakings.  The US Department of 
Commerce retaliated by advising citizens against buying Colombian bonds 
and the Wall Street Journal published that Colombia was copying Mexico and 
Russia.  The Colombian elite, whose interests were threatened, intervened to 
find a compromise (Bucheli, 2006:13).  Importantly, the US also 
diplomatically thwarted European oil interests in Colombia38 (Bucheli, 
2006:7).   
The dominant power status of the US and its MNOCs was again somehow 
reflected in the 1931 oil code, Law 37, which undid some of the measures 
adopted in the 1920s to improve conditions for Colombia and Colombian 
workers.  This included requirements for oil multinationals to hire a minimum 
of 25% of Colombian workers, decreasing royalties from 12.5-6% to 11-2%, 
taxation on private property from 8-4% to 8-1% and taxes on pipeline 
                                                          
37
 The Barco concession was eventually purchased by the Texas Petroleum Company and 
the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company in 1936 (Griess, 1946:245).   
38
 As Bucheli (2006: 7) notes, in order not to antagonise the US, Colombia did not award 
concessions to British firm Pearson and Son Ltd, despite Pearson's proposal to create a 
Colombian oil company with which he would work.   
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operations by 50% (Griess, 1946:246). Despite domestic opposition, the 
liberal Olaya Herrera government (1930-1934) acted on the advice of the US 
Treasury, re-establishing the Barco Concession to encourage future US 
loans and to avoid US opposition to the legislation, using the oil code to 
reassure foreign companies of their safety in Colombia (Bucheli, 2006:16). 
In the 1930s, government oil policies remained in line with those established 
in the 1920s, aimed at increasing oil production, rather than government 
income per barrel (Philip, 1982:51).  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the 
Pumarejo governments’ tax reform led the Tropical Oil Company to pay as 
much tax in one year, as it had during the preceding eight years to the benefit 
of state welfare (Bucheli, 2006: 17).  In the 1930s, following the Great 
Depression, the US introduced the New Deal, which contained protective 
measures affecting oil imports in the US.  Again, US policies were to impact 
Colombia’s oil sector.  Indeed, the great depression and the New Deal saw 
the emergence of a new paradigm in US-Latin American relations (as 
discussed in section 4.3.2) and in June 1932, tariffs were approved on oil 
imports and derivatives, disadvantaging Latin American oil exports to the US 
(Philip, 1982:46; McBeth, 1983:204). 
In parallel, during the 1930s, some Colombians began to oppose oil 
extraction, fearing the possible exhaustion of their country’s natural 
resources.  Politicians such as Gaitán gained popular political support by 
challenging the status quo, criticising US domination, inadequate government 
policies and the government’s alliances with multinational companies (Dix, 
1978:343; Bucheli, 2006:15).  Critics proposed that government oil revenues 
should be invested in improving agriculture, which would increase purchasing 
power, provide markets for Colombian manufacturers, further industry 
development and employ more Colombians on a higher wage scale (Griess, 
1946:254).  The election of President Pumarejo (1934-38 and 1942-1945), 
who had the endorsement of the labour unions and the Socialist and 
Communist parties, brought measures aimed at redressing the power 
balance and promoting national actors, some of which were more successful 
than others in face of opposition from the US and US oil multinationals 
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(Bucheli, 2006:17).  Government efforts in the oil industry to create a state 
owned refinery, which would have decreased the oil multinationals’ power, 
failed due to strong opposition from the Tropical Oil Company and the US 
embassy.  Thus, when oil legislation was proposed again in 1936, it 
contained incentives for both foreign and national investors, as it intended to 
facilitate greater oil exploration (Philip, 1982:51).     
Indeed, during the economic depression at the end of the 1920s, the 
Colombian economy was linked to the US by exports, debt, and foreign 
investment, but it suffered less than many other Latin American countries 
whose primary national industries were more dependent upon foreign capital.  
As such, compared with some of its neighbours, Colombia resisted the 
politics of economic nationalism in the depression and throughout most of the 
twentieth century (Corcoran, 2011:32). Whilst organised labour in places 
where US corporations were the dominant foreign presence called for oil 
nationalisation during the first half of the twentieth century, these appeals 
were weakened by a mixture of: i) the already existent state control of the 
important coffee industry (Corcoran, 2011:32; Bushnell, 1993:174); ii) by US 
and Colombian elite obstructionism; and iii) by inconsistent state cooperation 
with oil workers’ unions.  Unlike in Mexico, nationalists often failed to 
counterbalance MNOCs’ interests (Bucheli, 2006:2-23; Pearce, 2004:5).  
Despite popular discontent over government oil revenue mismanagement, 
including its failure to invest in agriculture, increase purchasing power, 
provide markets for Colombian manufactures, develop industry and/or 
increase wages, more nationalistic presidencies still struggled to bring 
change vis-à-vis the aforementioned internal and external opposition (Griess, 
1946:254; Dix, 1978:343; Bucheli, 2006:15-17).    
Throughout WWII, Washington placed great strategic emphasis on Colombia 
in terms of foreign diplomacy.  Given Colombia’s proximity to the Panama 
Canal and its influential German community, US policymakers prioritised 
Colombian support for Panamericanism vis-à-vis the Axis powers.  Whilst not 
very economically developed, Colombia possessed rich oil reserves and 
mineral deposits, so that compared with its neighbours, it had tremendous 
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economic potential (Corcoran, 2011:149).  Moreover, as Bushnell (1967:120) 
notes, by the early 1940s Colombia “came closer to exemplifying the 
democratic ideals for which the United States claimed to be striving than did 
the systems of most Latin American nations”.   This was to make Colombia 
an important US partner throughout the Cold War, during which the US 
intervened across Latin America to thwart the communist threat as is 
discussed below in section 4.2.3.  Moreover, the responsibilities attributed to 
MNOCs during the Cold War are also discussed below in section 4.4.1.  
In 1940, the Santos administration (1938-1942) created the Ministry of Oil in 
order to establish a national oil company on the expiration of the De Mares 
concession, emulating Mexico’s NOC, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), which 
had been established in 1938.  These efforts were unsuccessful and 
Ecopetrol was only created a decade later in 1951.  In the interim, 
conservative President Ospina (1946-1950) proposed a new law (Law 165) in 
1947, to base a national oil company on the De Mares concession with 49% 
of private capital (local or foreign).  Debate ensued as to whether the 
company should be state-owned, a series of joint ventures between the state 
and local entrepreneurs, or a foreign company with local capitalists (Bucheli, 
2006:20; Griess, 1946:251).   
The Gómez administration (1950-1951) entered into oil production in 1951 to 
stimulate the oil industry’s development, through the creation of a national oil 
company, the Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos (Ecopetrol) (Philip, 
1982:69).  Ecopetrol was created to take over the De Mares concession’s 
operations from Jersey Standard after 40 years of operation.  Although 
Jersey Standard may have been offered the opportunity to enter into a joint-
venture agreement with the Colombian government, this did not materialise 
and Jersey Standard became a technical service provider to Ecopetrol 
(Philip, 1982:69).  As a result of the debates preceding the creating of 
Ecopetrol, the latter emerged as a hybrid of national versus private interest 
(Perry et al., 2011:8).  Following Ecopetrol’s creation and  the introduction of 
new measures to facilitate foreign investment and ease exchange 
restrictions, oil production in Colombia increased from 65,000 b/d in 1948 to 
151,585 b/d in 1960 (Philip, 1982:69).  In parallel, through investments 
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realised by Ecopetrol and Jersey Standard, refining capacity increased from 
23,800 b/d in 1950 to 78,200 b/d in 1960 (Philip, 1982:69), demonstrating an 
increase of capacity in Colombia at various stages of the oil chain.  In 
addition, Jersey Standard opened its distribution business to local 
industrialists in 1951, by selling 40% of its shares in Esso Colombiana to 
local investors (Ecopetrol, 2010).  
The creation of Ecopetrol had not been supported across the board.   Indeed, 
the Colombian industrialists’ National Industrial Association (ANDI) had 
opposed the creation of a NOC, lest it set a precedent for private property 
expropriation.  However,  Ecopetrol’s creation did not exclude foreign 
companies from applying for concessions under new conditions and 
Ecopetrol entered into its first partnership contract in 1955 (Saenz-Rovner, 
2002; Bucheli, 2006:20,21; Perry et al.,2011:8). 
Ecopetrol’s creation did not exclude elite concessions, the accumulation of 
which subsequently contributed to a significant decline in Colombian oil 
production.  Private interest had prevailed whilst Colombia was a net oil 
exporter, yet by 1967, the limited exploration of the 1950s and 1960s, had left 
Colombian oil reserves worryingly low.  Indeed, Colombia’s exportable oil 
surplus declined so far that in 1975, Colombia became a net oil importer 
(Philip, 1982:130).  During the 69 years of the concessions system (1905-
1974), 2,807 proposals were submitted, but only 454 had ended in 
concession contracts (Ecopetrol in Perry et al., 2011:8).  Amongst other 
causes, companies had benefited from significant depletion-based tax 
deductions and concessions neither required minimum exploration levels nor 
devolution of non-prospective areas.  Thus oil companies, including US 
MNOCs, had sat on unexplored land for long periods.     
In the period between 1970 and 1994, politicians had to introduce a more 
pragmatic mix of nationalism and deregulation to revitalise oil production.  
Initial reform had begun in 1969 with Law 20, regulating joint venture 
contracts to strengthen Ecopetrol’s position and enabling new companies, 
including Elf-Aquitaine, to enter Colombia (Echeverry et al., 2008:3-7; Perry 
et al., 2011:8-9; Philip, 1982:130).    These efforts took time to translate into 
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an increase of oil production, given the time needed between exploration and 
exploitation.  Despite a large oil discovery in 1969, as mentioned above, 
Colombia became a net oil importer during the first oil-price boom in 1975, 
causing the government to use economic emergency powers to reactivate 
exploration and increase proven reserves (Perry et al., 2011:10).  Decree 
2310 (1974), for example, suspended non-productive concessions and 
eliminated depletion-based tax deductions, placing greater risk and 
investment requirements upon private companies.  It also enabled Ecopetrol 
to apply a formula whereby crude oil production was shared equally amongst 
the parties after 20% of royalties were deducted.  This regime became 
progressively more favourable to the state under presidents Barco (1986-
1990) and Samper (1994-1998) (González Posso, 2011:23).  The discoveries 
of oil fields such as Chuchupa (1973), Caño Limon (1983), Cusiana (1988) 
and Cupiagua (1993) helped to attract FDI despite less favourable terms 
(Echeverry, 2008:3).  Colombia regained self-sufficiency and became a net-
exporter of crude oil in 1986 so that oil taxes became an important source of 
government income (Perry et al., 2011:10).    
Following Colombia’s return to the position of a net exporter, private interest 
regained primacy with the arrival and subsequent deepening of 
neoliberalism.  The neoliberal shift in oil policy still prevalent today occurred 
under the Gaviria administration (1990-1994), which it was hoped would 
represent a distinct policymaking shift that would bring order amidst the 
socio-political crisis of escalating insurgent and narcotrafficking violence 
(Avilés, 2009:68).39  Simultaneously, large domestic and international shocks 
hit the economy, a new Constitution was adopted in 1991 which determined 
an expansion in government expenditure, and violence escalated.  It is not 
easy to disentangle the separate effects of these factors.  
As a result of neoliberal policies, oil association contracts were modified to 
include foreign investment, free trade, privatisation and modernisation 
                                                          
39
 International interference in Colombian decision-making was more transparent before the 
neoliberal reforms. The World Bank and the Office of the US Trade Representative for 
Greater Economic Openness and Liberalisation in Colombia were central to the development 
of neoliberal economic and political reforms, whereby some fundamental economic policy 
levers passed to transnational actors (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010).    
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consistent with the Washington Consensus.40  Given the trend towards 
encouraging FDI for the further exploration and exploitation of reserves, 
MNOCs have benefitted from increasingly favourable contracts.  From 1994, 
state levies decreased, reflecting the risks involved, field size, the pace of 
production and hydrocarbon quality (Pearce, 2004:9). 
 
In 1999, Pastrana's 
government (1998-2002) introduced a sliding royalty scale of 5-20%, 
depending on the production field’s size, which was more favourable to 
MNOCs (González Posso, 2011:24; Pearce, 2004).  In 2002, this was linked 
to the international prices of oil and gas as well.  In 2001, the USD1.50 per 
barrel war tax was phased out, due to companies’ complaints that such 
payments combined with other security and insurance costs affected their 
ability to put capital into future investment plans.  However, Richani 
(2005:116) argues that their profit margins did not suffer to the extent 
claimed.   
Still in line with neoliberal thinking, the 2003 decree 1760 structurally 
transformed Ecopetrol into a fully public company with shares, linked to the 
Ministry of Energy and Mines.  State oil resource administration passed from 
Ecopetrol to the new National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH), which values oil 
reserves, collects royalties, administers technical information, determines 
production levels and fosters investment (Ecopetrol, 2010; ANH, 2010).  
Ecopetrol’s transformation enabled it to offer 20% of its shares for purchase 
by independent actors and forced it to compete, find its own reserves and 
take exploratory risks.  Unlike Venezuela’s PDVSA, Ecopetrol is not the 
majority shareholder of each oil project (Salgar in González Posso, 2011:26).  
Critics of Ecopetrol’s privatisation argue that the company belonged not only 
to the state, but also to the Colombian people, whose national heritage was 
sold too cheaply (González Posso, 2011:27). 
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 The Washington Consensus summarises ten specific policy recommendations made by 
Washington-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 
and US Treasury Department, which believed them to be necessary for Latin American 
countries’ recovery from the economic and financial crises of the 1980s.  These include fiscal 
policy discipline, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, encouraging foreign direct 
investment, the privatisation of state enterprises, deregulation in areas that impede market 




To stimulate foreign investment, between 2003-2009, the ANH, which also 
deals with association contracts, extended exploration and exploitation time 
limits from 24 years to the exhaustion of reserves, encouraging the 
exhaustion of secondary reserves, and increasing royalty flexibility using a 
scale of 5-25%.  Moreover, concessions were reintroduced, contrary to 
association agreements, whereby the state plays no role in distributing the 
production (González Posso, 2011:25).  MNOCs negotiate contracts directly 
with the ANH and can own up to 100% of oil rights (Inter Pares, 2009:12).  
Indeed, Occidental and BP manage the two largest oil reserves in Arauca 
and Casanare with Ecopetrol as a minority partner (González Posso, 
2011:18).  FDI from the oil, mines and quarries sector has grown due to 
these policies, quintupling from 2003-2009 (Vásquez, 2010:6).  
Looking at recent reforms by President Santos (2010-), a new phase of 
increased centralisation could be underway.  As Llanos (2010) notes, the 
current administration has focused upon reengaging with other state 
institutions and maintaining and strengthening the balance of powers.  
Notably, in oil policy, President Santos pushed to reform the General 
Royalties System (SGR).  These changes to oil royalties allocation mean that 
the four oil-rich regions (Casanare, Meta, Arauca and, to a lesser extent 
Huila) and the ports cease to benefit from nearly 80% of the oil wealth 
(Colombian Embassy, 2011).  Since 1994, 70% of royalties had been paid 
directly to the regional departamentos, with 30% going towards the national 
royalties fund (Fondo Nacional de Regalías).  The royalties are now to be 
distributed as follows: 10% for the Science, Technology and Innovation Fund, 
10% for pension savings and up to 30% for the Savings and Stabilisation 
Fund.  The remainder (of a minimum of 50% of the total royalties) is 
distributed as follows: 20% for direct allocations, 48% for the Regional 
Compensation Fund and 32% for regional development.  For 30 years, a 
Regional Compensation Fund will finance projects to satisfy the unmet basic 
developmental needs of the poorest populations in priority coastal, border 
and periphery areas, after which funds go to the Regional Development Fund 
(Colombian Embassy, 2011).  These changes are consistent with the 2010-
2014 National Development Plan, which places the mineral-energy sector as 
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a key economic motor in “generating sustainable growth and greater social, 
regional and intergenerational equality” (DNP, 2010:15).  President Santos 
has even argued that “the Royalties Reform is the great fairness reform of 
Colombia” (Colombian Embassy, 2011).  The changes are significant, if 
potentially unpopular amongst politicians who retain rural client networks that 
demand patronage (Archer & Shugart, 1997:5).  However, as González 
Posso (2011:30-31) argues, none of the former large royalties beneficiaries 
achieved their targets in infant mortality rates, healthcare, education or 
drinking water as established in law 1747 in 1995.    Hypothetically, unless 
resource management improves, a decline in royalty income in oil-rich areas 
could lead to increased expectations vis-à-vis MNOCs.  Indeed, citizens in 
these areas expect to be compensated for the oil (Orellana Herrera, 2010).   
Today, several MNOCs are active in Colombia including BP, Occidental, 
Shell, Petrobras, Total, Perenco, Chevron and Repsol.  Notably absent are 
Lukoil and CNPC, which operate in neighbouring Venezuela, indicating the 
latter’s diversification of oil actors.  Annex 1 contains financial and business 
information from the annual reports of MNOCs active in Colombia.  For most 
of these companies, it appears that their Colombian production is relatively 
limited, generally no more than than 5% of their global oil and gas production.  
The annex also shows the differing levels of detail that MNOCs are willing to 
disclose relating to their Colombian operations and incidently, their 
transparency in terms of disclosing country-specific information.  It indicates 
that some further levelling-up is necessary to improve comparisons between 
companies.  Indeed, the information disclosed in companies’ annual reports 
is not only relevant to analysts or shareholders, but it is also a relevant 
source of information for stakeholders, such as the growing middle-class in 
Latin America, which are concerned about MNOCs’ activities in their country 
and in neighbouring countries (BSR, 2013).  
One of the notable absences has been the failure to address the effects of 
the Dutch disease in Colombia.  Richani (2005:117) argues that the 
neoliberal approach to Colombian oil policy has exacerbated existent 
structural problems.  He notes that in the 1990s the effects of the Dutch 
disease in Colombia (such as deagriculturalisation and deindustrialisation at 
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a macroeconomic level) were partially caused by an appreciation of the 
currency with an influx of extractive industry dollars that affected Colombian 
competitiveness in these sectors, as well as by neoliberal policies that 
eliminated subsidies and protections for vulnerable sectors.  Richani 
(2005:118) also notes that as underemployment and poverty rose, workers 
returned to rural areas where the extractive companies operated.  This influx 
exacerbated local conflict dynamics as workers returned to a weakened rural 
economy suffering from deagriculturalisation, high labour costs with an 
oversupply of labour, eroded social fabric and contributed to greater violence 
and the consolidation of a war system (as is discussed below).   
4.2 The weak state: What are the causes?  
Colombia is a weak state with limited control over its territory.  This section 
addresses the causes of the weak state, and the ways in which elite interests 
have not only undermined oil policy, as shown in the previous section, but 
also democracy, thereby fostering the emergence of violence and protostate 
actors.  These factors have in turn further weakened the Colombian state’s 
ability to govern effectively so that, as the subsequent section 4.3 shows, 
democracy cannot be seen in isolation of these factors.  This is also the 
context in which the oil policies above were implemented and in which 
MNOCs have had to operate.  This has shaped the notion of what it has 
meant for companies to be socially responsible as discussed in section 4.4.   
This section will discuss in turn: i) the history of political divisions and 
violence in Colombia before 2002; ii) protostate actors that have emerged in 
the country and that have been both causal and the consequence of the 
weak state; and iii) foreign military intervention, especially by the US, under 
the headings of war on communism, war on drugs and war on terror. 
4.2.1 A history of political divisions and violence before 2002 
As shown below, the recent history of Venezuela is to a large extent linked to 
its status as an oil producer and a petro-state.  This is not the case for 
Colombia.  The history of Colombia is not primarily a history of oil, but rather 
a history of violence fostered by political divisions.  The history of these 
political divisions and the violence that ensued is discussed below.  This is 
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not to say that the divisions and the violence did not have any impact on the 
oil industry or that the latter had no impact on the political sphere.  These 
relationships are more fully discussed in section 4.4.  However, in order to 
understand why MNOCs have acted as they have and assumed the 
responsibilities that they have assumed, an understanding of the context of 
their operations is now provided.  This also enables an understanding of the 
historical continuities and discontinuities in Colombia’s history.  This 
subsection looks at the period before 2002 and the election of Uribe.  I chose 
this division of time to enable comparisons between contemporary Colombia 
and Venezuela under Bolivarian socialism.  This also corresponds to the 
presidents in power, to whom interviewees were referring when the research 
in chapter 7 was conducted.   
Political divisions amongst elites are longstanding in Colombia.  They even 
precede the Colombian Declaration of Independence from Spain in 1810, 
which led to the formation of a new Republic of Gran Colombia in 1819 
(including the current Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and as of 1822 
Ecuador), under a centralised government headed by President General 
Simón Bolivar (1819-1830).  Following independence, elites failed to find 
agreement on the form of governance to be adopted and divided into two 
main rival groups; one favouring the preservation of the Spanish colonial 
legacy of authoritarianism, Roman Catholicism and the continuance of 
slavery, and the other favouring an anticlerical federalism, the abolition of 
slavery and broader suffrage.  Governance accordingly oscillated between 
the political poles and regional rivalries affected the exercise of state 
authority.  In 1830, Ecuador and Venezuela seceded Gran Colombia, which 
subsequently dissolved into the Republic of New Granada (Hanratty & 
Meditz, 1988).  Personalism and regionalism continued to define New 
Grenada with its weak state, small cities and a semi-feudal population, which 
was bound to large landowners in patron-client relationships.  This changed 
around 1849, as capitalism began to replace the old colonial structures and 
the Colombian Conservative Party (PCC)41 and the Liberal Party (PL)42 were 
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 Partido Conservador Colombiano 
42
 Partido Liberal 
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established, reducing Colombian personalism.  Nevertheless, the formation 
of the parties consolidated the ideological split with the Conservatives, which 
grouped together large landowners, the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the 
liberals, which consisted of newer, ascending classes including merchants, 
manufacturers, small landowners, and slaves seeking freedom.  The 
campesinos loyalties generally followed their employers (Hanratty & Meditz, 
1988).  
Between 1849 and 1886, Colombia had several constitutions and three 
different names.  The Republic of Colombia emerged from the 1886 
constitution, which although amended, remained in place until 1954.  
Nevertheless, the prevailing political and economic instability led to the 
Thousand Days’ War43 (1899–1902) between liberals and conservatives, 
which left the country too weak to prevent Panama from declaring 
independence in 1903 (Hanratty & Meditz, 1988).  
Following the civil war, General Rafael Reyes (1904-1909), was elected 
president with moderate Conservatives’ support to rebuild the nation.  Reyes 
incorporated minority liberals into the cabinet and other important political 
bodies to bridge the division and foster peace.  Moreover, he undertook 
important reforms that started a period of economic prosperity that lasted 
until the Great Depression in 1929.  This event contributed to political change 
in 1930, leading to 15 years of liberal governments.  However, whilst the 
Liberals increasingly identified themselves with the growing demands of the 
masses, the Conservatives favoured minimal concessions, church influence 
and elite control of the country, viewing the reforms as communistic.  
Disagreement within the liberal party also grew as to which liberal ideology 
should be applied (pro-reform v. pro-status quo).  Despite the reforms of the 
1930s, economic progress had ended during World War II, as European 
markets closed, preventing the import of raw materials essential to the 
Colombian industrial base.  During his second term in office (1942-1945), 
López Pumarejo received criticism for declaring war on the Axis powers in 
1943 during a period of economic downturn.  The 1946 transfer of power to a 
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Conservative president re-ignited tensions between the parties, resulting in 
violent political conflict, particularly in rural areas (Hanratty & Meditz, 1988).   
Colombian violentologists agree that the democratic system collapsed and 
the state lost its monopoly of violence during La Violencía (1946-1965), 
which resulted from the dominant elite-led Conservative and Liberal parties’ 
power games.  Parties that had seen state control as a zero-sum game 
usually ending in civil war, once again, backed by a politicised population, 
executed their well-known hereditary hatreds (Ramsey, 1973:3; Mauceri, 
2004:149; Leal Buitrago, 1995; Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010; Manwaring, 2002:6; 
Bouvier, 2009:6). In the late 1940s, this hatred fuelled a widespread wave of 
intimidation and violence by Conservative local authorities, culminating in the 
assassination of the liberal presidential candidate, Gaitán, and in mob riots 
that destroyed parts of Bogotá and started La Violencía (Dix, 1980:306-7).   
Given the liberals’ refusal to present a presidential candidate in 1949, Gómez 
(1950-1953), the only Conservative candidate, took office in 1950, expanding 
his powers and curtailing civil liberties to curb violence and prevent the 
liberals from regaining power.  Gómez’ repression was directed, in particular, 
against the liberal opposition, which he branded communist.  Gómez lost 
support because of protracted violence and his attacks on moderate 
Conservatives and on the military establishment. In June 1953, Rojas Pinilla 
(1953-1957) led a coup d'état and assumed the presidency.  Rojas Pinilla 
followed the populist example of General Perón (1946-55) in Argentina to 
introduce policy measures that responded to demands for social reform.  He 
recruited support from non-traditional sources including the military and the 
church, attempting to create a third force movement of peasants and urban 
workers to counter the elite's traditional domination of the country's politics.  
This angered the elite and support for the Rojas Pinilla regime dwindled with 
violence restarting by the end of 1953.  Rojas Pinilla responded by reversing 
initial social reform measures and introducing a wave of increasingly brutal 
repression.  Violence only ended as the political elite realised that they stood 
to gain more from coalition than from continued hostility and military 
dictatorship (Dix, 1980:313).   
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Civilian rule was re-established by Conservatives and Liberals in 1957 with 
support from the church, the business community and elements of the army. 
However, this attempt at consociational democracy (by means of a new 
National Front) perpetuated traditional social inequalities and two-party 
hegemony (Hartlyn, 1988:4).  The bipartisan institutional pact required an 
alternating presidency from 1958 to 1974, restricting eligibility for elective 
office to Conservative and Liberal party members, who divided posts up 
equally regardless of the election results (Karl, 1990:12; Dix, 1978:304).  The 
Communist Left and the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL) were 
disenfranchised, so that throughout the 1970s and 1980s, regime reform 
became a shared cause among leftists, intellectuals and reformist politicians 
and alternative political movements were forced to be anti-system, mutating 
the Colombian Left’s development and fuelling leftist insurgencies.  The US’ 
anti-communist activities and pressure on Latin American governments to 
proscribe communist parties also weakened the possible emergence of left-
wing political groups (Grandin, 2003:9)44 (see subsection 4.2.3).   
During La Violencía aggrieved peasants had begun to attack landlords, 
thereby starting mass counter-elite mobilisation, with more guerrilla groups 
becoming Marxist and posing an armed challenge and a risk of social 
revolution to the state (Hartlyn, 1988:3).  As interparty violence diminished 
and the ties between a disillusioned electorate and the traditional parties 
broke down, political unrest assumed a more urban, class-orientated base.  
Amongst the groups to form in the 1960s and 1970s, were the Armed 
Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC), which was linked to the 
Communist party, the National Liberation Army (ELN), the 19th of April 
Movement (M-19), the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the indigenous Quintín 
Lame movement and the Workers' Revolutionary Party of Colombia (PRT) 
(Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002:28; UNHRC, 2010:6).  Guerrillas 
spoke of creating a Soviet, Cuban or unique socialist system to redress 
socio-political and economic inequality.  Whereas the FARC had a strong 
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 It is noteworthy that following WWII, Soviet dictator Josef Stalin had instructed international 
communist parties to adhere to a popular front strategy so that these had been a 
democratising force against the Latin American dictatorships to emerge in the 1940s and 
1950s (Brands, 2010:14). 
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land reform agenda, the ELN, composed of students and intellectuals, 
focused on opposing the working conditions that emerged from natural 
resource exploitation by foreign capital, such as oil by MNOCs.  The 
guerrillas predominantly operated in areas with little state presence and 
survived primarily on extortion and theft (Sanchez, 2001:3; Guáqueta, 2006; 
Breuer, 2008:75).   Paramilitary groups also subsequently played an 
important role in the history of Colombian violence.  They were created by 
the state for counterinsurgency activities, but it subsequently had little control 
over them (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002:23; Guaqueta, 2006; Lair, 
2001:114).  These groups first emerged in the 1960s with state legislation 
authorising self-defence against the guerrillas.  Government policies have 
both encouraged and discouraged paramilitary activities (see below).     
President Pastrana (1970-1974) began to dismantle the National Front 
structure in accordance with 1968 constitutional amendments.  However, his 
successor, López Michelsen (1974-78) faced difficult legacies in terms of the 
economy, the guerrilla movement and the drug trade.  By this time, the illicit 
narcotics industry was emerging as a dominant economic force, changing the 
structure of the national economy and disrupting existing social and political 
relations. Subsequent governments proved unable to address the resulting 
inflation, unemployment and the skewed income distribution.  As mentioned 
above, by 1975, given the decline in oil production, Colombia had become a 
net oil importer. Colombia also faced high inflation due to an influx of foreign 
exchange from the coffee boom and the illicit drug trade. López Michelsen’s 
attempts to counter this by instituting austerity measures resulted in strikes, 
riots and a resurgence of guerrilla activity.  Simultaneously, corruption funded 
by drugs was permeating all levels of the political system.  In some areas, 
drug traffickers were elected to local or state offices.  President Julio César 
Turbay (1978–1982) used a state-of-siege decree to implement security 
policies that weakened the M-19 in particular, but were considered highly 
questionable internationally, due to accusations of human rights abuses 
against suspects and captured guerrillas.  The liberal Colombians’ desire for 
peace led to the election of Conservative Belisario Betancur (1982–1986), 
who negotiated a 1984 cease-fire with the FARC and M-19 after releasing 
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guerrilla prisoners in 1982.  The ceasefire with the M-19 ended in 1985 with 
guerrillas claiming that members had suffered threats and assaults by official 
security forces and questioning the government's real willingness to 
implement peace accords.  FARC negotiations led to the creation of 
the Patriotic Union (UP), a legal and non-clandestine political organisation.  
Whilst FARC members joined the UP, most of the guerrilla's chiefs and 
militiamen did not demobilise nor disarm, as the process did not yet require 
them to do so.  Both sides began to accuse each other of not respecting the 
cease-fire and political violence against both FARC and UP members was 
blamed not only on drug lords, but also on the security forces.  Government 
members increasingly accused the FARC of continuing to recruit guerrillas 
and of kidnapping, extorting and politically intimidating voters even as the UP 
was already participating in politics (Ambrus, 2007; Williamson, 2009). 
The Virgilio Barco administration (1986–1990) had to contend with the 
complex negotiations with the guerrillas, but also with the drug lords, who 
began a campaign of terrorism and murder to counter government moves to 
extradite them overseas.   Alongside the paramilitaries and paramilitary 
sympathisers within the security forces, the drug lords significantly weakened 
the UP, assassinating two of its presidential candidates, Jaime Pardo Leal 
and Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa.  In the 1990 elections, a total of three 
presidential candidates were assassinated before César Gaviria was elected 
(1990-1994).  The drug cartels were also in war against the state; especially 
the Medellín cartel until the death of its leader Pablo Escobar in December 
1993.  Thereafter, the Cali cartel rose to prominence (Williamson, 2009:591). 
The M-19 and several smaller guerrilla groups were successfully 
incorporated into a peace process at the end of the 1980s.  The decision was 
taken to reform the constitution to make society more modern, democratic 
and politically open, leading to the enactment of the 1991 constitution.  The 
reincorporation of these guerrilla groups into the legal political framework was 
a key success.   
Contacts with the FARC had continued sporadically despite the interruptions 
of the ceasefire and the official 1987 break from negotiations.  These were 
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temporarily cut in 1990 under the Gavaria administration with an army 
assault on the FARC's Casa Verde sanctuary, followed by a FARC offensive 
to undermine the deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly.   
Samper’s presidency (1994-1998) was paralysed by allegations that drug 
traffickers had contributed to his presidential campaign and reinforced by his 
unwillingness to extradite narcotraficantes to the US (Williamson, 2009:591).  
Under Samper, the FARC overran several rural military bases and took a 
record number of soldiers and officers hostage.   
Conservative Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) initially based his programme 
upon a commitment to peacefully resolve Colombia's longstanding civil 
conflict through negotiations with the FARC and the ELN, which both 
participated in the peace process, but without any explicit commitments to 
end the conflict.  Pastrana granted land the size of Switzerland to the FARC 
as a safe haven, but as negotiations dragged, he changed his tactics, sent 
troops in to recover the land, and turned to the US for help to combat illegal 
drug-trafficking (Williamson, 2009:591-2).  The growing severity of 
countrywide attacks by the guerrillas and even more violent paramilitary 
groups, such as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), made it 
very difficult to resolve other socio-economic problems that resulted from the 
Colombian government’s commitment to the neoliberal economic policies 
practiced by other Latin American countries.  Indeed, in the early 1990s, the 
national government had provided the convivires in Antioquia with arms and 
equipment, to weaken the FARC, but they simultaneously strengthened the 
paramilitary movement.   Given the failure of Pastrana’s negotiations, Uribe’s 
hard-line approach to dealing with the conflict won him electoral success in 
2002 (Botero, 2007; Breuer, 2008:79).  Key events following the election of 
Uribe are discussed in section 4.3.  The granting of territory to the FARC by 
Pastrana, however, reinforced another challenge to the incoming Uribe 
government, that of alternative centres of power to fill in the voids left by the 





4.2.2 The rise of protostate actors 
This subsection shows how the Colombian state’s weak control over its 
territories has encouraged competition from protostate actors.  Indeed, the 
absence of government agency in certain (oil) areas has enabled other non-
state agents to establish parallel governance structures.  Companies and 
pipelines are often situated in areas in which governance struggles have 
occurred.  The inability of the Colombian government to firmly establish itself 
throughout its territory has compromised its ability to penetrate society, 
regulate conflicts within it, govern legitimately, extract resources, enforce the 
law and administer justice.45  These weaknesses predominantly stem from a 
combination of structural problems, including clientelism, particularism,46 
political trade-offs (Robinson, 2005; Leal & Dávila, 1990), poverty, inequality 
(Carneiro, 2007:6-7), the culture of violence (Manwaring, 2009:2), the drugs 
trade, the US drugs war (McLean, 2005), the political regime's institutional 
distortions, the atomisation of political parties and historic state absence in 
certain areas (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002:14;  Bejarano & Segura, 
1996:10).  These have all weakened state legitimacy and democracy, 
reducing public compliance with other agents filling vacuums of control left by 
the state.  As Mason (2004) has stated:   
“In Colombia, alternative political communities such as transnational NGO's, 
church and humanitarian associations, and global organizations, as well as 
insurgent and paramilitary groups, are increasingly viewed as functional and 
normative substitutes for the state”. 
As discussed in section 4.4, a first type of quasi-protostate actor is the (oil) 
multinational, which has taken on government responsibilities and can 
present challenges to democracy.  Indeed, if local populations or mayors see 
MNOCs providing (state) welfare, then this changes MNOCs’ status, whether 
or not companies mean to compete with the state.  Indeed, certain MNOCs, 
such as Occidental, have also supplied the Colombian military with 
equipment and helicopters to provide law and order (Leech, 2008).  Such 
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 Criteria which Bagley (2001:2) uses to gauge state capacity.   
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 Particularism refers to discretionary deviations from universal rules (O’Donnell, 1996). 
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donations raise questions as to where military allegiances lie and what the 
military might do for MNOCs (see below). 
A second category of protostate actors that can be identified are the guerrilla 
groups.  These have been protostate actors since the 1960s, providing an 
example copied by paramilitaries of replacing the traditional state to compete 
for citizens' loyalties.  They have levied taxes, provided social welfare and 
infrastructure and involved themselves in political affairs, religious and moral 
issues and distributing justice.  The FARC's strategic decision to tax coca 
bush cultivation and cocaine production cultivated for sale not only brought 
them extra wealth, but reinforced the notion of a protostate (Pizarro 
Leongómez, 1992; Le Billon, 2003; Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 
2002:32), as did its sophisticated social security including pensions for retired 
guerrillas and minimum wages for coca pickers (Cooper, 2006:20).  The 
global cocaine prohibition regime consolidated the guerrillas’ existence as 
coca became the world’s most profitable crop (Peceny & Durnan, 2006:99).  
However, Day (2011:50-3) argues that the FARC, which lost 50% of its land 
between 2002 and 2010 due to former President Uribe’s military successes, 
is no longer as able to provide for the local populations that had supported it 
and is losing legitimacy as a social actor. 
A third category of protostate actor is the paramilitaries, which emerged in 
response to the guerrillas groups with the explicit or implicit support of the 
state (see above).   
4.2.3 International military influence  
The Colombian conflict is not strictly internal, nor is it limited to armed actors, 
as it involves a complex interplay of domestic and international security 
domains.  Indeed, many of Colombia’s internal risks, whether physical or 
structural, are intertwined with regional, hemispheric and global security 
dynamics, dominated by both state and non-state actors (Mason, 2004).  
This section begins by discussing the US’ role in the war system and its three 
discursive shifts, communism, drugs and terror, which have framed the 
Colombian conflict.  Thereafter, I briefly discuss the impact of globalisation 
and of Colombia’s neighbours in the conflict, using the example of the FARC.    
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4.2.3.1 The US and its war against communists, drugs and terror 
US involvement in the Colombian war system has significantly influenced the 
conflict with Colombia being a principal recipient of US military aid.  The US, 
which decreased its military aid to Colombia for the 2013 fiscal year to USD 
30 million, has nevertheless given Colombia approximately USD 7 billion in 
military aid since it began in 2000 (Bittner, 2012). US intervention in 
Colombian affairs has not only compounded the war system, but it has 
transversally normalised war as a liberal discourse of transnational 
intervention (Corva, 2009:169).  Corva (2009) indicates a trend that 
corresponds to the Foucauldian inversion of Clausovitz' axiom, suggesting 
that politics could be understood as the extension of war by other means. 
Through such wars, the US has enabled politics, i.e. a transnational 
militarisation of the police function.  These efforts could be called 
terrorocratic, essentially amounting to state terrorism under a democratic 
façade (Stokes, 2006:368); however, they are often framed as morally right.  
Discursively, the war against communism became the war against drugs and 
then against terror, seeing armed groups change from communists, to 
narcotraffickers, to terrorists.   
4.2.3.1.1 War on communism 
The first period discussed is that of the war on communism.  Throughout 
Latin America, the Cuban revolution exacerbated anti-Americanism and  
solidarity with the third world against imperialism (third-worldism), leading to 
increased superpower competition within the region and magnifying left-right 
militancy (Brands, 2010:3).  Whilst the US claimed to be fighting to defend 
democracy in this period, as Grandin (2003:9) notes, at its outset, many 
democrats believed that the US was using the Cold War as a pretext to roll 
back democracy and excuse intervention.  Indeed, at the same time as the 
US was exporting the ideal of democratic modernisation, it was invigorating 
Latin American militaries with centralised intelligence agencies to counter 
insurgent threats, militaries which began to topple governments across Latin 
America.  The US used a mixture of discreet and open support for 
137 
 
governments or insurgents depending upon the country in question (Grandin, 
2003:10).  
During the Cold War, if not consistently, the US supported the Colombian 
state, whilst the Soviet Union sent aid to FARC and Cuba had links with the 
M-19 and the ELN (Chernick, 2005:190).  Moreover, the US backed Western 
elites by opposing land reform plans and providing counterinsurgency aid 
and advice (Gray, 2008).    
US military intervention in Colombia extends back to the 1950s, when it 
promoted a US inspired anti-communist, security doctrine amongst the 
Colombian military47, advocating and supporting the repression of emerging 
left-wing groups (Chernick, 2005:190), the creation of counterinsurgency 
groups in the 1962 Plan Lazo, and a policing of civil society actors that could 
offer a front for insurgent activities (Stokes, 2006:373).  US training of the 
Colombian military also encouraged the latter to be suspicious of civil society, 
despite its traditional allegiances to the elitist political parties, neither of which 
was left-wing (Stokes, 2006:273; Leal Buitrago, 1995).  Thus, the US played 
a role in fostering a suspicion of civil society within Colombia, which 
transformed by the conflict, established civil society as a viable target from all 
sides.  Indeed, years later, under former President Uribe, such suspicion 
permeated government policy, displaying itself in a stigmatisation of civil 
society as is discussed below (Semana, 2003). 
4.2.3.1.2 War on drugs 
The second period discussed is that of the War on Drugs.  The deceleration 
of the Cold War in the late 1980s, shifted the US’ focus from anti-communism 
to a narcotisation of its bilateral relations with Colombia, whereby it used 
coercive diplomatic and economic pressure and supplied strategic military 
assistance to curb drug flows to the US, the primary market for Colombian 
drugs (Crandall, 2002:2; Youngers et al., 2004:3).  The 1970s and 1980s had 
seen transborder terrorist and criminal networks expand into a war system 
with a consolidating socioeconomic base from the trafficking of contraband 
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 The military fought internal Communist resistants from the 1940s.  
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goods, the drugs trade, arms trade, armed robberies, kidnapping and other 
economic activities (Richani, 1997:38; Mason, 2004).48   
The US G.H.W. Bush administration launched the Andean Initiative, a USD 
200 million operation to counter the drugs trade, with limited success.49  The 
US Clinton administration, fearing possible Colombian government defeat by 
guerrilla forces and the expanding drug trade, with Colombia producing 90% 
of cocaine globally, created a USD 1.3 billion aid package called Plan 
Colombia in 2000 to increase military support to strengthen counter-narcotics 
and counter-insurgency efforts (Walker, 2002:15).  The US G.W. Bush 
administration provided the Colombian military with an average of USD 600 
million each year in aid from 2003-2005 (Stokes, 2006:369, 378).   
Drug-traffickers, moreover, widened the scope of the conflict, by funding 
paramilitary self-defence groups, whose private armies protect them from 
possible extortion (Peceny & Durnan, 2006:99; Martín Ortega, 2008; Bouvier, 
2009:4).  Thus, the US has found itself increasingly entangled in a drugs war 
amidst the Colombian conflict without an exit strategy (Gray, 2008:70; 
Crandall, 2002:2-8; Feickert, 2005). 
It is, however, over-reductionist to conflate armed groups with drug-trafficking 
and with Colombian violence and crime (Peceny & Durnan, 2006:111; Martín 
Ortega, 2008:2).  Firstly, whereas the FARC is predominantly an insurgent 
organisation that uses criminal activity to promote its political agenda, the 
raison d'être of paramilitary groups such as the AUC, prior to its 
demobilisation, is harder to determine given their mixed composition of 
paramilitary and criminal organisations (Peceny & Durnan, 2006:111; Martín 
Ortega, 2008:2).  Secondly, even if the government succeeded in 
demobilising the FARC, which lost several key leaders in the late 2000s and 
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 Moreover, in the 1980s, the struggle for power led the Medellín traffickers to attack the 
government with waves of assassinations and bombings.  The government only defeated 
them with help from the US and the traffickers’ Cali rivals.  The subsequent dismantling of 
the Cali group produced many smaller, more mobile trafficking organisations (Reina, 2001).  
49
 Regionally, in the 1980s, US crop eradication in Peru and Bolivia increased coca 
cultivation in Colombia as armed groups followed drug traffickers to new cultivation areas, 
displacing small farmers and intensifying conflict in target areas (Holmes et al., 2006).  
Moreover, US military campaigns in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama brought millions of 
weapons to the Colombian borders, fuelling the Colombian illegal arms trade (Rabasa & 
Chalk, 2001).   
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is currently involved in peace talks, or new paramilitary groups, organised 
violence would not immediately end in Colombia (Gray, 2008:83).  Thirdly, 
such reductionism misses the role of other violence fuelling legal economic 
sectors,  such as emeralds (Gutiérrez & Barón, 2008; Rettberg et al., 2010), 
gold (Richani, 2005), palm oil (Roa Avendaño, 2007), flowers (Rettberg et al., 
2010), coffee (Palacios, 1980; Rettberg & Nasi, 2005; Rettberg et al., 2010), 
bananas (Chomsky, 2007; Rettberg & Nasi, 2005), land (Bagley, 1979; 
Pécaut 1987; Medina, 1992), coal (Chomsky et al., 2007) and oil (Richani, 
2002; Dunning & Wirpsa, 2004; Pearce, 2004).   
However, the FARC’s move from a centralised decision-making structure to 
one with multiple nodes has encouraged growing numbers of FARC 
commanders to focus on narco-profits rather than ideological goals 
(Eccarius-Kelly, 2012:235) (see chapter 3 for a discussion of war 
economies).  However, whilst Le Billon (2003) shows that revenue 
maximisation can motivate armed group members, the capture of state 
functions, interest in welfare provision, social issues and politics to further its 
struggle show that the greedy rebel thesis (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000; Collier, 
2000) is not wholly descriptive of the FARC agenda (Chernick, 2005).  
Instead, as shown above, FARC motivations appear mixed (Gray, 2008:67; 
Peceny & Durnan, 2006:96).  Whilst finance and politics are not mutually 
exclusive and every movement needs money, individual greed cannot fully 
explain the FARC’s organisational patterns (Cramer, 2006:9) nor can it 
explain its emergence.    
Motivations aside, this militarisation of the drugs problematic has further 
compounded a war system (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001:xvii; Hartlyn, 1993:5).  
The US’ analysis of, and impact upon, Colombian conflict dynamics have 
received much criticism for being derived from a failing prohibition and 
criminalisation strategy.  The Latin American Commission on Drugs and 
Democracy (2009:5) reports that prohibitionist policies focused upon 
eradicating drug production, disrupting drug flows and criminalising 
consumption have failed and that a new paradigm is needed to tackle drug 
trafficking and associated crime.  Bejarano and Pizarro Leongómez 
(2002:23) accuse the US anti-drug stance of limiting the Colombian 
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government’s autonomy and policy options, diverting state attention from 
social problems that fuel illegal economies to militarised solutions.  Corva 
(2009:168) argues that the resultant militarisation of the police function feeds 
the illicit economy; high risk equals high profit and the increased use of 
violence to produce and maintain such profit.  These findings support 
arguments that, by bringing the US military and policies into this system, the 
US involvement in Colombian affairs has both internationalised and 
compounded the war system (Martín Ortega, 2008:5; Scott, 2011).  
Moreover, there has been criticism of US intervention, which has sought to 
further US control and/or profit in the context of the war on drugs. Several 
authors contend that the US is complicit in, or has profited from, the drugs 
trade (Scott & Marshall, 1998; Scott, 2003; Villar, 2007:97; Chomsky, 2000:4; 
2009).  Scott (2011) argues that the US aligned itself with paramilitary drug 
traffickers, which have been allies of the Colombian army and those it helped 
train to fight the left.  He claims that such cooperation has come from: i) the 
traffickers' ability to supply resources; ii) their offer of counter-insurgency 
assistance against left-wing guerrillas; and iii) the US' desire to prevent the 
drug trade from being controlled by a hostile power.  Villar (2007:97) takes a 
radically critical approach, arguing that the US not only benefits from the 
cocaine trade, but that it exercises a narcocolonialism or re-colonisation so 
that the cocaine trade and the cocaine economy are vital aspects of US 
imperialism in the Colombian economic system.  In addition, Chomsky (2009) 
suggests that the controversial strategic mass aerial herbicidal spraying of 
coca and poppy fields is a form of chemical warfare, not only impacting left-
wing insurgents, but facilitating peasant farmers’ displacement from 
fumigated land for mining companies or ranch owners.  He claims that a 
complicity exists between the US and drug traffickers, or US involvement in 
terrocratic acts such as clearing land for the elite, which not only impacts the 
environment in which MNOCs operate, but also raises questions about their 
possible complicity.   
However, I argue that it is not a logical progression that the US specifically 
used the wars as a pretext for narcocolonialism or the clearing of land for 
business or elite interests, although this rationale may have affected certain 
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decision-making.  Arguably, in such a laminated reality, this proposed 
overarching framework appears theoretically restrictive and may have 
retroductively imposed inexistent causal links.  On examination of US 
collective actions in Colombia, the individual actions that compose such a 
reality suggest that the wars have been somewhat driven by topics on the US 
national political agenda and a self-perpetuating military industrial narcotics 
complex.50  Indeed, Manwaring (2002:11) describes Plan Colombia as "the 
basis of a coherent political project, but not much else", noting that 
disagreement vis-à-vis conflict management has produced unsystematic 
responses, thereby questioning the ability of the complex to clearly define the 
objectives that best serve its agenda to conduct a war on drugs.    
I would argue that given Colombia’s complex layers of structural and physical 
violence, in which drug cartels have infiltrated even the highest levels of 
government, some degree of intentional or unintentional complicity with drug 
traffickers is difficult to avoid.  However, US agents’ intentionality appears to 
be split.  On the one hand, the ethical norms that govern US decision-making 
on Colombia have been criticised as a result of reports of US military 
collusion with paramilitaries and military aid primarily benefitting this armed 
group (Dube & Naidu, 2011).  On the other hand, according to Crandall 
(2002:4), the US government has avoided individuals with suspected links to 
drug-trafficking to work with trusted counter-narcotics allies.  Plan Colombia’s 
aid has also been contingent upon the Colombian government’s ability to 
meet certain human rights targets and to ensure the suspension of military 
officers accused of human rights violations or of working with paramilitary 
groups (Avilés, 2009:67).  Negotiations on the US-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement (CTPA),51 eliminating trade barriers between the two countries, 
was used by the US government to lobby the Colombian government on the 
issue of labour rights (EOP, 2011).   
Whatever US motives may be, as MNOCs are often located in areas of weak 
state presence, their military protection of oil facilities is mutually beneficial to 
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 Crandall (2002:7) uses this term, based upon Eisenhower's military industrial complex, to 
describe a situation where there is a self-perpetuation of expenditure on military hardware 
and budgets of US agencies involved in the war.   
51  This is also known as the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement (CFTA). 
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the Colombian government, MNOCs and the US government.  Moreover, 
Colombia has internalised much of the anti-drug posture and has willingly 
complied with US policies in order to receive tangible benefits (Mason, 2004).  
Colombian security forces received US funding, military and intelligence 
training and modern equipment to combat drug-trafficking (Rabasa & Chalk, 
2001).  This aid has effectively weakened the FARC over recent years 
(Avilés, 2009:67).   
4.2.3.1.3 War on terror 
The discursive focus of the war on drugs shifted to a third war paradigm, that 
of the war on terror following 9/11.  If Colombia’s Bolivarian neighbours have 
been coy about their FARC ties, the FARC’s kidnapping of three US 
contractors (rescued in Operation Jacque alongside Ingrid Betancourt) in 
2003 firmly altered the US stance of reluctantly using Plan Colombia funds 
against the FARC, to place the latter’s demise as a key policy objective in the 
framework of the War on Terror (Spencer, 2011:87).  The change of 
discourse from the Cold War to the War on Drugs to the War on Terror did 
not entail a complete shift of objectives, thus illustrating Chomsky’s continuity 
thesis.  In reality, despite the superimposition of new discursive frameworks, 
counter-insurgency has remained a key objective, although it may 
encompass new, related objectives.  Thus, policies and practices from the 
previous paradigm have been transferred into the next (Stokes, 2006:370; 
Feickert, 2005:1).  
The US commitment to the War on Drugs and the War on Terror provided a 
framework to justify and structure continued US regional military operations, 
bases and interventions in Colombian internal affairs in its backyard post-
Cold War (Corva, 2009:169; Crandall, 2002:7).  The disparity in economic, 
political and military power between the US and Colombia has enabled the 
continuation of a dominant-subordinate, asymmetric relationship, whereby 
the US maintains political and economic advantage by backing Colombian 
counter-insurgency efforts and supporting the pro-US elitist democracy.  For 
example, the pressure on Colombia to grant immunity to American citizens 
and military from prosecution for human rights violations under the 
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International Criminal Court serves neither Colombian justice nor democracy 
(Mason, 2004; Chomsky, 2009). 
As Scott (2011) states, oil is a component in the main countries where the 
US has launched major military campaigns.  Indeed, as a strategic US 
interest, energy policy transverses most other US policy areas.  Whereas 
under the Clinton administration, Plan Colombia specifically targeted FARC 
regions, under Bush (2001-2009) it emphasised the military defence of 
Colombia’s oil industry (Gray, 2008).  Military deployment to protect MNOCs’ 
assets has been a political response to changing policy and needs, but also 
results from MNOC lobbying and domestic concerns over energy security 
rather than being a plan determined a priori.  Only as of 2002, when violence 
and oil worker kidnapping peaked (Fondelibertad, 2009), was an additional 
USD 98 million authorised to protect the Caño Limón oil pipeline and US 
forces were stationed in the oil producing areas of Arauca and Caquetá 
(Gray, 2008).  The heightened US military presence has offered oil facilities 
and pipelines better protection, transferring some MNOC security costs to the 
US taxpayer (Richani, 2005:131-138).  
4.2.3.2 The FARC’s external support  
Given its Cold War, Marxist roots, the FARC has been involved in external 
relations/geopolitical struggle from its outset.  The Cold War fused long-
standing social, political and economic tensions with the persistent friction 
between US hegemony and Latin American nationalism, along with the 
ideological implications of decolonisation, the rise of the Third World and the 
bipolar struggle52 for pre-eminence in developing countries.  Thus, as Brands 
(2010:7) notes, in Latin America “the Cold War drew together local, regional 
and global conflicts, and the result was to lend the struggles that occurred 
during that period their intense and seemingly intractable nature”.  Consistent 
with the ideological dichotomy of the Cold War, self-identified emergent 
Marxist armed groups were supported by communist countries such as 
Cuba, but opposed by the Colombian state, as well as the US, which saw the 
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 Following Stalin’s death in 1953, Khruschev opened Soviet policy towards Latin America, 
offering new trading opportunities (Philip, 1982:102). 
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struggle as part of its hegemonic, anti-communist security agenda in Latin 
America (Spencer, 2011).   
The FARC successfully adapted its war strategies to a transborder reality, 
enjoying international relationships with foreign governments, political parties 
and terrorist organisations.  It has also used cross-border sanctuaries and 
established internationally-oriented advocacy networks (Eccarius-Kelly, 
2012:235).  The FARC’s terrorist relations include: the IRA, Basque-
separatist ETA, the Peruvian MRTA, the Paraguayan EPP and Venezuelan 
guerrilla groups (both historical and created under President Chávez) 
(Spencer, 2011:91).  By adopting a policy of solidarity with Bolivarian 
socialism, the FARC has identified itself with, for example, Venezuelan, 
Bolivian and Ecuadorian governments.  Evidence from the FARC Secretariat 
member Raúl Reyes computers, obtained in 2008, alongside information 
presented by Colombia to the OAS in 2010, show financial and political 
relations between the FARC and Ecuador’s President Correa and former 
Venezuelan President Chávez amongst others (Spencer, 2011:79,89-90).  
These relations have caused tensions between the Colombian government 
and its neighbours (Uribe Vélez, 2012).   
4.3. Challenges to governance post-2002 
This section discusses some of the governance challenges that Colombia 
faced from the period starting in 2002 with President Uribe’s first election.  I 
will discuss in turn: i) the discourses around the security situation and its 
impact on governance; ii) the state abandonment of people and land; iii) the 
friend/enemy dichotomies; and iv) the democratic nature of Colombia’s 
government. 
4.3.1 Uribe’s election, the security situation and its impact on 
governance 
This section discusses the post-2002 security situation in Colombia and the 
measures taken by the state to combat the violence.  As will be shown in 
section 4.4, these measures have influenced the parameters of MNOCs’ 
responsibilities and their practice of CSR.   
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President Uribe won the 2002 elections on a pro-neoliberal, anti-corruption 
platform and his administration proposed a Democratic Manifesto that was 
paradoxically criticised as a blueprint for authoritarian presidency.  This 
authoritarianism was predominantly framed by a discourse that emphasises a 
conceptual trade-off between security and liberty.  As Gutiérrez Sanín (2010) 
notes, the discourse took place in other countries as the US war on terror 
began.  Nevertheless, in Colombia, it was superimposed upon existing 
conflict dynamics and was not based upon the Islamic threat that 
characterised this paradigm in the rest of the world.53   
President Uribe’s aggressive approach to the FARC and ELN was popular 
following the failure of Pastrana's diplomatic model of peace-building through 
land concessions to the FARC (Botero, 2007; Breuer, 2008:79).  The 
disastrous result, Farclandia, provided additional legitimacy for the 
manifesto's security policies.  The objectives of democratic security included: 
i) the "consolidation of state control throughout Colombia," defining terrorism, 
drug and weapons trafficking, money laundering, kidnapping, extortion and 
murder as the major threats to peace; ii) the military defeat of the FARC; and 
iii) state-paramilitary negotiations (Ministerio de Defensa, 2003:32,24-31; 
Vásquez, 2010:1).  Police and military presence in lawless areas 
characterised by state absence became key priorities (Shifter & Jawahar, 
2004).  These policies successfully reduced conflict intensity, murder and 
political assassination rates and international humanitarian law violations 
(Vásquez, 2010:1).  Nevertheless, democratic security threatened other civil 
liberties in the fields of human rights, justice and peace (Bejarano & Pizarro 
Leongómez, 2002:35).  
The Colombian social fabric was seriously weakened by the Uribe 
government’s combined use of democratic (power1) and authoritarian tools 
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 Certain trends linked to the war on terror globally have negatively affected Colombian 
democracy.  The 2003 constitutional reform enabled the military to detain people for 36 
hours, to search houses and intercept communications without warrants or judicial orders, to 
create a registry of personal data for military surveillance of the population, granting judicial 
police-powers to the military, so that they could investigate suspects at violent crime scenes, 
even if the military might have been implicated (Hanson & Romero, 2005:2).  In Uribe’s first 
year as president (2002-2003) alone, there were 4,362 arbitrary detentions, nearly double 
that of the previous six years combined (Hanson & Romero, 2005:3). 
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(power2).54  The literature shows that President Uribe, in particular, 
increased the state’s use of power2, given the war conditions against those 
who disagreed, or were perceived to disagree, with the government, e.g. left-
wing NGOs.   
Democratic elections and greater party competition have developed since 
these were enshrined in the 1991 Constitution.  However, given the violence, 
the state's failure to consistently provide certain civil liberties limited the 
space available within the legal realm of participation, so that certain agents 
have shaped their collective identities, or have had them shaped by state 
presence or abandonment (Ramirez, 2003).  Despite regular elections, 
assassinations of leaders, candidates, and elected politicians have distorted 
the election process, discouraging alternative parties and threatening 
participatory democracy (Manwaring, 2002; Gray, 2008).  As shown above, 
violence robbed the left of political space throughout the 1980s and 1990s as 
the Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union) formed of thousands of FARC members 
who had renounced violence, was systematically decimated by paramilitary 
groups and victimised by armed guerrillas.  Thus, Colombia witnessed the 
accumulation of instruments of force such as men, territory, and arms to the 
detriment of public space (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002:5).   
The impact of state weakness and violence upon democratic process is also 
visible in the judicial branch.  Whereas, across Latin America, the judicial 
branch is not always truly independent of the executive branch, in Colombia, 
the National Front pacts helped to assure a greater judicial independence 
instigating a system for naming judges and magistrates without political 
interference.  However, despite the 1991 Constitution’s judicial reforms and 
greater justice expenditure, the judicial apparatus and the state’s normative 
capacity are weak (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002:35).  Since the 
1980s, the judiciary has suffered from rising criminality, violence and drug 
trafficking, corruption, intimidation and death threats against judges 
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 Power1 refers to the general causal powers of human agency, whose characteristics 
include the possibility of human emancipation, (e.g. a capacity to investigate, communicate, 
plan, construct moral and ethical systems, feel and care for others, and reach agreement 
based on judgmentally rational argument).  Power2 refers to negative characteristics such as 
domination, subjugation, exploitation and control that can be identified in given social 
structures (Hartwig, 2007:372). 
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(Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002:36; Rubio, 1999:213–14).  Over 300 
judges were murdered between 1995 and 2010.  The majority of these 
crimes were neither adequately investigated nor criminally punished, creating 
an atmosphere of impunity (IACHR, 2010:410).   
Democracy has also been undermined by some politicians’ alliances with 
paramilitaries, who are key instigators of violence (Pearce, 2007).  For 
example, the Uribe administration (2002-2010) recruited civilians to ambush 
guerrilla patrols in Arauca.  Despite the official 2003-2006 AUC 
demobilisation process under President Uribe, whereby the government 
demobilised over 30,000 paramilitary members (ICG, 2009:i; Martín Ortega, 
2008:2-3), according to Haugaard (2008), in 2008, emerging new illegal 
armed groups (NIAGs), such as the Aguilas Negras (Black Eagles), 
continued to threaten civilians, sometimes with Colombian army support.  
Whilst state-sponsored militias were declared unconstitutional in 1989 as 
their atrocities were exposed, some paramilitary groups that had functioned 
like militias continued to conduct joint operations with government forces and 
specific military brigades.  Implicated military personnel have not always lost 
their positions (Welna, 2007:4).  Whilst the Ministry of Defence has tried to 
quash the paramilitary ethos amongst the armed forces, this work is 
incomplete (Arias et al., 2010:6).  Moreover, the Colombian government’s 
abdication of certain basic security functions to right-wing armies complicated 
the task of assigning responsibility for their actions or ascertaining whether 
the militias’ subsequent actions were officially approved (Bejarano & Pizarro 
Leongómez, 2002:23). 
Accusations have accumulated with the Colombian attorney-general’s office 
running investigations against state officials, judicial officials, pro-Uribe ex-
governors, ex-mayors and ex-congressmen.  In 2006, for example, the 
Liberal Party leader, Alberto Santofimio Botero, was identified as having 
planned the 1989 assassination of liberal reformer Luis Carlos Galán by 
Pablo Escobar (Ambrus, 2007).  Moreover, Jorge Noguera, a Colombian 
intelligence chief and campaign manager to former President Uribe, has 
been connected to corruption and the paramilitaries.  Given such revelations 
about important state actors, state impingements on peoples' civil liberties in 
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the name of security appear all the more dangerous as the extent of armed 
infiltration in the government institutions’ is unclear (Pearce, 2008; Semana, 
2008:30-32).  As Pearce (2008) argues: 
"The idea that Uribe himself knew nothing of what was going on defies belief; 
but it is a suspension of belief amongst the population- and, scandalously, 
amongst international allies and some commentators- which has enabled 
Uribe to convince the country that the threat to peace and democracy comes 
uniquely from the Farc."   
Whilst some may view politicians’ links with paramilitaries as a potentially 
positive negotiating tool, paramilitary penetration of the political regime has 
signalled both state incapacity to deal with the armed actors and a 
degradation of democracy (Botero, 2007:97).  These concerns are 
compounded by reports that, since the United Self-Defence Groups of 
Colombia’s (AUC) 2005 partial demobilisation, paramilitary and criminal 
networks have regrouped and expanded (Haugaard, 2008) (see above).  
4.3.2 State abandonment of people and land  
In this subsection, I will show that the state has placed economic interests 
above those of its citizens, at times abandoning land to businesses, 
regardless of the desires of existing communities.  Indeed, the hollowness of 
Colombian democracy is visible in the government’s failure to consider and 
protect certain communities’ interests vis-à-vis oil operations.  By ceding 
settled agricultural lands that have sustained Colombian families to MNOCs, 
the state has sometimes neglected the interests of those dependent upon the 
subsistence economy vis-à-vis the interests of the rentier economy.  These 
lands have become strategic points of conflict between the state, armed 
actors and companies (Sanchez, 2001:5; Richani, 2005:117).   
In addition, state relations with indigenous communities have been 
particularly tense as the state, MNOCs and indigenous groups sometimes 
disagree on whether land should be exploited.  Whereas the latter consider 
the earth and its subsoil to be a sacred part of Mother Earth, the state sees 
the potential oil wealth.  Indigenous communities living on land surrounding 
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oil exploitation sites have also been particularly vulnerable to violence, 
resulting from the territorial struggles by armed groups that have emerged in 
oil areas, damaging the community identity of certain groups that had long 
protected their surrounding ecological environments (Sanchez, 2001:6; 
González Posso, 2011).   
Since 1998, decree 1320 has entrusted the state with the responsibility to 
guarantee that indigenous groups are consulted prior to any oil development 
in and around their communities (González Posso, 2011:46-48).  Whilst their 
situation has thereby improved, nevertheless, their rights, alongside those of 
Afrocolombians, have been frequently violated and despite the constitutional 
framework, the implementation of such legislation is limited (CERD, 
2006:157-159; IACHR, 2010:341; Aponte Miranda, 2011);55  According to 
Inter Pares (2009:55), the government failed to recognise (and thus consult) 
traditional indigenous communities in certain reports and moved official 
project boundaries so that indigenous communities wonder whether 
boundaries were moved to exclude them.   
In 2010, the ANH round offered oil companies another 470,000,000,000 m², 
including protected areas and submarine platforms (González Posso, 
2011:52).  Whilst, MNOCs’ treatment of local communities and wildlife in 
these areas remains to be seen, they were offered land prior to local 
consultation.  Indeed, Inter Pares (2009) asserts that information sessions 
are sometimes held with indigenous communities (instead of consultations) 
after drilling activities have started; thus communities "feel pressured to 
accept extraction projects".  As such, the government may not have resolved 
the concerns of those groups living on land that MNOCs have already been 
offered (Sánchez Botero, 2006:200).   
I consider that there is a logic whereby neoliberalism may appeal to a weak 
state that cannot adequately provide employment opportunities or social 
                                                          
55
 In 1995, the U'wa community gained international attention as they threatened collective 
suicide should Colombian Occidental and the state not stop the drilling activities on its lands 
(Association of U’wa Traditional Authorities, 2003).  Whilst Occidental decided to stop 
drilling, this was due to profitability, not the U'wa’s domestic and international legal appeals 
based on claims of not having been consulted (Aponte Miranda, 2011:671; see Sánchez 
Botero, 2006:193-198).   
150 
 
welfare for the population and is, thus, ready to welcome corporate 
intervention.  However, the prioritisation of the economic over the social and 
environmental is a worrying welfare strategy, which undermines the state’s 
authority and, a fortiori, democracy. 
4.3.3 Friend/enemy dichotomies 
Another challenge to the state and its weak democracy is the unclear friend-
enemy boundary.  The Uribe administration reluctantly tolerated the 
democratic and non-violent expression of alternative political views, applying 
a false dichotomy whereby agents that questioned the state and its national 
security agenda were by default anti-state leftists and subversives (Leech, 
2008; Zibechi, 2005).  Indeed, President Uribe identified human rights groups 
as subversives or guerrilla spokespeople and members of the Alternative 
Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo), an anti-neoliberal party 
founded in 2005, as disguised communists (Leech, 2007).  Given Uribe's fear 
of dissent, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) wire-tapped 
high court judges, NGOs, press organisations and opposition politicians; 
thus, Colombian citizens’ security was reduced to state-strengthening and 
victory vis-à-vis the insurgents (Hervieu & Léon Posada, 2010:3-4).   
Contemporaneously, civil society has also been targeted by paramilitaries 
who have violently weakened civilian groups perceived as left-wing, anti-
capitalist or anti-globalisation and by guerrilla organisations that do not 
necessarily view them as allies (Ambrus, 2007; Leech, 2008).  Moreover, 
Colombian security forces have been implicated in extrajudicial civilian 
executions during anti-insurgent military operations (IACHR, 2010:345).  
Indeed, despite nationwide protests against Pastrana’s neoliberal economic 
agenda in 1999 and opposition to Uribe's 2003 privatisation measures, 
Colombian neoliberalism has been pushed ahead with a military repression 
of anti-capitalist activists from civil society, indigenous communities, leftist 
political parties and trade unions (Avilés, 2009:62; Bouvier, 2009:4).  Thus, 
Colombian labour leaders, journalists, human rights' defenders, judicial 
authorities, afrocolombians, indigenous leaders, church leaders, students 
and elected officials have been amongst the most threatened in the world 
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(Bouvier, 2009:4).  Consequently, Colombia has proven to be one of the 
most difficult Latin American settings to campaign for social justice and to 
challenge the neoliberal status quo.  As Gustavo Petro, leader of the Polo 
Democrático Alternativo, argued in 2007, neoliberalism could not be 
substantially challenged “because here in Colombia the popular movement 
that represents the root of those peaceful proposals on the left is itself being 
destroyed through assassinations” (Petro in Avilés, 2009:65).   
As outlined in chapters 2 and 3, civil society can act as watchdogs, 
monitoring MNOCs behaviour and participating in the creation of new CSR 
language/events that can lead to paradigmatic shifts.  In my opinion, 
Colombian civil society, which has emerged in parallel to counter the 
negative effects of neoliberalism or to promote its democratic face, can play 
an important role in the design and implementation of CSR programme; 
indeed its debilitation has damaged democracy.  
The friend/enemy dichotomy is, moreover, inadequate to describe the role of 
non-combattants in Colombia.  Whilst the complex situation in Colombia has 
been called a war or civil war, as citizens took up arms against the state, 
neither categorisation truly fits as most civilians do not identify themselves 
with an armed group and are themselves victims (Pécault, 2000:310).  
Nevertheless, civilians can also be coerced into violence and are identified by 
the armed groups as friends or enemies.  Such forced labelling has 
complicated agents’ abilities to remain completely neutral and has pushed 
some to choose uncharacteristic courses of action (Lair, 2001:115).  
Kalyvas (2006:180) contends that the interpersonal and intergroup conflicts 
in oil areas have also empowered normally innocuous agents to advance 
personal motives through malicious opportunism as, for example, armed 
groups remunerate informants that denounce prosperous neighbours.  
Colombian massacre survivors describe executioners being prompted by 
local hooded residents, so that, some civilians are fostering and benefitting 
from violence (Gray, 2008).  Moreover, Restrepo (2003:169-70) observes 
that the judicial system and state administration fail to provide justice.  Given 
that intimidation often leads to the non-reporting of crimes, witnesses failing 
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to come forward, corrupt criminal adjudication or impunity for serious 
offenders, some citizens effectively purchase private justice.  As Gray 
(2008:83) notes, "understanding of violence in Colombia would deepen if the 
findings on the evolution of conflicts and the malicious role of non-
combatants were more widely recognized".   
4.3.4 Is Colombia a democracy? 
This chapter has thus far established many of the challenges faced by 
successive Colombian presidents and has thereby shown how Colombian 
democracy has evolved.  This subsection deepens the analysis by focusing 
upon the type of governance in place in Colombia and discusses whether 
Colombia is a democracy. 
Most scholars argue that Colombia is a democracy, with adjectives.  It has 
stable and independent institutions (Guáqueta, 2006:274).  Colombia’s 1991 
Constitution established a precedent for Colombian participatory democracy 
and reaffirmed the separation of powers between the legislative, executive 
and judicial branches (Constitución Política de Colombia 1991, 1991).  Over 
the last 50 years, the Colombian regime has been characterised as elitest 
rule, near polyarchy, inclusionist authoritarian (Bagely, 1984:129), ineffective-
oligarchic polyarchy (Centellas, 2000:26) and terrorocracy (Stokes, 2006).  
The first four terms reveal the Colombian elite’s well-documented supremacy 
and the lack of space for alternative political viewpoints.  The latter term, 
used in 2006, indicates the authoritarian behavioural patterns that remained 
under President Uribe (2002-2010).  Colombian democracy has been 
classified as: controlled, oligarchical, traditional bipartisan elite, reforming, 
anocratic, (Manwaring, 2002:13) besieged (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 
2002) or limited democratic consociational regime (Hartlyn, 1993:3).  The 
most commonly used classifications are semi-democracy and besieged 
democracy, which, as with the terms above, highlight Colombia’s democratic 
imperfections, its powerful armed actors, weak state capacity and weak rule 
of law (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002).  For example, besieged 
democracy emphasises the deterioration of the liberal dimension of modern 
democracy, constitutional order and the provision of basic civil rights and 
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liberties also making Colombia an illiberal democracy.  The main shift 
between terrorocracy and illiberal democracy is that the former sees 
authoritarianism behind a democratic façade, whilst the latter views a 
democratic core with authoritarian tendencies (Smith & Ziegler, 2008:51).  
Looking at the literature, the core itself appears to be nuanced and transitory.   
Indeed, Colombia is a hybrid system56, combining both democratic and 
authoritarian behaviour with transformative capacity (power1) and activities of 
subjugation (power2);57  The contemporaneous co-existence of authoritarian 
and democratic elements has meant that attempts to improve core 
democratic elements, such as electoral reforms, have sometimes negatively 
affected governability (Bejarano & Pizarro Leongómez, 2002:6; Shifter, 
1997:114).  The failure to internalise democratic over authoritarian attitudes 
is not unique to Colombia, characterising Chile, Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela (Stevens et al., 2006:606; Carothers, 2002:18).  More unique to 
Colombia is its predominantly right-wing, neoliberal, free-market trajectory 
vis-à-vis the anti-neoliberal, left-turn of neighbours such as Ecuador and 
Venezuela (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2010:209).  Nevertheless, in Latin America, 
caudillo-style populism appears more compatible than democracy with 
neoliberalism.  Indeed, neoliberal populism remains a viable leadership 
strategy in Colombia, given the potential for a leader to benefit from the 
violence by protecting the Colombian people from menacing enemies 
(Weyland, 2003).  As Weyland (2003) asserts: “(…) populist leaders like 
boosting their mass support by combating some ‘enemy of the people’”.  This 
is somewhat reflected in Santos’ decreasing approval ratings for his 
perceived weakness or naivety in continuing  peace talks with the FARC, 
unlike his democratic-caudillo predecessor, Uribe’s tough approach to this 
group.  Notably, Uribe has become Santos’ greatest critic (Minto, 2013; Uribe 
Vélez, 2012), backing another candidate for the 2014 elections (The 
Economist, 2014).  
                                                          
56
 See McCoy & Myers (2006:133) for a discussion of hybrid systems and regimes.  
57
 Bhaskar (1993) uses this distinction of power1 and power2 as a way to view complex 
power relations (see footnote 54 on page 145). 
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Whilst the Santos administration began as the previous government had left-
off (Llanos, 2010), economically neoliberal with a firm commitment to the US 
wars on drugs and terror, its approach has since become more pragmatic 
(Balke, 2012).  Externally, President Santos is rebuilding diplomatic 
relationships with Ecuador and Venezuela.  Internally, the FARC peace-talks 
are a break from the previous administration, as is the focus upon social 
investment programmes to mitigate the effects of the violence in Colombia in 
rural areas.  The new administration faces several unresolved challenges 
from the last administration, including crises in the private healthcare system 
and in higher education institutions (Balke, 2012).  Moreover, as is shown 
below, the Uribe administration may have brought greater national security, 
but at a cost to social justice.  Indeed, despite its popularity, during the Uribe 
administration, Colombians increasingly filed actions for the protection of 
their fundamental rights to receive treatment, and an average of two social 
protests occurred each day; that was the highest rate in 50 years (Vásquez, 
2010:11-12).   
4.4 MNOC agency amidst violence and as a quasi-protostate actor 
This section discusses the role MNOCs have played in Colombia from two 
angles: i) firstly, amidst the violence, where MNOCs’ agency has been both 
that of a victim and a perpetrator; and ii) secondly, as a quasi-protostate 
actor providing security, livelihood, education, healthcare and/or 
infrastructure to oil communities for which the state has failed to provide.  In 
this context, it provides an overview of the historical development of MNOCs’ 
agency as well as the contemporary effects of neoliberalism upon MNOCs’ 
CSR.  This section also discusses the historic shift of business involvement 
in peace-building efforts. 
I argue that it is important to consider the neoliberal context in order to 
understand MNOCs’ contemporary agency.  MNOCs in Colombia have 
typically operated in areas characterised by a mixture of protostate/armed 
actors, violence, civilian distrust, significant poverty and inequality and 
shadow economies.  Indeed, MNOCs enter oil areas that are often far from 
urban centres to find communities with significant needs.  Given that these 
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areas were invaded by guerrillas and paramilitaries and have also 
experienced high levels of corruption, they have also often been 
characterised by state abandonment (Orellana Herrera, 2010:39).   
The neoliberal economic agenda has penetrated the Colombian socio-
political fabric, whether for ideological reasons or as a result of an inculcation 
of the hegemonic logic disseminated by the US, the IFIs and the UN.  It 
advocates a framework whereby a strong, open economy fosters greater 
democracy and development.  This logic places business needs first, 
subordinating democracy and politics to market needs and, moreover, peace-
building to both neoliberalism and electoral democracy (Richmond, 2010:292; 
Taylor, 2010:156-161).  Unfortunately, as shown below, such logic has 
proven insufficient to transform the imbalances of social justice and equality 
prevailing in Colombia.  Instead, I argue that it perpetuates the status quo of 
a shallow democracy legitimised by abstract rationalities. 
Above, I have discussed how elitist egocentric atomicity58 and abstract 
universalities59 have prevailed in Colombia and I argue that neoliberalism is a 
continuation of these interests and furthers asymmetric dependencies.  
Focused on profit-making (as discussed in chapter two) companies are not 
primarily focused on improving peoples’ lives.  Whilst MNOCs’ CSR spending 
is minimal, their welfare provision is not principally insufficient on financial 
grounds; it is insufficient as it is part of a neoliberal promise of business-led 
welfare, peace and prosperity.  Despite some MNOCs executing important 
CSR projects that have benefitted local community members, such projects 
are mainly assistentialistic and ill-equipped to transform social breakdown 
and fear in oil areas that can prevent the cultural change necessary to 
change entrenched negative social/behavioural patterns (Orellana Herrera, 
2010:48-9).   
4.4.1 MNOCs as agents and victims of violence 
MNOCs have long been sitting targets in oil areas in which the state’s 
absence has enabled armed groups to surround them (Martin Ortega, 2008).  
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 Man’s self-centeredness and failure to acknowledge that s/he is related to other beings. 
59
 The justification of an action to suit one’s own goals. 
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On arrival in Colombia, oil workers met with hostility from indigenous groups 
(Griess, 1946).  During WWII, US MNOCs, Tropical Oil and the Andian 
Corporation pressured Bogotá to offer them military protection from Nazi 
sabotage, emphasising their joined responsibility to supply fuel for the Allies 
(Corcoran, 2011:140).  During the Cold War, these companies were symbols 
of imperialism and were increasingly targeted by armed groups looking for 
funds.   
As Rettberg et al. (2010:11) note, whilst not unique to Colombia, compared 
with other natural resources, "oil stands out in the context of the Colombian 
armed context because it has been systematically looted, not only by corrupt 
state officials (as in other oil countries [...]) but by several illegal armed 
actors”. Statistics by Fondelibertad (2009:4) argue that self-supporting 
financial motives underpin the kidnapping of 15,477 people in Colombia 
between 1996 and March 2009.   Not only are personnel and facilities at risk, 
but oil has been siphoned off at the distribution level for use by armed 
groups, such as that stolen from the Transandean pipeline for use in coca 
laboratories (Pearce, 2008).  Indeed, most companies have suffered basic 
infrastructure attacks on pipelines, power-cables, roads, bridges, public 
buildings and services.  Extortion occurs throughout the supply chain, also 
harming the surrounding communities.  For example, in an Unreported World 
(2001) interview, the Mayor of Arauca explained that MNOC-funded building 
projects often result in the extortion of construction companies and that 
rebels had even poisoned the town's water supply by attacking oil pipelines 
to extort money from repair companies.   
However, in the context of Colombian violence, MNOCs have also had to 
make some difficult ethical choices, for example when favouring to pay 
ransoms for kidnapped workers.  This approach was criticised by Pearce 
(2004:4), who notes that when faced with extortion and the kidnapping of oil 
workers, many multinationals initially chose "the easier route of appeasement 
through dollars with few questions asked".   Considering illegal armed 
groups’ territorial control in some areas and their impact on citizens’ everyday 
lives, MNOCs have had to negotiate with them to gain or maintain access to 
oil resources (Orellana Herrera, 2010:48-9).  Whilst not MNOCs, major 
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companies such as Chiquita Brands, Coca Cola and Drummond Company 
Inc. have faced US lawsuits under the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) for 
knowingly having paid taxes to the FARC, the ELN and the AUC, money 
which funded violence against local inhabitants (Martín Ortega, 2008; El 
Tiempo, 2010).   
Payments aside, MNOCs have caused direct and indirect violence in 
Colombia by consolidating regressive structures that emerged from the 
violence (Elhawary, 2008:96).  MNOCs follow the oil, often misunderstanding 
the socio-political and environmental contexts (Pearce, 2004).  Many 
companies fail to recognise that their practices have fuelled community 
grievances, inadvertently escalated the predatory dynamics of armed groups 
and created conflict.  Such practices may include: i) suspicion towards unions 
and the freedom of association; ii) the support of paramilitary forces; iii) 
lobbying in Congress to influence sectoral policies that are not in the public 
interest; iv) ideological intolerance; v) ignoring drug trafficking and money 
laundering; and vi) tacit endorsement of a restrictive class system (Guaqueta, 
2006:281).  However, according to González Posso (2011:31), certain 
MNOC representatives have stated that even when they have tried to act as 
corporate citizens, for example, by asking authorities what happened to 
royalty payments, they have been threatened and reminded to stay out of 
political matters.    
Nationally, various ranch and plantation owners have funded paramilitary 
campaigns to suppress social protest or clear land through mass 
displacement.60  Companies’ complicity in displacements, human rights 
abuses and killings has been questioned (Martín Ortega, 2008:6).  Indeed, 
the Texas Petroleum Company had a founding role in the Death to 
Kidnappers (Muerte a Secuestradores (MAS)) paramilitary groups in the 
1980s that aimed to eliminate guerrilla subversives (HRW, 1996).  The 
paramilitary replaced the guerrilla in many oil areas after an offensive 
between 1995-2002 (Pearce, 2004:12; González Posso, 2011:36).  By 
targeting the guerrilla and their sympathisers in the 2000s, the paramilitaries 
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 Acción Social (2010) estimates that 3,470,384 people were internally displaced between 
1997 and 2010, peaking in 2002.   
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were fighting the enemies of both the Uribe government and MNOCs, which 
Richani (2005:150) notes fostered an affinity between them and the MNOCs, 
particularly as the paramilitaries are not ideologically opposed to foreign 
investment.  
Different companies have experienced the Colombian conflict differently 
(Rettberg, 2008:44).  MNOCs have adopted various security models to 
protect their employees and facilities, ranging from paying legal and illegal 
armed actors to financing or co-financing private security forces, to 
cooperation with state armed forces or to receiving state security provisions 
(González Posso, 2011:35).  Despite the oil sector’s economic importance, 
the government has struggled to ensure oil production security.   Moreover, 
most businesses do not inform local authorities of extortion against them as 
they distrust public security forces or their ability to conduct proper 
investigations (Guáqueta, 2006:283). 
Armed attacks on MNOCs’ infrastructure cost the government around USD 
400 million between 1988 and mid-1989 due to pipeline damage
 
(Pearce, 
1990:283).  In the 1990s, it entrusted pipeline security to the armed forces, 
funded by a war tax on oil companies.  As it was phased out in 2000, oil 
producers developed independent survival strategies.  Pearce (2004:12) 
suggests that MNOCs rely more on good community relations than on armed 
defence, which made the US government's decision to directly intervene to 
defend the Coveñas oil pipeline with a counter-terror unit a significant shift in 
approach.  Pipeline attacks have, however, decreased.  For example, the 
Colombian government noted only 11 pipeline attacks in 2008, in comparison 
with the hundreds of attacks that took place in the early 2000s (EIA, 2010).   
In areas where armed forces guard oil facilities, their interventions primarily 
protect private sector interests and there have been restrictions on mobility 
with vehicle checks and detentions (González Posso, 2011:41; Rettberg et 
al., 2010).  The ANH facilitates companies' contracts with the army and many 
MNOCs directly employ ex-soldiers (Inter Pares, 2009).  MNOCs' security 
agreements with state agencies, in which they pay money or offer logistical 
support to the army and their hiring of private security forces, can leave them 
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vulnerable vis-à-vis reports of human rights violations committed by their 
partners.61  The matter is complicated by the difficulty in distinguishing the 
activities of legal security firms from those of illegal armed groups (González 
Posso, 2011:41; Gray, 2008:72).  Thus, companies are increasingly 
redefining their links with armed groups to minimise the risk of being found 
complicit in human rights’ abuses.  As Canadian MNOC Nexen stated:  
“We train military personnel in human rights [and] respect for the community 
in collaboration with the Attorney General, the Public Defender’s Office, the 
bureaucrats… the budget is used exclusively for the betterment of soldiers 
and not to buy lethal weapons or equipment that would increase 
confrontation with the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia]. We 
have control over the budget to ensure this.” (Nexen in Inter Pares, 2009).   
Human rights organisations have used naming and shaming and peoples’ 
trials to hold MNOCs accountable for their actions (Martín Ortega, 2008:9).  
The peoples' extrajudicial trials or oil hearings by the Permanent Peoples' 
Tribunals62 have found several MNOCs (including BP, Occidental and 
Repsol) guilty of fostering violence alongside the Colombian government 
(see González Posso, 2011:43-44; Inter Pares, 2009:54; Martín Ortega, 
2008:9).  MNOCs security arrangements to protect their assets are heavily 
criticised vis-à-vis their human rights performance, although the boundaries 
of MNOCs’ responsibilities are unclear (Blanton & Blanton, 2009:474; Martín 
Ortega, 2008:12).     
4.4.2 MNOCs’ development and peace efforts 
MNOCs’ CSR in Colombia has ranged from nothing to quasi-protostate 
engagement.  Studies exist focusing upon individual oil company’s social 
impacts, including BP (Pearce, 2004), Nexen Inc. (Inter Pares, 2009), Shell 
(Skajærseth et al., 2004), Hocol (Gutierrez & Jones, 2004) and Hocol and 
Perenco (Orellana Herrera, 2010).  This subsection does not repeat these 
efforts, but presents an overview, based upon existing research, of MNOC’s 
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 For example, the involvement of Occidental personnel and equipment in the Colombian air 
force's 1998 bombing of Santo Domingo received much criticism (LA Times, 2002).   
62
 The Permanent Peoples' Tribunals examine and judge complaints regarding the violation 
of human rights and the rights of peoples.  They are international opinion tribunals that are 
not attached to a particular State authority. 
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changing responsibilities and social priorities, highlighting specific examples 
and addressing the question of to whom MNOCs are responsible.  
The Colombian government welcomed US capital and oil corporations’ 
participation in its nascent oil industry.  In terms of responsibilities, MNOCs’ 
social contributions were indirect and made to the national government 
through royalties, taxes, surface rents, and allowing it to use company 
pipelines for free for several hours each month to transport government 
owned oil and refined products.  MNOCs’ presence boosted FDI, the 
Colombian demand for refined products and developed cross-country 
linkages that affected other economic sectors, thereby developing scientific 
and technological elites (Ripoll & Báez, 2003; Murray, 1995; Stokes, 
2006:372).   
However, there were also expectations upon MNOCs to engage in non-oil 
activities and to bring modernisation.  For example, in 1914, following 
aborted negotiations, in a letter from Ribon, an oil consultant, to Lord Murray 
of British firm Pearson and Sons, it was reported that “we had to show that 
we were not after an oil contract alone, but that we would take an interest in 
the development of the company in other directions, if we became 
established in Colombia” (Philip, 1982:34).  It later emerged that the 
Colombians were most interested in the construction of ports and railways 
(Philip, 1982:34).  Indeed, during the early oil years, social investment was 
often used to provide infrastructure to open up isolated and jungle-covered 
country through to roads, air fields, railroads and ports, despite the diversity 
of terrain and peoples.  MNOCs primarily improved living conditions for 
workers and their families, offering them housing, sanitation, rural hygiene, 
medical and hospital facilities, education, industrial training, churches, 
schools and post offices (Griess, 1946:251-3).   
The Rockefeller Foundation, established in 1913 by Standard Oil’s John D 
Rockefeller, is one of the better known oil funded social foundations to have 
operated in Colombia.  Under the mantel of scientific philanthropy designed 
to promote global wellbeing, it engaged in healthcare projects in Latin 
America from around the same time as Standard arrived in Colombia.  The 
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projects were ambitious, including ridding Colombia of hookworm and yellow 
fever.  Indeed, the foundation conducted initial yellow fever surveys as early 
as in 1916 (The Rockefeller Foundation, 1932:31).  Whilst the Rockefeller 
Foundation’s Latin American programmes received no US government 
funding, their efforts benefitted from Washington’s support (Corcoran, 
2011:6). 
The shift from classic liberalism, with its suspicion of government intrusion, to 
the New Deal liberalism with its belief in state responsibility created 
opportunities for official US engagement in cultural diplomacy (Corcoran, 
2011:7).  Given the unpopularity of the US in Colombia following the Panama 
secession, US’ businesses and cultural bodies provided a means for the US 
to exercise influence indirectly. 
Whilst CSR is a modern term, the ‘s’ for social can be considered as 
somewhat  misleading, as business’ social responsibilities have also long 
been political in nature.  Nelson Rockefeller initially became interested in 
using private economic diplomacy as a means to counter the rising threat of 
Latin American nationalism that jeopardized US investments in the region, 
most notably in the oil sector.  The threat later changed to encourage 
business investment in socio-cultural activities to counter Nazism and later 
communism (Cramer & Prutsch, 2012:30).  Indeed, during WWII, the US 
argued that the Axis powers were bringing a cultural death of the peoples 
they conquer, in order to facilitate their political assimilation. A few years 
later, Soviet Communist culture was the target (Corcoran, 2011:234).63 
In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt established the Office of the 
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA), to serve as a war agency until 
its closure in May 1946, appointing Nelson A. Rockefeller as its coordinator, 
directly responsible to the president.  The OIAA’s most pressing concern was 
the economic crisis in Latin America that resulted from it being cut off from 
many of its European markets. To alleviate these supply problems, the US 
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government purchased large quantities of raw materials, preventing inroads 
by Axis powers.  Additionally, the OIAA actively developed and implemented 
new cultural programs to counter Axis influence.  It organised committees on 
art, music, literature, publications, education and cultural interchange 
educational programmes were formed. The OIAA believed that positive 
public testimonies about life in the US would soften lingering views of the US 
as an imperialist power and counter anti-US propaganda perpetuated by Axis 
powers and their local supporters (Corcovan, 2011:68-69).   
The Roosevelt administration hoped that business, philanthropic, and 
professional organisations would execute the new US programmes in the 
Southern hemisphere. As a war agency, the OIAA was officially empowered 
to address immediate matters, but Rockefeller was more ambitious, also 
engaging in long-range projects to improve the Americas.  Under Rockefeller, 
OIAA leadership was drawn from the business world and offered a wide-
range of expertise.  The OIAA’s programmes were varied and changed 
throughout the war, but they predominantly fell within the following 
organisational divisions: commerce and economics, transportation, 
information, health and sanitation, food supply/nutrition, and culture 
(including education).  
At least partially in response to the US’ political lead, in the area of education, 
by the early 1940s, US MNOCs, Tropical Oil and the Colombian Petroleum 
Company, operated three schools in Colombia, teaching a US curriculum in 
English.  In addition, MNOCs, alongside other companies, funded 
government established mobile schools, Escuelas Ambulantes.  These 
schools sought to democratise culture, by providing educational, cultural, and 
health programmes in areas where schools did not exist. The mobile schools 
also carried projection and sound equipment for use with radio and film.  
From the start, the national and subsequently local governments borrowed 
heavily from the OCIAA film catalogue (Corcoran, 2011:8,117).  Highlighting 
the centrality of transnational capital to this venture, Corcovan (2011) cites an 
example of International Petroleum, a Canadian affiliate of US Standard Oil, 




By the 1960s, oil companies’ social projects continued to carry a political 
message, now anti-communist, but they were also framed by the 
modernisation theory promoted by President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress 
(AFP).  Launched by US President Kennedy in 1961, the AFP sought to 
encourage the adoption of anti-poverty policies that would increase the 
legitimacy of Latin American governments and, thus, prevent Communist 
revolution.  Still, most of the literature concludes today that the AFP was a 
serious US foreign policy failure, which raised, but could not fulfil, great 
expectations of material improvement, democracy and stability in Latin 
America.   
Since the first days of his administration, Colombia was seen as one of the 
most important testing fields for Kennedy’s Latin American policy.  President 
Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958-1962), who was elected as the National 
Front’s first presidential candidate months before the Cuban revolution, was 
committed to social reform, strongly anti-communist and pro-US (Fajardo, 
2003:5).  Until the mid-1970s, Colombia was a major beneficiary of AFP 
programmes.  Despite teething problems, the Alliance seemed to have 
achieved more popularity in Colombia than almost anywhere else in Latin 
America.  The accession of Lyndon B. Johnson (1963-1969) to power in the 
US has often been portrayed as a turning point in the development of the 
AFP.  Following Johnson’s election, the US government’s devotion to 
financially supporting social change in Latin America was replaced by a more 
pragmatic desire to shore up pro-US governments and prevent political 
agitation in these nations (Corcovan, 2011).  
By the 1980s, MNOCs’ operations were increasingly affected by the violence 
and external expectations (Guáqueta, 2006:278; Pearce, 2004:4; Inter Pares, 
2009:54).  Thus, several major MNOCs established charitable foundations to 
improve Colombian socio-economic development,64 as communities held 
them accountable for their partners’ human rights records (Inter Pares, 2009) 
and foundations were perceived as more trustworthy or controllable than 
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 Occidental and Ecopetrol started El Alcaraván in 1986 (AFP, 2010); Ecopetrol, Total and 
BP joined other Colombian companies in 1994 to start Amanecer in the Orinoco; Petrocol, 
Ecopetrol, Total, Esso and Hocol created the Fundación del Alto Magdalena with Petrobras 
and the regional government of Huila becoming involved in 1996. 
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other social organisations (Rojas, 2002:27).  This reflects the paradigm shift 
to neoliberalism, whereby social action should be seen to benefit local 
communities, rather than being seen to respond to the US’ international 
concerns.  As Gutierrez and Jones (2004) show, the Colombian transnational 
Hocol started a foundation after its production infrastructure suffered guerrilla 
attacks.  The attacks occurred during a strike that was led against it by 
attendees of a Hocol-funded micro-enterprise programme, subcontracted to 
be run externally.  Until 1992, Hocol had subcontracted CSR to local 
organisations, providing basic social infrastructure including roads, schools 
and health centres.  Thereafter, it ran all social programmes through its 
charitable foundation and took on educational projects as did other MNOCs 
at this time (Gutierrez & Jones, 2004:168).65  
Armed groups have not only pressurised MNOCs to fund them (fostering 
violence), but also to engage in social action (fostering peace) since the first 
ELN attacks on a Mannesmann AG pipeline in 1984 (Chernick, 2005:194).  
The 1986 ELN campaign entitled “Awake Colombia…they are stealing the 
oil”, aimed to force MNOCs to pay for local social projects.  Occidental, for 
example, began to pay an annual sum to church social projects.  
Consequently, oil money not only funded the ELN's resurrection, its political 
profile and physical capabilities, but also the spread of its ideological 
message (Chernick, 2005:184; Richani, 2005:126; Pearce, 1990:283; 
Pearce, 2004:6).  The FARC, which increased oil industry attacks in the late 
1990s, also pressurised MNOCs to engage in social action projects such as 
the construction of vocational schools and clinics, road paving, and the 
subcontracting of business to businesses owned by guerrilla members or 
supporters.  It not only claimed direct taxes, but also community taxes, 
subcontracts and retention taxes gained by kidnapping high-level oil workers 
for ransom (Richani, 2005:125).  Interestingly, thus, part of what could be 
classed as MNOCs’ informal CSR has actually simultaneously perpetuated 
violent and peace-building welfare activities.    
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Elhawary (2008:86) notes that in protracted conflict-related emergencies, 
where violence is characterised by its multiplicity and interdependence over 
both time and space, it is almost impossible to make neat analytical 
boundaries between good and bad, legal and illegal, conflict and 
development or democracy and authoritarian.  CSR in such circumstances 
must be viewed as part of a living system or organism (Duffield, 2001:10), 
characterised by interconnection, mutation and self-transformation outside of 
the lens of the false dichotomy between violent conflict and development 
(Elhawary, 2008:86).  As Cramer (2006:13) notes, “societies often cross a 
fuzzy border from war to peace: the territory on either side of the border can 
look very similar” (Elhawary, 2008:97).  Nevertheless, this does not remove 
any capacity for normative judgement.  
As Pearce (2004:4) notes, there are challenges to seriously engaging with 
society and "the danger is of slipping through default into “state-like roles”".  
Indeed, companies have delivered health and education services similar to 
state welfare, although MNOCs have increasingly asked for government 
participation (Gutierrez & Jones, 2004:168; Orellana Hererra, 2010).  
Government failure to prioritise rural communities’ well-being has both 
undermined the development of authentic democratic processes and led to 
unrealistic community expectations as to what MNOCs could/should provide, 
with some communities threatening to block oil projects if their requests were 
not met (Inter Pares, 2009:55).  The absent state and the government's 
failure to inform oil communities of their rights, or to develop alternative 
economic programmes, have created unhealthy economic dependencies 
upon the oil sector (Orellana Hererra, 2010).   
As Guáqueta (2006:278) contends, when the Colombian government initially 
enlisted business leaders as presidential advisors at peace talks during the 
Betancur administration (1982-86), the private sector had little reason to work 
towards a peace agreement proposing social reform or to support military 
action; nor was private sector intervention expected, as peace was perceived 
to be a state challenge.  However, in the 1990s, the business environment 
became less stable; security risks and costs to MNOCs’ business operations 
grew in parallel with conflict dynamics and illegal armed groups.  Deaths 
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averaged at over 23,000 per year and the industrial sectors offered attractive 
kidnapping victims (Fondelibertad, 2009).  An intra-subjective shift occurred, 
whereby MNOCs acknowledged the rising importance of external socio-
political and environmental factors and conflict-sensitive practice.  They 
began to engage in macro-level peace initiatives, forging closer business-
state ties and fostering a more inclusive approach to peace-building (Lair, 
2001:109; Pearce, 2004; Rettberg, 2007:468).66  Thus, when invited to join 
the Pastrana administration’s (1998-2002) negotiating team in peace talks 
with the FARC, businesses donated land, guaranteed finance for 
demobilising ex-combatants and supported peace bonds as an obligatory 
investment to collect revenues for social and military investment (Guáqueta, 
2006:279).   
Business connections to paramilitary groups and drug trafficking was absent 
from such debate and the private sector with its diverse interests lacked a 
uniform approach to peace-building.  However, business-led peace initiatives 
emerged looking at economic development, social reconciliation and 
assistance to conflict victims.  Moreover, Fundaçión Ideas para la Paz was 
established to focus upon private sector responsibilities in peace-building.  
By engaging in workshops and conferences on companies’ agency in the 
conflict, MNOCs have had to practically respond to criticism vis-à-vis their 
conduct and corporate identity (Guáqueta, 2006:301).   
The simultaneous, global evolutions of neoliberalism and CSR have led to 
greater pressure upon Western companies, in particular, to be seen to 
adhere to a growing body of ethical norms surrounding good practice in 
conflict areas (Guáqueta, 2006:281).   Indeed, the private sector has offered 
management expertise and been a key donor in different peace projects.   
Most MNOCs engage in peace-related, social projects to tackle conflict-
creating or conflict-sustaining mechanisms, targeting issues such as local 
economic development, poverty, inequality, social exclusion, institutional 
weakness, human rights and the promotion of democratic values (Guáqueta, 
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 At a national level, however, the grupos’ influence reduced business collaboration (see: 
Rettberg, 2005:31,46).   
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2006:280).  In Colombia, MNOCs have increasingly engaged in specific 
peace-building projects, such as the Peace Laboratories.  Some MNOCs 
have also hired former combatants despite the difficulties this could 
potentially create (Rettberg et al., 2010:1).   
A more progressive understanding about socio-economic issues is emerging 
and companies are engaging in trust-building with NGOs and social 
organisations that were traditionally perceived as enemies from the left 
(Guáqueta, 2006:283).  However, as Pearce (2004:51) noted in her study on 
BP in Casanare, it is difficult to speak of a balanced partnership between a 
company and other agents of civil society, where the latter have been 
severely weakened by the violence.  This not only leads to asymmetric 
partnerships, but the weakness of MNOCs’ partners in executing CSR 
reduces their abilities to operate capacity-building, transformative social 
action projects.    
Moreover, as Guáqueta (2006:278) notes, not all Colombian businesses see 
their role in peace-building, although their motivations are unclear.  Rettberg 
(2007:465) argues that the Colombian private sector has not yet developed a 
generalised interest in a peaceful solution to the conflict, or organised itself 
as a significant force to shape or support peace talks.  Private sector 
responses to peace-building and conflict are not always coherent as 
individual companies face different challenges and may find the cost of 
peace too high.  At times companies may strike arrangements with, or pay 
protection fees to, guerrilla or paramilitary forces for short-term gain, whilst 
supporting state efforts to defeat these groups mitigating community 
grievances, or paying triple-tributes to all three actors (Guáqueta, 2006:282; 
Richani, 2005).    
Some MNOCs have been operating CSR for almost 20 years; however, this 
has not brought substantial change to these regions.  As Orellana Hererra 
(2010) finds in her research on Yopal, with so many basic needs to be met, it 
is difficult for MNOCs to bring emancipatory CSR that either empowers large 
numbers of citizens or transforms cultural patterns of behaviour that are 
steeped in a history of violence and distrust, especially given the weak social 
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fabric in such areas.  This is especially true given that companies’ have a 
limited CSR budget, determined in relation to their profit-margin as discussed 
in the previous section.  In this vein, as I argued in chapter 3, CSR cannot be 
seen as a quick-fix panacea for all social ills.  Accordingly, the logic of the 
neoliberal peace and development agenda, which advocates a weak state 
and strong market as part of the solution for such areas, loses credibility as a 
globally applicable economic and political solution.  
Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that Colombia’s history is marked by continued 
weakness of government structures, the extended presence of illegal armed 
actors, durable disorder and violence, and US influence (as seen in the three 
wars, which, although branded under various names, reflect the continuous 
involvement of the US in Colombia), amongst others, have left MNOCs 
confronting an ethical minefield in operating CSR in Colombia.  MNOCs have 
faced many expectations vis-à-vis their CSR, including from actors outside of 
Colombia and armed actors within Colombia, whose intentions and sense of 
social justice vary.  The space given to and taken by MNOCs in which to 
conduct social responsibility programmes has varied, depending upon the 
prevailing overarching political paradigm, although MNOCs’ expectations 
under their current CSR programmes are much lower than those which 
prevailed under US hegemonic struggle, which was dominant until the late 
1980s and modernisation theory.  The bankrupt nature of the latter appears 
to have been understood by companies which promote of neoliberal 
development and peace, but nevertheless undertake less ambitious (and 
more local) projects.  The days when MNOCs engaged themselves in 
projects to change society, such as those instigated by Nelson Rockefeller, 
have long gone, dissipated by the ongoing violence and the rise of the 
neoliberal paradigm.     
The impingement of the Colombian security discourse upon the space 
available for civil liberties, the vilification of elements of civil society by the 
state and the confusion as to whether an agent is a friend or an enemy have, 
furthermore, complicated companies’ ability to choose appropriate partners in 
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designing and executing CSR.  Indeed, in my opinion, Colombian civil 
society, which has emerged in parallel to counter the negative effects of 
neoliberalism or to promote its democratic face, could, if strengthened, play 
an important role in the design and implementation of CSR programmes and 
its debilitation has damaged democracy.  As such, it is somewhat 
unsurprising that many MNOCs operate assistentialistic policies, rather than 
engaging to radically transform unhealthy cultural behavioural patterns.   
MNOCs’ ability to bring transformative change has, however, also been 
compromised by their own direct and indirect involvement in the violence or 
by the actions and alliances of their partners.  I have also shown that 
MNOCs’ CSR is not a comprehensive panacea to community development 
nor peace-building; this is not an oil company’s primary raison d’être within a 
neoliberal framework.  The following chapter looks at the second case study 
Venezuela, which has rejected the MNOC-led approach to CSR outlined in 
this chapter and the accompanying neoliberal paradigm, whilst firmly 





Case study 2: the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and MNOCs’ CSR 
This chapter presents the second case study on Venezuela.  Unlike 
Colombia, Venezuela has undergone a philosophical and ideological 
paradigm shift to embrace 21st century socialism, which has led to greater 
regulation of MNOC’s CSR.  Indeed, Venezuela is attempting to: i) break free 
from the relations of international dependency and US hegemony that 
characterise the oil trade; and ii) rebalance power relations within 
Venezuelan society to emancipate Venezuela’s poor, by implementing new 
oil-funded social, political and economic models.  To this end, the Chávez 
government (1999-2013) built counter-hegemonic social blocs in a 
Gramscian war of position and manoeuvre against the old elite’s discourses 
and practices (Harris, 2007:1).  A dialectical process of non-violent revolution 
has intensified over time as the government has consolidated and radicalised 
its ideas, so that it has become "the most well-known and controversial 
neoliberal alternative in South America" (Buxton, 2009:147).   
This chapter shows the Bolivarian trajectory’s direct impact upon MNOCs’ 
ability to act as corporate citizens and to define the scope of their CSR.  
Given its rejection of neoliberalism, it is noteworthy that the Chávez and 
Maduro governments have not completely abandoned CSR, even if it now 
exists under a more implicit form.  Indeed, unlike most other political 
systems, due to the important resources available to the oil sector, 
Venezuela identifies the oil industry not as one of many corporate citizens, 
but as a government defined agent of social emancipation.  However, the 
government's social vision offers little long-term space for private initiative.  
Thus, the government takes the initiative on MNOCs’ CSR regardless of 
companies' core values.   
Section one provides a socio-historical context that illustrates the importance 
of oil nationalism and private interests in the formulation of oil policy and the 
impact of oil policy upon the Venezuelan social fabric in the pre-Chávez 
days.  It, thereby, contextualises the reactionary nature of 21st century 
socialism’s emergence.  It discusses the history of Venezuela over the past 
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century in which oil and Venezuelan politics have mutually shaped each 
other.  Indeed, in Venezuela, one cannot be separated from the other. As 
discussed in chapter 3, MNOCs internationally have shown social interest on 
different levels and responsibilities from different sources.   
In this section, I outline how oil companies in Venezuela have been 
responsible to different actors at different times.  This enables me to show 
throughout the following sections that there is some historical continuity in 
terms of these responsibilities and interests, which have been, and are again 
today, simultaneously present at the levels of community welfare, of the 
macro-political environment and of democracy and governance.  In the 
Bolivarian context, CSR has been institutionalised as a driving force by the 
government to allow it to take credit for social welfare.  By taking over CSR, 
the government has pre-empted any moves by MNOCs to use it as a way to 
appease Venezuelans, maintain the status quo and avoid incurring further 
nationalisation or taxes. 
Section two examines the developing patterns of radical societal 
transformation in contemporary Venezuela.  It argues that 21st century 
socialism is a hybrid system67, which combines both democratic and 
authoritarian behaviour in the creation of its new order.  Furthermore, it 
examines the government's oil funded social policies in practice, analysing 
theory-praxis consistency.  I argue that the government’s practice of 
participatory and protagonistic democracy offers elements of both: i) 
transformative capacity (power1), through its revolution, new social models 
and expanding welfare provision; and ii) activities of subjugation (power2)68, 
through the continuation of corruption, assistentialism, and the weakening of 
institutions and civil liberties.  This will lead me to argue in chapters 7 and 8 
that a new RCSR model has emerged.  
Following the examination of 21st century socialism, in section three, I will 
examine how it specifically affects the oil sector.  It examines the role 
assigned to the state oil company PDVSA to directly fund and execute social 
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 Bhaskar (1993) uses this distinction of power1 and power2 as a way to view complex 
power relations (see footnote 54 on page 145).  
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action, establishing a direct link between the company and the people.  It, 
thereafter, turns to MNOCs’ new role and analyses the significant impact of 
Bolivarian socialism upon the scope of companies' operations and CSR.    
5.1 The pre-1998 Venezuelan petro-state 
This section discusses the impact of oil, oil policy and Venezuela’s economic, 
political and cultural development.  I show how oil-interests (defined in large 
part due to the interdependent, dialectical relationships between MNOCs, the 
US and the Venezuelan state) and oil (mis)management over the last century 
contributed to the economic and political crisis that directly preceded and 
paved the way for a new popular mode of politics, referred to as 21st century 
socialism.  Thus, this section looks at the different responsibilities and social 
interests that MNOCs have had in Venezuela.  It, thereby, contextualises the 
tensions between oil nationalism and domestic/external elite interests that 
contribute to a causal explanation of the limitations of MNOCs’ agency in 
contemporary Venezuela and the Bolivarian governments’ distrust of 
Empire69 and provide a fuller understanding of the development of 
Venezuelan CSR.  In order to address these issues, this section is split into 
two subsections.  The first discusses Venezuelan political history and oil 
policy until 1998 and the second examines the pre-1998 impact of MNOCs 
upon the Venezuelan social fabric. 
5.1.1 Venezuelan political history and oil policy until 1998 
Let us now look at the history of Venezuelan oil policies in the context of its 
political history, starting with the pre-oil days.  Unlike in Colombia, the 
Spanish conquistadors left much of Venezuela unexplored, as it did not 
appear to possess mineral ores or large Amerindian civilizations.  Oil was 
noticed in 1500, but left largely unexplored for four centuries.  Instead, 
starting in the 1620s, cocoa became Venezuela's principal export for the 
following two centuries, until political events left the cocoa-based export 
economy in ruins and Venezuela shifted its agricultural export activities to 
coffee production in the 1800s (Haggerty, 1993).  
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Politically speaking, Venezuela completed its independence from Spain at 
the Battle of Carabobo in 1821.  It subsequently formed part of Gran 
Colombia with Simón Bolivar as President and Colombian Francisco de 
Paula Santander as vice president.  Venezuelans expressed resentment at 
being governed by Santander in Bogotá, whilst Bolivar continued the struggle 
for liberation in Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru.  In the spirit of Venezuelan 
nationalism, José Antonio Páez led Venezuela in its separation from the 
confederation in 1830.  Páez served as president for 16 years, after which 
Venezuela, like Colombia, suffered from a liberal-conservative struggle for 
much of the 1800s, resulting in a series of caudillo administrators (Haggerty, 
1993).   
MNOCs came to Venezuela less than 100 years following its independence.  
Indeed, MNOCs have operated in Venezuela since 1914, when Venezuela, 
unable to exploit its resources, awarded concessions to Royal Dutch Shell, 
Standard Oil of New Jersey and the Gulf Oil Company (Miller, 1940; OPEC, 
2010; Singh, 1989:89; Tinker Salas, 2007:36). At that time, Venezuela was a 
dictatorship under General Juan Vincente Gómez (1908-1935), the Tyrant of 
the Andes, who saw oil as a means to the economic development needed to 
rehabilitate Venezuela following his predecessor’s chaos, even before the 
industry had established itself in Venezuela (McBeth, 1983:6,213).70  Gómez 
believed that the country's economic development could only be completed 
by foreigners with superior technological capabilities and management skills, 
who needed a stable political environment in which to work; a description in 
which MNOCs could recognise themselves.  Venezuela, therefore, allowed 
the free entry of all oil companies, unlike in the Middle East where 
governments were at the mercy of one company that controlled exploitation, 
exportation, refinery and marketing (McBeth, 1983:65). This helped to allay 
domestic fears of foreign strategic interventions in Venezuela.  Indeed, 
Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 corollary to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine had 
justified military intervention in Latin America to settle cases of wrongdoing, 
masking US imperialism under the guise of a moral crusade (Bulmer-Thomas 
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 It should also be noted that despite his political pragmatism, Gómez’ family benefitted 
handsomely from the oil business being granted concessions which it resold at a much 
greater value (McBeth,1983; Yergin, 1991:236). 
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et al., 2006:36). From the outset, the Venezuelan government was aware of 
the value of Venezuelan oil and constantly sought to increase revenues, 
however, it only acted as a quasi-watchdog, allowing companies to develop 
the industry.  The companies ran significant financial risks to discover the oil 
and given their expertise, they had the upper hand in oil negotiation so that 
there was rarely any question of forfeiting the concessions of those who 
disrespected Venezuelan laws (McBeth, 1983:6,212). 
Venezuelans have long discussed oil ownership, management and profit-
allocation (Cuervo, 2010:641).  In 1917, the development minister, Dr Torres, 
famously warned that oil, previously a hidden treasure, was indispensable for 
industrial growth and should be well managed (Prieto Soto, 2004:26; Dávila, 
2004:372).  In 1922, the government drafted an oil law, setting terms for 
concessions, taxes and royalties (Yergin, 1991:234) and, in 1929, it created a 
technical service on hydrocarbons, which became the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines (Lander, 2005:4).  By the late 1920s, oil became Venezuela's primary 
export and Venezuela became the world's largest oil exporter (Dávila, 
2004:361-397).71  As oil rent dependence grew, Venezuela rapidly displayed 
Dutch Disease symptoms72 and became a rentier economy with new oil elite 
(Ortiz, 2006:74; Mommer, 2006:13; Azzelini, 2007:101; Karl, 1997:81).  In 
1932, when in the context of implementing its New Deal, the US raised tariffs 
on oil imports and oil derivatives from Latin America, Venezuela was the 
hardest hit as 55% of its production went to the US.  Thus, by the mid-1930s, 
Venezuela had diversified its supply to European markets, overtaking the US 
as Europe’s main supplier, although tariffs on Venezuelan oil were relaxed 
towards the end of the 1930s (Philip, 1982:46; McBeth, 1983:204; Yergin, 
1991:258).   
Gómez was aware that labour relations were bad in the oilfields and that oil 
companies operated with little regard to local communities.  On his death in 
1935, riots erupted with Venezuelans also seeking revenge on oil 
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multinationals for their poor treatment of Venezuelan nationals (Ellner & 
Tinker Salas, 2007: 33; Prieto Soto, 2004: 11-24), forcing foreign employees 
to seek refuge in oil tankers anchored at Lake Maracaibo (Singh, 1989: 89; 
Ellner, 2008: 19).73     
Gomez’ death left a political power vacuum that was filled by his former 
minister of war, General Eleazar López Contreras (1935-1941).  The López 
government dismantled the worst of Gómez' repressive apparatus, however 
in the face of continued strikes, outlawed nascent labour unions in 1937 and 
most political opposition thereafter.  López concentrated upon less 
controversial economic reform efforts, establishing a central bank, opening 
new oil fields to exploitation and launched infrastructure programmes under 
the slogan of sembrar el petróleo (sowing the oil) (Haggerty, 1993).   
This conceptualisation of oil as natural capital marked a paradigmatic shift 
(Mommer, 2006:15-29).  Its foundations are attributed to a 1936 newspaper 
article entitled Sow the oil, in which Venezuelan scholar Uslar Pietri argued 
that the government should use oil rents to fund agricultural credits and 
create new reproductive wealth (Prieto Soto, 2004:41; Dávila, 2004:361-397).  
An anti-imperialist discourse subsequently emerged focusing on the concepts 
of destructive (non-productive) economy, dependence and neo-colonialism.  
Supporters’ discontent was compounded by reports that the US was using 
Venezuela as a source of cheap oil, that MNOCs had committed tax fraud 
and that the government was misusing oil resources by investing in 
unproductive tertiary sectors (Prieto Soto, 2004:33-4; Dávila, 2004:375-383; 
Mommer, 2006:28).  Whilst revenues went to the state, a popular struggle 
emerged, alongside that for democracy, calling for the people to directly 
benefit from the wealth and transforming the sowing the oil concept into one 
of greater national sovereignty over oil wealth and its redistribution (Mommer, 
2006:67).   
Venezuela had embraced rent capitalism and oil policy that sought to 
squeeze oil companies for a ground-rent, so that, instead of creating an 
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Argentinan-style NOC, or nationalising its oil holdings like Mexico, the 
Venezuelan state focused upon ever-greater revenue attainment (Mommer, 
1998:2).  However, it did not press for more than companies were willing to 
offer (Philip, 1982:67). 
Post-Gómez, there was a drive to set in motion a new oil process and from 
1941 Venezuela sought to renegotiate the terms under which oil concessions 
had been granted.  Allied dependence upon Venezuelan oil during WWII 
enabled the Isaías Medina Angarita’s government (1941-1945) to enact the 
1943 Hydrocarbons Act (which placed a tax on the income the oil companies 
earned from their downstream operations, such as gasoline refining, fertilizer 
production, printing ink, and subsequently plastics), and the first Betancourt 
administration (1945-1948) to reform it, after years of political wrangling, in 
1948, so that 50% of companies’ total profits should be paid to the 
government (Mares & Altamirano, 2007:23; Lander, 2005:5; Mommer, 
1988:84-96: Karl, 1997:87). The new principle of 50:50 was a landmark event 
in the oil industry’s history, setting a precedent that was subsequently 
exported to other countries in Latin America and the Middle East (Yergin, 
1991:435; Philip, 1982:61).   
Whilst companies had feared a gradual erosion of their position, they were 
more afraid that the Venezuelan government could challenge the legality of 
some of their contracts should they refuse to cooperate.  However, Philip 
(1982:64) argues that, in the end, companies accepted these measures 
relatively easily as their profits taxes paid in Venezuela could be deducted 
from US taxes, so that companies were little worse off.  Moreover, this 
provided a solution to avoid nationalisation as had occurred in Mexico in 
1938, so that MNOCs gained extra responsibilities as taxpayers (Philip, 
1982).   Whilst this move was arguably the first step in a process of 
nationalising Venezuela's oil industry, it simultaneously increased state oil 
dependency, reducing any focus upon individual income taxes (Karl, 
1997:77).  Post-1961 this dependency was compounded by the 
government’s halt on granting concessions, whilst increasing its profit share 
to 65% (Mommer, 1994:8; Karl, 1997:93). 
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These changes in the oil industry were accompanied by significant socio-
political changes.  After taking power by force in 1945, President 
Betancourt’s administration (1945-1948) brought in sweeping political reform 
in 1946, decreeing universal suffrage and legalising all political parties.  
Impressive victories led the government to continue a highly progressive 
programme, including a new 1947 constitution.  However, the Democratic 
Action (AD) party's pursuit of social justice and better conditions for workers, 
as seen under the Betancourt presidency and also under that of his 
successor, Rómulo Gallegos (1948) (who pushed forward a controversial 
land reform bill and reduced military spending), engendered widespread 
hostility from conservatives and business communities.  Indeed, nine months 
into his presidency, Gallegos was overthrown in a nearly bloodless military 
coup and the entire AD leadership was exiled and outlawed.   
The provisional military junta that assumed government control restored the 
1936 constitution.  It was headed by Colonel Delgado, who given his 
moderate views was assassinated in 1950 and replaced by Germán Suárez 
Flamerich (1950-1952).  Under pressure from non-AD political parties, the 
junta reluctantly called presidential elections in November 1952.  Junta 
member, Colonel Marcos Pérez Jimenez (1952-1958), began a new pro-
government party, the Independent Electoral Front74 (FEI).  However, when 
the election count indicated that the URD (supported clandestinely by AD), 
was going to win, he halted the count and declared himself president, 
sending the other junta members, the URD and COPEI leadership in exile 
with the AD (Haggerty, 1993). 
Pérez began a brutal dictatorship with a regressive new constitution and a 
strong secret police75 (SN).  However, his staunch anticommunism won him 
the US Eisenhower government’s open support, which even presented Pérez 
with the Legion of Merit, despite ongoing human rights violations (Brands, 
2010:15).  He was also openly supported by MNOCs as his policies were 
more liberal and inviting of foreign capital than the nationalistic AD policies, 
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which Pérez abandoned.  Moreover, Pérez reversed the policy of raising oil 
taxes to increase the national income and instead increased production.  He 
lacked an overarching economic plan, but pursued subordinated politics to an 
economic development based upon a fetishistic vision of modernity as a 
series of grand material achievements and used substantial oil revenues for 
ostentatious construction projects, including the luxurious Humboldt 
mountaintop hotel and the world's most expensive officers' club (Coronil, 
1997:178-180).  Meanwhile, government social expenditure on health and 
education stagnated.   
When Pérez was forced into exile in 1958, following fraudulent 1957 
elections and subsequent civilian and military insurrections, he had accrued a 
personal fortune of an estimated USD250 million (Haggerty, 1993).  Pérez’ 
fall marked a political shift back to the interests of the consumer countries 
(Philip, 1982:88).  Throughout 1958, President Wolfgang Larrazábal Ugueto 
(January-November 1958) led the military junta that worked to dismantle the 
dictatorship’s institutions and transfer power to an elected civilian 
government.  Faced with USD500 million in foreign debt, it stopped Pérez’ 
public works projects and effectively increased oil taxes from 52% to 65%, 
angering oil companies (Haggerty, 1993; Philip, 1982:88).   
Betancourt's (1959-1963) inauguration as president began Venezuela’s 
democratic era (Di John, 2009:105).  One of Betancourt’s main objectives 
was to institutionalise a political truce, by winning public opinion in favour of 
the democratic project.  Pre-elections, party leaders from the AD, URD and 
COPEI had agreed to share cabinet positions and the control of state 
institutions regardless of who won the 1958 elections in the Punta Fijo pact 
(Coppedge, 1994:76; Miller, 2012:68).  Despite persistently low world oil 
prices throughout Betancourt’s presidency and the Washington’s 1959 
establishment of unfavourable import quotas, his government managed to 
continue initiate a variety of reform programs, including agrarian reform, 
distributing only unproductive private properties and public lands and 
generously compensating landowners (Haggerty, 1993).  Tax cuts were an 
option to stimulate greater production, but this option was domestically 
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unpopular (Philip, 1982).  Vast state subsidies were used to benefit the poor 
in areas such as food, housing, and healthcare.  Moreover, a new 1961 
constitution guaranteed a wide range of civil liberties and created a weak 
bicameral legislature to minimise the potential damage of partisan political 
conflict (Haggerty, 1993). 
Punto Fijo effectively excluded other parties out of Venezuela's political 
arena.  Benefiting from oil profits, the two parties satisfied the needs of their 
major constituencies at the expense of the poor and marginalised 
communities represented by smaller political parties.  Over time, the system 
became corrupt as the AD and COPEI attempted to hold on to power 
(Coppedge, 1994). The far left was one of the excluded groups from Punto 
Fijo, resulting, initially, from the AD’s anti-communist stance.  However, the 
triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 provided the Venezuelan left with a 
model for a successful revolutionary effort in Venezuela.  In 1960, the URD 
left the governing coalition with AD in protest over Betancourt's firm stance 
against Cuban leader Fidel Castro.  The AD also lost most of its student 
wing, which left to form the Movement of the Revolutionary Left76 (MIR), 
allegedly to protest delays in the implementation of the government's 
agrarian reform program.  These groups, together with the Venezuelan 
Communist Party77 (PCV), began to advocate anti-government guerrilla 
warfare (Haggerty, 1993; Miller, 2012).   
Betancourt’s disdain for nondemocratic governance was reflected in the 
Betancourt Doctrine, denying diplomatic recognition to right and left-wing 
regimes that gained power by military force.  However, his support of Cuba's 
expulsion from the Organisation of American States (OAS) and of breaking 
off diplomatic relations with the Cuban government in December 1961 was 
followed by violent uprising.  Betancourt responded by proscribing the PCV 
and the MIR, which went underground to form the Armed Forces of National 
Liberation (FALN)78 (Haggerty, 1993; Miller, 2012).  The FALN engaged in 
rural and urban guerrilla activities throughout the 1960s, including the 
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sabotage of US oil interests such as oil pipelines and a series of bombings 
and attacks against Venezuelan politicians and US diplomats in Caracas.  In 
this context, the US and MNOCs both contributed to socio-economic 
programmes during this period to counter the communist threat, as described 
below.  However, the FALN failed both to attract members from the poorer 
classes and to take power by coup d’état.  From 1958-1961, President 
Trujillo Molina from the Dominican Republic and, from 1962-1968, Cuban 
President Fidel Castro were both implicated in anti-government 
counterinsurgency conspiracies uncovered within the Venezuelan military.  
Trujillo, for example, was directly involved in the 1960 bombing of 
Betancourt's car, in which Betancourt was badly injured (Miller, 2012).  
Three major challenges to the dialectical-relational balance with external 
actors arose in the 1960s: i) oil prices fell as the Middle East’s oil production 
increased; ii) Eisenhower's 1960 law that forced quotas on Venezuelan oil 
imports in favour of the Canadian and Mexican oil industries; and iii) the 
Seven Sisters, which dominated the Western oil market, had cooperated to 
lower oil prices (Makón, et al., 2006:15).  In 1960, to regain leverage, 
Venezuela created the Venezuelan Oil Corporation (CVP)79, which was later 
integrated into PDVSA (Mommer, 1998:7; Philip, 1982:477).  Moreover, that 
same year, Venezuela, together with Saudi Arabia, encouraged Iraq, Kuwait 
and Iran to join them in founding the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).80  They emphasised state sovereignty over their natural 
resources, which should benefit their national development (Mommer, 
1994:8).  OPEC’s establishment played a significant role in ensuring that no 
further cuts were made in tax-reference prices and placed the burden of 
falling prices in the 1960s on the companies.  The US government lacked a 
consistent oil policy at that time and its attacks against the newly formed 
OPEC reinforced sympathies for the Third World (Philip, 1982:139-140). 
Nevertheless, whilst I acknowledge that the foundation of OPEC was a 
significant milestone in altering master-slave type dependency-relations with 
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consumer countries, and in the Venezuelan case particularly with US 
hegemony, it has proven insufficient to balance these relations in the 
absence of global systemic change at a superstructural level.   
In 1964, following the 1963 electoral victory of Raúl Leoni Otero (1964-1969), 
the presidency passed from one constitutionally elected president to another 
for the first time.  As oil prices recovered, economic growth improved.  
Moreover, subversive activities quietened considerably during the Leoni 
presidency, although military plots and threats from the revolutionary left 
persisted.  By 1965, the PCV was less increasingly sceptical of using 
revolutionary violence as a means to power.  Splinter groups persisted and a 
small landing party headed by a Cuban army officer was captured at 
Machurucuto in 1967; insurgent activity, however, subsided and bilateral 
relations with Cuba eventually improved (Brands, 2010).   
The 1970s saw a shift of power over oil markets from oil companies and their 
home governments to large oil producing countries.  A split in the AD party 
led to the election of COPEI candidate Caldera.  President Rafael Caldera 
(1969-1973) replaced the Betancourt Doctrine, which had served to promote 
US hegemony, with pluralistic solidarity, restoring bilateral relations with the 
Soviet Union, several Eastern European states and South American 
countries under military rule.  By joining the Andean Common Market 
(Ancom) under special conditions to assuage business concerns, Caldera 
emphasised Venezuela’s Andean identity and began to provide oil-based 
financial aid to Central America and the Caribbean.  Caldera also adopted a 
policy of pacification towards the remaining insurgents, legalising the PCV 
and other leftist parties and granting amnesty to revolutionary activists 
(Haggerty, 1993).  At first Caldera favoured accommodation with oil 
companies to reverse the disinvestment in the oil industry and to ensure 
Venezuela international oil market access.  However, as companies 
continued to disinvest given falling world prices and local tax increases and 
the international balance of oil industry power shifted in favour of the 
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producers81 (Philip, 1982:302), nationalisation became a more attractive 
option, although it took place under the subsequent Pérez government.   
The 1973 Middle East oil embargo showed a lack of solidarity between Arab 
and non-Arab members and weakened OPEC.  However, it also raised world 
oil prices, leading to an oil boom that quadrupled Venezuelan government 
revenues between 1972 and 1974 (Wilpert, 2003), enabling the government 
to legislate that it alone could exploit the internal market of hydrocarbon-
derived goods.  The 1973 Arab-Israeli War had quadrupled crude oil prices in 
a two-month period so that when Pérez assumed office in 1974, he had an oil 
windfall to manage.   
The Pérez government (1974-1979) ideologically committed itself to undoing 
master-slave type relations, announcing the end of foreign MNOCs’ 
exploitation of Venezuelan oil, and the creation of a utopian Gran Venezuela 
(as shown below, there are similarities between these policies and those 
followed by Chávez).  The underlying normative assumptions of first-world 
styled progress fostered a developmental doctrine based on the premise that 
social prosperity would result from a sowing of the oil into a combination of 
poverty combating measures via price controls, income increases and 
economic diversification via import substitution.  Expectations rose as the per 
capita income in Venezuela equalled that of West Germany by the mid-
seventies and Venezuelans enjoyed better material conditions (Lander, 
2005:2).   
The 1975 Hydrocarbons Law enabled the negotiation of new contracts with 
MNOCs (Cuervo, 2010:647-8), whereby they continued to receive 
preferential treatment (Azzellini, 2007:100).  Notably, this developmental 
rationale corresponded to the prevailing economic development model 
promoted by the US in Latin America at this time, whereby private investment 
was supported and this allowed the US to benefit from increased oil exports 
(Rivas, 2006:243).   
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By 1976, a democratic and nationalistic revolution was hailed as Venezuela's 
oil industry was nationalised in Petroleos de Venezuela SA (Petroven soon 
renamed PDVSA), designed to make ordinary Venezuelans the owners of 
the oil wealth (Cuervo, 2010:643).  The 14 foreign oil multinationals affected 
did not vigorously oppose the move; they had received no new concessions 
since 1960 and their profit share from extracted oil had dropped to 30%.  The 
USD1 billion they received in compensation at net book value did not cover 
the replacement cost of the surrendered assets, but was considered to be fair 
under the circumstances (Philip, 1982:118).  Indeed, the move was less 
radical than it appeared.  The majority of concessions that were nationalised 
were due to revert to the state in 1983 and, as such, simply did so early.   
Indeed, one argument for this intervention was to prevent further decay.  In 
1970, 2.7 of the 3.7 million b/d came from only 6 fields, which had been 
discovered in 1926, 1928, 1930, 1937, 1938 and 1959 respectively; as such, 
the new NOC needed to keep the oil flowing until new discoveries were 
made, requiring reliance on foreign expertise at the outset (Philip, 1982:469).   
The original contracts for outsourcing to MNOCs were viewed as too 
favourable to MNOCs domestically, although Venezuela gained better 
conditions following the Iranian revolution in 1979 (Philip, 1982:475-476).  
Nationalisation followed a decade in which Venezuela took the majority of oil 
companies’ income in taxation, controlling production levels and sales prices.  
As such, companies had reduced their investment programmes, limiting 
future production levels (Philip, 1982:115-116).  Philip (1982:306) argues that 
“the companies were willing to be nationalised and simply sought satisfactory 
terms” and that “one of the objectives of the nationalisation was precisely to 
permit the oil industry to increase its investment, reverse Venezuela’s 
production decline and maintain a stable rate of output in the long term” 
(Philip, 1982:116).  The government was keen not to be seen to be 
negotiating with the oil companies, arguing that they were dismantling 
dependency theory; however, the new company needed to maintain good 
relations with the MNOCs, whose properties had been nationalised, to 
engage them as technological service providers.  As such, MNOCs received 
fair lump sum compensation, freeing up their capital for new ventures and 
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were still able to earn income for similar work (Philip, 1982:116-117,307).   
For example, Shell and Jersey Standard were contracted to advise their 
former subsidiaries Maravén and Lagovén respectively (Philip, 1982:477).  
However, behind the façade provided by the years of abundance, supported 
by large oil windfalls, was democratic decay, including the concentration of 
state power, an excessive expansion of state apparatus, poor 
macroeconomic decision-making, rent-seeking, clientelism, corruption and 
increasingly inefficient welfare provision (Ortiz, 2006:77-81; Naim, 1993; 
Ellner & Tinker Salas, 2007:8-9). Despite government efforts, economic 
diversification had not occurred.  Indeed, perpetual rent-seeking had become 
the main organising principle of political and economic life (Karl, 1997:184).   
The 1974 national budget saw oil peak at around 86% of the government's 
fiscal revenues, compared with 30% in the 1930s or 60% in 1958 or 50% in 
2008 (Dunning, 2008:162; The Economist, 2010).  No internal tax collection 
took place, but instead the government, resorting to external debt amidst 
growing public demands and oil price fluctuation, engendered chronic 
inflation and indebtedness, problems that were aggravated by OPEC 
members breaking their quotas (Wilpert, 2003; Karl, 1997; Coronil, 1997:94).  
Moreover, the government overestimated reserves to attract FDI and 
continued with a debt-financed development model (Prieto Soto, 2004:200; 
Buxton, 2009:152).   
COPEI's Luis Herrera Campins (1979-1984) became president on an agenda 
of economic austerity.  However, the Iranian Revolution and subsequent 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War caused oil prices to grow and austerity 
measures were abandoned.  When oil prices fell again, the government 
resumed large-scale independent borrowing, which led to increased public 
debt and a private capital flight in 1983.  Venezuela fell into deep economic 
crisis, entering negative or zero growth and facing a decline in real income, 
rising poverty and informal sector expansion (Prieto Soto, 2004:191-9; 
Azzellini, 2004:100; Karl, 1997:162).  The 1983 currency collapse, Black 
Friday, further undermined economic and political stability (McCoy & Myers, 
2006:3).  PDVSA emerged as the only profitable, dynamic and stable 
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institution (Mommer, 1998:23).  The government began to transfer a greater 
share of its expenses to PDVSA. The Central Bank of Venezuela 
appropriated some USD4.5 billion of PDVSA's reserves to repay foreign 
debt, undermining its autonomy.  Partisan politics began to influence the 
selection of PDVSA's board of directors, which drew domestic and 
international criticism, costing the government its good credit rating with 
foreign banks.  As Philip stated of the oil industry in 1982, there was “growing 
awareness that the oil industry must remain under ultimate political control, if 
only in the interests of co-ordination and communication”; however the 
balance between decentralising the industry to reduce the chances of 
politicisation and finding a healthy central control had not yet been found 
(Philip, 1982:479).  
In crisis, the Venezuelan government turned to US backed efforts to impose 
neoliberal austerity, including the IMF’s structural adjustment programmes 
(SAP) and World Bank recommended reforms of privatisation, radically 
reduced social expenditure, liberalised and deregulated financial markets and 
implemented legislation to increase employment (Albo, 2006:1; Azzellini, 
2007:100-1; Mommer, 1998:21).  The necessary economic recovery did not 
come (Lander, 2005:3) and the SAP, which set out a rise in fuel prices and 
harsh cuts, met with popular protest, polarising society and stirring up 
disillusionment with the established political system.82  Whilst the neoliberal 
measures were not applied as comprehensively as in neighbouring countries, 
the new austerity in the context of rising poverty led to popular protests, the 
most notorious of which, the 1989 Caracazo, saw several days of brutally 
suppressed spontaneous riots and looting (Medina & López Maya, 2003:141; 
Norden, 2004:96; López Maya & Lander, 2005:93; Buxton, 2009:154-5).   
Indeed, popular discontent led to spontaneous protests and a failed coup 
d'état in 1992, in which former President Chávez gained notoriety (Medina & 
López Maya, 2003:142; Levine, 2002:255), indicating that the military was 
politicised and not under government control (Oropeza Venegas, 2004:147).  
Political parties’ hegemony ended with President Pérez’ (1989-1993) 1993 
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impeachment and President Caldera’s (1994-1998) subsequent election on 
an anti-party platform.  Investor confidence in Venezuela and GDP fell 
accordingly, further weakening the government.  Moreover, with continued oil 
wealth mismanagement, inflexible political institutions and incoherent 
policies, poverty and inequality had continued to increase (Lander, 2005; 
Crisp, 2000:172; Coppedge, 1999:46).   
The events of the 1980s-90s shattered the popularly held exceptional 
democracy thesis, which fell with the oil prices to reveal that Venezuela, as 
other Latin American countries, was characterised by a hybrid democracy.  
The thesis was that Venezuela was on the developmental path towards a 
Western-democratic utopia and that Venezuela had made positive progress 
towards reaching this goal since 1958.  Indeed, compared to its Latin 
American neighbours, Venezuela had been heralded as a model for other 
Latin American countries.  It was free of civil war and appeared to lack their 
racial tension and authoritarianism.  It had also established an unusually 
large middle class, social mobility, rising living-standards, strong political 
parties and an obedient military (Karl, 1987:87; Levine, 1994; 2002:249; 
Ellner, 2008:2; Dunning, 2008:206-7).  However, falling oil prices brought this 
economic mismanagement to the fore, revealing the exclusionary nature of 
the Punto Fijo pacted democracy and its neglect of distribution capacities and 
the social grievances of the lower classes (McCoy, 2006:265; Buxton, 
2001:222).   
The elitist AD and COPEI parties had exercised excessive control 
(partyarchy) (Coppedge, 1994:76; Crisp et al., 1995) and caused political 
decay by failing to reform in affluent years (Urbaneja, 1992:339).  As in 
Colombia, US-led anti-communist sentiment, weakened the left and 
discouraged challenges to the system, thereby enabling democracy’s 
subordination to class interest (Neuhouser, 1992:117; Karl,1987).  Scholars 
discussed the crisis of Venezuelan exceptional democracy thesis as a Latin 
Americisation or re-Venezuelanisation, meaning a cultural propensity to 
authoritarianism (Morse, 1989) and populism (Romero, 2007).  The 
subsequent election of President Chávez and his Fifth Republic Movement 
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(MVR) in 1998 heralded the dawn of a new Bolivarian democracy, which will 
be discussed below (Ellner, 2008; Levine, 2002:257).     
5.1.2 MNOCs' impact upon the Venezuelan social fabric in pre-1998 
Venezuela 
This subsection discusses MNOCs’ influence upon Venezuela’s social fabric 
before 1998, including through their Corporate Social Responsibility.  Indeed, 
CSR has emerged and developed in response to international and domestic 
politics within Venezuela, in response to MNOCs' internal expectations and 
stakeholders’ external expectations, predominantly in line with US thinking.  
As in Colombia, MNOCs in Venezuela had long enjoyed US government and 
the national elite’s backing.  The different political phases of the 20th century 
also corresponded to differing expectations of companies and differing 
conceptions of social responsibility.   
Moreover, MNOCs have influenced Venezuela’s social fabric by supporting 
both dictatorship and democracy and by influencing oil policies (Ellner & 
Tinker Salas, 2007:33; Prieto Soto, 2004:11-24; Singh, 1989:89; Ellner, 
2008:19).  Foreign MNOCs relations with the Venezuelan state have been 
marked by instability, constant tensions and interdependent bargaining 
through a series of reforms more or less favourable to MNOCs or the state, 
and occasionally to both simultaneously.   
The Venezuelan state, as an oil exporting economy, has, over time, tried to 
diminish its dependence on foreign MNOCs.  In 1978, Tugwell (1978:3) 
observed that, as an export economy, Venezuela is tied to the international 
economy so that its oil has been “a massive, foreign-controlled export 
industry” that has predominantly served US oil needs.  I argue below that this 
is still somewhat true today.  Geopolitical circumstances have changed over 
time, altering this asymmetric relational balance.  Nevertheless, in my view, 
as the Venezuelan governments have failed to sow the oil in balanced 
economic development, unfortunately Venezuela’s economic gains 
undermined its political system, constituting a series of semi-Pyrrhic victories 
that simultaneously dismantled and established further dependency. 
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Initially, MNOCs and their home governments promoted Western-style 
economic and cultural development, which they hoped would emanate from 
the new oil enclaves (Wilkens, 1974:430; González Casas, 2004:174; 
Mommer, 1998:1; Lander, 2005:4; Quiroz Serrano, 2003:153).  MNOCs 
contributed to a new oil culture, oil infrastructure, scientific and technological 
development, migration and population resettlement, class formation and 
employment as a result of companies' need to explore, extract, transport, 
refine and export oil (Prieto Soto, 2004; Mommer, 1988; Karl, 1997).  
Companies engaged in limited philanthropic investment in ports, bridges, 
roads, hospitals, schools, housing, social clubs, shops and postal facilities to 
meet the company workers’ needs, ignoring the structural problems caused 
by their social impact (Dávila, 2004:175).   
As democracy and workers' groups emerged, public and employee relations 
gained importance and uniform labour practices were established, although 
operational transformations occurred slowly, inequalities between 
Venezuelan and foreign oil workers remained, and funds to improve staff 
conditions were often intercepted by middlemen (Ellner & Tinker Salas, 
2007:38-9; Prieto Soto, 2004:78-81).   
These phenomena affected Venezuelan state building and modernisation, 
enabling, for example, the emergence of a consumer culture (Dávila, 
2004:361-397) as well as changing political attitudes, relations with other 
countries and social values. Areas of physical MNOC absence also suffered 
from disproportionate economic under-development and poor levels of 
government investment (Martín Frechilla & Texera Arnal, 2005:23; Ellner & 
Tinker Salas, 2007:33-35).   
Throughout Gómez’ dictatorship (1908-1935), companies needed the oil less 
than Gómez needed oil income.  Correspondingly, whilst Gómez tried to 
persuade companies to engage in public works, companies generally 
resisted (Philip, 1982:33).  Nevertheless, as McBeth (1983:138) notes, in this 
period, whilst the wealth generated by oil companies had a relatively small 
impact on the general economic conditions in Venezuela, “its socio-economic 
effects on Zulia in general, and on Maracaibo in particular, were startling”.  
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Oil towns sprang-up across Zulia State, for many of which local governments 
failed to provide adequate services, rather enriching themselves (McBeth, 
1983:143).   
In Maracaibo, the capital of Zulia, the Venezuelan Gulf Oil Company (VOC)’s 
concession covered the town and, as such, it felt legally entitled to operate 
with little regard for the local population.  The company refused to recognise 
claims for damages caused by fires, from the pollution of Lake Maracaibo’s 
freshwater or from workers.  Indeed, local employees had to initially sign 
forms renouncing any right to compensation for industrial accident or death.  
Moreover, VOC placed rigs next to peoples’ homes, forcing Venezuelans to 
abandon their homes, which were either flooded with oil or unsafe given the 
risk of fire.  Tradesmen also complained of having routes obstructed by 
company operations.   
In 1926, Gómez appointed Perez Soto as state president to re-establish the 
rule of law and regain the communal land illegally taken by the oil companies.  
Perez Soto noted that the American companies, were especially “insolent, 
that is without due respect to the regional government, refusing to pay state 
and municipal taxes, seeking to ignore everything by fixing it with open 
cheques, flattering our greed, but depressing our moral entity” (Perez Soto in 
McBeth, 1983:138).  The Gómez dictatorship tried to obtain some 
compensation for ordinary Venezuelans.  In Monagas State, Exxon was 
warned that it needed to provide medical facilities for workers following local 
complaints.  Moreover, the 1925 Oil Law provided that companies were to 
supply fresh water to the towns, although the water taps provided were 
grossly insufficient to deal with the towns’ needs (McBeth, 1983: 
213,175,146).  Thus, during Gómez’ dictatorship, the beginnings of a state-
led, compensatory CSR emerged, where companies were responsible for 
paying taxes, and rather than feeling responsible for the communities in 
surrounding areas, acted in flagrant disregard of their wellbeing.   
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In 1934, Franklin Roosevelt discarded Theodore Roosevelt’s Corollary to the 
Monroe Doctrine83 to introduce a Good Neighbour Policy, encouraging US 
companies to contribute to the economic wellbeing of their host countries 
(Brands, 2010:13).84  In 1940, Roosevelt appointed Standard Oil’s Nelson 
Rockefeller as Director of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs (OCIAA), which was to develop commercial and cultural relations 
between the American Republics and thereby increase the solidarity of the 
Western hemisphere in cooperation with the Department of State.  
Rockefeller became one of the most well-known oil philanthropists in 
Venezuela and pursued an enlightened capitalism that sought to bring 
permanent peace, through a broad vision of economic security in the world 
(Hamilton, 2011:4).  As such, Rockefeller professed that it was possible to 
raise the Latin Americans living standards through technological guidance 
rather than wealth redistribution.  MNOCs’ social action followed this principle 
towards the goal of transforming Venezuelan society.   
Moreover, by engaging in such social projects and by selling the American 
Dream overseas, MNOCs were also seen as a strategic source of 
counterrevolution in Cold war Latin America.  Rockefeller, for example, 
actively engaged in this pursuit by Point IV of President Harry S Truman's 
1949 inaugural address, which called for US corporate investment in poor 
nations’ economies throughout the world (Martin Frechilla & Texera Arnal, 
2005:180-5; Bartley, 2001). In September 1949, he informed a congressional 
committee considering the Point IV proposals that American capitalism’s 
power, if applied correctly, could provide a path for the achievement of US 
geopolitical goals in the emerging Cold War (Hamilton, 2011).  
Indeed, the Rockefellers played a significant part in funding the tools of the 
US’ cultural Cold War.  In Venezuela, they funded artistic projects and such 
educational projects as the Social Science Research Council in order to 
promote specific ideological preferences (Bartley, 2001:580).  As Bartley 
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 Indeed, in 1938, Roosevelt angered US investors by failing to intervene in Mexico following 
the nationalisation of their oil fields (Brands, 2010:13). 
84
 This policy was accompanied with democratic optimism and a message of national self-
determination, although the latter died down during the Cold War as the US cooled its 
support for popular alliances to cooperate with Latin America’s anti-communist military 
governments.   
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(2001:590-1) notes, by funding the social sciences and university 
programmes, US businessmen, such as Rockefeller, in cooperation with the 
CIA, conveniently exported economic progress in a way that propagated 
Western values and ensured the rejection of Marxism.  This somewhat 
ironically given the extent of the social divide in most Latin American 
countries, led to a rejection of class conflict as a useful model of analysis.   
In the 1940s and 1950s, MNOCs, and particularly Standard Oil’s Nelson 
Rockefeller, began to introduce similar social responsibility models to those 
in their home countries,85 to stimulate the non-oil economy, improve living 
standards and fund the US style modernisation of Venezuela he actively 
advocated (Dávila, 2004:182-202; Rivas, 2002).   
As noted above, following WWII, Venezuela's reformist Democratic Action 
party had responded to domestic pressures by increasing taxes on foreign oil 
companies, including those in which the Rockefellers had significant 
investments.  To reduce these pressures upon the oil companies, Rockefeller 
convinced oil companies to pay USD15 million to help President Betancourt’s 
government confront a rising food crisis in Venezuela (Hamilton, 2011).  
As of 1947, Rockefeller co-invested USD2 million of his family’s wealth in the 
International Basic Economy Cooperation’s (IBEC) subsidiary, the 
Venezuelan basic Economy Cooperation (VBEC).  Half of VBEC's 
capitalization came from the oil companies and half from the Venezuelan 
government (Hamilton, 2011).  Like its parent company, VBEC was a profit-
oriented corporation with a social mission. Its certificate of incorporation 
declared that VBEC would "promote the economic development of 
Venezuela, and particularly its agricultural economy, to increase the 
production and availability of goods, things and services useful to raise the 
standard of living” (Hamilton, 1982).  VBEC focused upon agriculture, 
fisheries and supermarkets, commercial centres, housing, distribution, 
industry and financial services until the mid-1970s (Dávila, 2004:182-202).   
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 Rockefeller also established the Venezuelan Development Cooperation (CVF) and the 
non-profit Bolivar Foundation, later renamed the American International Association for 
Economic and Social Development (AIA) (Dávila, 2004:186).  
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Founded on the optimistic notion that a corporation could make profits whilst 
improving social welfare on a global scale, IBEC would score its greatest 
successes from the late 1940s until the 1960s with a Venezuelan 
supermarket chain, rather than with food production.  These supermarkets 
were deeply politicised entities.  As Rockefeller later declared: “it’s hard to be 
a Communist with a full belly” (Hamilton, 2011:2).  The supermarkets were to 
reach back into the small-scale localised agriculture of countries such as 
Venezuela, forcing the rapid adoption of modern technological systems that 
cheapened food supplies for urban populations.86  These goals were also 
present in the 1963 establishment of the Creole Foundation, which was 
instrumental in the establishment of the Dividendo Voluntario para la 
Comunidad (DVC) that still exists today and is aimed at improving 
communities' quality of life through partnerships with businesses.  The DVC 
has even been used as a model for CSR in other countries (Ramos, 2008:49; 
DVC, 2013).   
In the 1950s and 1960s these policies also aimed to reduce the 
yankeephobia, which US interventions in Latin America increasingly 
engendered. For example, in 1958 Venezuelans nearly lynched US Vice-
President Nixon (1953-1961) during a visit organised by Nelson Rockefeller 
in protest as to US intervention in Guatemala.  Castro’s successful 
mobilisation of anti-imperial, Third World feeling during the Cold war also 
made it politically dangerous to support Washington, leading US President 
Kennedy (1961-1963) to label Latin America “the most dangerous area in the 
world”.   
Under the Kennedy administration, Venezuela received more 
counterinsurgency aid (USD 60 million) than any other Latin American 
country (Brands, 2010:33).  Kennedy also established an Alliance for 
Progress, a ten year programme designed to stimulate economic growth and 
better distribute its benefits.  US aid to Latin America averaged at around 
USD1 billion annually between 1961 and 1965 (Miller, 2012:403).  
Throughout the 1960s, modernisation theory, which argued that there was a 
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 Interestingly, these supermarkets were recognised as symbols of US imperialism in the 
1960s when they were bombed by communists (Hamilton, 2011).   
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single, linear trajectory to economic development, gave the programme the 
ideological hook that enabled US to intervene in countries’ internal affairs 
without the taint of colonialism to protect its back yard from communism.   
As Philip (1999:362) notes, between independence and 1958, Venezuela 
had only experienced three years of genuine democracy.  Thus, Venezuelan 
president Betancourt was able to reinforce Kennedy’s concerns about the 
fragility of Venezuelan democracy to gain extra US funds (Brands, 2010:17-
47).  In the 1970s, with Nixon (1969-1974) and Ford’s (1974-1977)87 darker 
anticommunism, a dependency theory framed backlash set in across much of 
Latin America as development failed to occur with talk of US cultural and 
economic hegemony, allowing national leaders to blame underdevelopment 
on external factors (Brands, 2010:92).  By 1974, Kissinger concluded that 
“we have to loosen up or we isolate ourselves”.   
Nevertheless, in Venezuela, Betancourt was a shining example for the 
Alliance for Progress and emerged relatively well from the 1960s and was 
able to take advantage of the 1970s US power vacuum in the region, 
nationalising the oil industry 10 years ahead of schedule.  Oil revenues were 
used to launch aid programmes in the Central America and the Caribbean, 
so that a Guatemalan official wrote in 1974 that Caracas was “almost equal 
to Washington” in the Caribbean (Brands, 2010:141).   
In this vein, Venezuela also concluded a petrochemical contract with the 
Soviet Union (Brands, 2010:146).   However, the debt crisis provided the 
developed world with the leverage to influence the trajectory of developing 
countries towards free market capitalism and electoral democracy.  As IMF 
and World Bank agreements proliferated across Latin America in the 1980s, 
it appeared as if America had definitively won the Cold War, although the 
events of the late 1980s and early 1990s showed such assertions to have 
been premature (Brands, 2010:224-269).  As government institutions failed to 
reduce poverty throughout the 1980s and 1990s, communities increasingly 
looked to a mixture of companies and NGOs to address social problems 
(Schmidheiny, 2006; Ramos, 2008:50). 
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 Nelson Rockefeller was Vice-President during the Ford presidency. 
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5.2 What is 21st century socialism?  
Bolivarian or 21st century socialism was introduced by former President 
Chávez (1998-2013), who was elected with a programme to empower the 
poorer segments of the Venezuelan population, exciting progressive 
socialists globally.  This new brand of socialism has sought to dynamically 
change hegemonic relations and counter neoliberalism (Valencia Ramírez, 
2007:122-3; Kozloff, 2007:37), emancipating Venezuela from US imperialism 
and the capitalist "realm of injustice and tyranny of the rich over the poor" 
(Chávez, 2010) to which the Venezuelan people "were totally enslaved" 
(Chávez, 2007a:58).   
Actively resisting Empire began predominantly by negation or opposition, as 
concrete policies were initially lacking to tackle social problems and the 
complex web of elite/US interests within and outside of Venezuela.  The 
Bolivarian movement has developed transversally as a process of identifying 
variables that, from its ideological standpoint, enable/constrain emancipation 
(Malavé Mata, 2006; Medina & López Maya, 2003:142).  Due to its 
experimental nature, an initial lack of direction and the rapid, revolutionary 
urgency with which policies have been implemented, transformation has 
resulted in some haphazardness and policy contradictions (Lebowitz, 2009; 
CIA, 2010; Valencia Ramírez, 2007:122-3; Shifter & Jawahar, 2005:176).   
In refining and redefining the new brand of socialism and its discourse, 
Chávez worked with prominent left-wing intellectuals including István 
Mészáros, Marta Harnecker and Carlos Lanz Rodriguez.  The Chávez 
presidency initially focused upon the human dignity of a socialist versus a 
purely capitalist economy, before moving from social democratic capitalism to 
a socialist society and embracing more concrete ideas such as István 
Mészáros’ socialist triangle.88  Following Chávez’ electoral victory at the 2004 
Venezuelan recall referendum and his self-identification as a socialist in 2005 
(Ellner, 2009), democratic political processes have been increasingly 
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 The elementary triangle of socialism incorporates the following ideas: i) social ownership 
of production, ii) social production organised by workers, and iii) production for communal 
needs.  Chávez believed that for the Bolivarian alternative to work, each element must be 
actualised (Bellamy Foster, 2010).  
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institutionalised under Heinz Dietrich Steffan's banner of 21st century 
socialism (Lebowitz, 2009; Hillman, 2006:124-129) and have led Venezuela 
to take a leading position in a new wave of Latin American socialism (Ellner & 
Tinker Salas, 2007:60) that has challenged the dominance of US-led 
neoliberal market logic and the abstract utopia it propagates.    
As applied in Venezuela, 21st century socialism is not a single, coherent and 
all-pervading dominant ideology of the type put forward by dominant ideology 
thesis that is unified in articulation and practical expression (Ellner, 2008).89  
Nevertheless, it is an attempt to create another vision of La Gran Venezuela 
through a more radical restructuring of society built by redistributing 
resources and guided by Gramscian logic, whereby the ruled class becomes 
the ruling class and multi-level power relations are progressively reframed.  
The purge of neoliberal patterns in the Venezuelan socio-political fabric 
through the institutionalisation of new social configurations is discussed in 
this section.   
There is significant scope for those looking to criticise the revolution despite 
its noble attempts at increasing social justice as shown below.  The 
Bolivarian revolution has faced, but also provoked, obstructionism on several 
fronts.  It has antagonised the US, a significant trade partner, which has 
responded to the defiant Venezuelan challenge to its hegemony and 
alongside the traditional elite, has acted to undermine the Chávez and 
Maduro governments’ legitimacy and scope of action.90  Moreover, whilst 
social division characterises much radical, revolutionary change, as 
illustrated below, the government is partially responsible for their creation.   
Moreover, government responses to counter the perceived neoliberal threat 
have been increasingly hyperpresidentialistic, which sets a negative 
precedent for future social relations.  In order to explain what this revolution 
entails, I will now discuss the principles of participatory and protagonistic 
democracy and the effects of their implementation.   
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 Indeed, it should be noted at this point that although President Chávez created a United 
Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) in 2006 merging several socialist parties, the socialist 
movement in Venezuela is not homogeneous (Ellner, 2008:141).  
90
 On Chávez’ death, some foreign newspapers even published that the ill president had 
been murdered by the US (Algeria Times, 2013).  
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5.2.1 The overarching principles of social emancipation: participatory 
and protagonistic democracy 
This section highlights the political context and the new society in which 
MNOCs currently operate in Venezuela.  As such, it helps to show the 
conditions in which the RCSR model, discussed in chapter 7, has come into 
fruition.  The effects of Bolivarian Socialism on the oil sector, more generally, 
are discussed in section 5.3, including MNOCs obligations to fund social 
programmes.      
The Bolivarian Constitution (CRBV), approved in 1999 by 92% of Venezuelan 
voters, provides a conceptual basis for the sweeping changes in Venezuela 
(Malleson, 2010:2).  It privileges nationalist discourse and refers to 
Venezuela as a protagonistic and participatory democracy; two adjectives 
that are somewhat contradictory in their fullest sense.  Protagonist, from the 
Greek protagonistes, denotes a leader or agent with a main role in a Greek 
drama.  Given the revolutionary rhetoric, a more pertinent role is that of a 
proponent or advocate of a political cause.  Advocating participatory 
democracy, from the greek demokratia, literally means rule of the people or 
people power (McClean & McMillan, 2009).   
CRBV (1999) Article 62 enables citizens to intervene in all levels of public 
affairs.  Thus, the government has developed a mandate to foster active, 
meaningful and direct citizen participation and engagement in public policy as 
an essential prerequisite of this democracy.  The mechanisms to implement 
protagonistic and participatory democracy are primarily outlined in CRBV 
Article 70 and envisage citizens taking active decision-making roles, thus 
constituting a direct democracy (Salamanca, 2006:102).91   
Social protagonism, as established in CRBV, refers to a system of social co-
responsibility that organises society into different levels of action and 
accountability (Rodríguez, 2006).  The Chávez administration, having 
constitutionalised social movements’ demands for greater participation, 
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 Despite the rise of community level social movements unconnected to political parties, 
companies or workers unions since the 1960s, the political and institutional reform needed to 
create mechanisms for civil society to participate in the political decision-making process 
was limited and arrived too late (García-Guadilla, 2002:242-250; Salamanca, 2006). 
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worked to concretise participatory democracy by institutionalising socio-
political movements, giving them a forum in the public sphere to express their 
concerns (García-Guadilla, 2002:257; 2006:57).  Petras (2003) notes that the 
formerly excluded were not placed into an existing system, but rather the 
latter was transformed to grant them access.  These social organisations and 
movements formally and informally occupy space previously taken by 
political parties, each with their own values and interests (Salamanca, 
2006:93).   Consequentially, the culture of political agreement and dialogue 
between parties is disappearing (Adrianzan, 2009).   
As discussed above, the Chávez government had a challenging legacy, so 
that in 2010, Cuervo (2010:641) asserted that Venezuela remains poor after 
a century of oil and gas exploitation, resulting from resource 
mismanagement.  The new system of using oil money to help the people is 
one of citizen-owners entitled to the country's oil wealth (Gibbs, 2006).  The 
debate has not only reopened as to how oil revenues’ can best empower 
Venezuelan stakeholders, but the latter have extended from traditional 
stakeholders to the people more generally (Ellner & Tinker Salas, 2007:27), 
enabling previously socially excluded individuals to make greater social 
claims vis-à-vis the oil industry.  Despite oil revenue fluctuations, oil is 
expected to benefit Venezuelan citizens in increasing policy areas, so that 
MNOCs have needed to redefine the scope and limits of their social 
mandate.   
Measuring practical results is difficult as the Chávez government altered 
methodologies used to measure social phenomena when displeased with a 
set of results, for example, poverty rates (Weisbrot et al., 2006:3).  I argue 
that the principles have had an emancipatory effect for the lower classes, but 
have not yet been equally and fully applied and that other emergent patterns 
threaten their successful establishment.  Indeed, several policies that 
promise emancipatory power192, simultaneously exert subjugating power2 
over the people, therefore, raising questions about whether the Western-
framed values MNOCs’ wish to project externally, such as human rights 
                                                          
92
 Bhaskar (1993) uses this distinction of power1 and power2 as a way to view complex 
power relations (see footnote 54 on page 145). 
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protection and revenue transparency, are met by supporting government 
projects.   
In this context, this chapter analyses the creation of new social structural 
agents that are replacing, for example, the traditional NGOs and town 
councils.  These new agents: i) depend on oil sector funding; ii) compete with 
the oil sector in terms of the execution of social action; and iii) provide new 
social partners with whom MNOCs should cooperate in defining local social 
action programmes and their scope.  It should be noted that (particularly US) 
MNOCs form part of the Empire and as such are a minori enemies in the 
government's enemy/friend dichotomy, even if, as Philip (2010:6) argues, the 
oil market is so deconcentrated that oil imperialism is less salient than it was 
in the twentieth century.  This dichotomy is discussed in section 5.3.   
5.2.1.1 Protagonism: overcoming Empire and installing democracy 
The principles of protagonistic and participatory democracy supersede that of 
representation, which existed under the former predominantly two-party 
system and its corresponding institutions and mechanisms.  Bruni Celli 
(2003:46) contends that regimes that abandon representative democracy for 
direct democracy may try to empower citizens, yet historically struggles for 
direct democracy have often ended in its negation (a form of governance 
which weakens popular power).  Indeed, the current Venezuelan debate is 
focused around questions of who is included and which mechanisms and 
institutions best facilitate direct democracy.93   
Whilst the dominance of a majority group over other social actors is a well-
documented problem of representative democracy, it should not occur to the 
same extent in a participatory or deep democracy, so that those who oppose 
governmental policies cannot be entirely excluded from all areas of society.  
Nevertheless, as Bolivarian socialism has included the previously excluded, 
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 Petras (2007) argued that opposition and confrontation was somewhat inevitable as: 
"when you put social democracy, egalitarianism and popular power at the top of the political 
agenda […], the Right, the reactionary military, the 'Centrist' political defectors and 
ideologues, the White House, the hysterical middle classes and the Church cardinals will 
sacrifice any and all democratic freedoms to defend their property, privileges and power by 




but not those who had vested interests or a non-socialist vision of society, 
Venezuela is not (yet) a participatory democracy.   
In advocating a new social model, protagonism has used democratic and 
non-democratic means including populistic and hyperpresidentialistic 
elements.  Populism emerged via the political mobilisation of the lower 
classes, which were previously excluded by the established parties and 
lacked institutionalised forms of political self-expression (Roberts, 2000:2).  
Indeed, the very use of term Bolivarian socialism, linking the project to the 
historical cult figure, Simón Bolivar, draws from populist tradition the notion of 
a virtuous Venezuelan people fighting to overthrow long-standing oppression 
(Philip & Panizza, 2011).  Venezuelans have rational and emotional reasons 
for adhering to the populist worldview, with its Manichean discourse that 
holds the nation's elite responsible for the country's difficulties (Weyland, 
2003:1098).  Unfortunately, as noted above, whilst it is emancipatory to place 
the dismantling of elite oppression/discrimination on the political agenda, the 
moralisation of politics by politicising the social divide of the haves and have-
nots is problematic for consensus-building, the use of the elite as a 
scapegoat is reductionist and the idea of popular sovereignty can be used to 
counter checks and balances on government power (Kaltwasser, 2013).   
Establishing dualistic friend/enemy dichotomies, has entrenched the divide 
between rich and poor.  This has been both a necessary advocatory and self-
defensive governmental strategy, given US/old elite hostility and 
Bolivarianism’s need to establish itself and bolster support from its poorer 
electoral base for state intervention (Philip & Panizza, 2011).  However, it has 
markedly deepened political polarisation within Venezuela (Ellner, 2008:5; 
Dunning, 2008:154), reflective of a complex of interests and opinions within 
contemporary Venezuela (Buxton, 2007).  The entrenching divide, however, 
threatens the stability of Bolivarian socialism as witnessed by the contested 
2013 election of President Maduro.  Such us and them dichotomised 
language may be helpful in fuelling a revolution, yet it is unhelpful for social 
cohesion unless a dialectical synthesis can be found.94  Indeed, by 
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 As Lipmann (1922) argued, polarisation can arise from distorted information, a failure to 
analyse facts before reaching conclusions and the use of stereotypes that subject people to 
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abandoning meta-reality’s axioms of universal solidarity95 and axial 
rationality96, by not differentiating between people and their ideas or to auto-
critique their own actions in view of resolving social tensions, the Bolivarian 
governments have failed to resolve the social dichotomy and to achieve a 
Bolivarian synthesis.  The normative implications that this approach raises for 
MNOCs operating in Venezuela are discussed in section 3.  
The Chávez’ administration also used hyperpresidentialism, a reliance on 
enabling acts, which allowed Chávez to pass executive decrees without 
legislative debate or approval, antiparty rhetoric and a discourse with 
messianic overtones (Penfold (2010:21).  The late President Chávez won in 
1998 as a personalistic candidate and was known for his military dress, 
charisma, cavalier outbursts and self-comparisons with leaders such as 
Zamorra, Bolivar, Guevara and Jesus (Salamanca, 2006:100; Chávez, 
2007b:47; León et al., 2009:4).  For many, his personality embodied the 
revolutionary poor’s struggles (Malleson, 2010).  Moreover, whilst he used 
grassroots support to further participatory democracy, he also used top-down 
state directed authoritarianism, e.g. in 2009, to amend the constitution he had 
vociferously defended to stand for indefinite re-election (Malleson, 2010; 
Romero, 2007; Corrales, 2009b:77-78).  His government placed military men 
in government positions, encouraging the military to participate as a political 
and social actor called to defend fatherland and socialism or die (Trinkunas, 
2006:68-70).   
5.2.1.2 Protagonism: the media 
The inherent contradictions embedded in the sheer wealth of information and 
disinformation on Venezuela form a great obstacle in determining a clear-cut 
Venezuelan reality.  Firstly, Empire has fought back and most Western-based 
                                                                                                                                                                    
partial truths.  These have arguably been used extensively on both sides of the socio-
political divide with people adopting demi-reality as truth.   
95
 The principle of Universal Solidarity specifies that any human being can empathise with 
and come to an understanding of another and become one with something radically different 
from him/herself (Bhaskar, 2010:18). 
96
 The axiom of Axial Rationality specifies that there is a basic logic of learning by identifying 
and correcting mistakes that is accessed by all human communities without regard to their 
cultural background so that there is a capacity to learn from mistakes and to (auto-)critique 
(Bhaskar, 2010:18).   
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coverage of the revolution has been critical.  In 2010, the US State 
department declassified documents showing that the US had provided 
funding for Venezuelan anti-Chávez journalists and media organisations 
(Gollinger, 2010).  The biased Venezuelan media coverage of the 2002 coup 
against Chávez showed a strong media preference for his rival Carmona, 
reflected in estimates that 95% of all Venezuelan media at this time, including 
the major TV channels, was anti-Chávez and presented an influential political 
opposition (Lemoine, 2002).  This imbalance has been significantly 
redressed.   
Indeed, media-state relations have been an ideologically-permeated, political 
battleground (Bisbal, 2003:134-136; Weisbrot & Ruttenberg, 2010).  
Interestingly, whilst the media discusses Venezuelan society in terms of 
Chavistas and the opposition, figures indicate that 54% of Venezuelans 
consider themselves neither one nor the other (Datanalisis in Noticias 24, 
2010)97, highlighting the complexity of categorising Venezuelans.  
Nevertheless, the Chávez government adopted this Manichean approach 
(Petras, 2007), calling, for example, on supporters to fight subversive internet 
media as "soldiers" that "engage with the enemy online" (Reuters, 2010).  
High-ranking state authorities, moreover, discredited and accused certain 
journalists and independent communications media of practicing journalistic 
terrorism by fomenting a discourse of hate that affects Venezuelans’ “mental 
health” (IACHR, 2009:108).   
The government's Media Crimes Bill, whereby subversive journalists face 
imprisonment and the governmental control of certain TV and radio stations 
were set to combat this trend (CPJ, 2009).  Government actions are 
consistent as they, as in Plato's Republic, ban all material deemed 
subversive, including episodes of the popular US series Family Guy (El 
Universal, 2009).  Unsurprisingly, the Chávez government moved to control 
the dissenting media by progressively eliminating their freedom and 
independence, threatening opposition media with closure (Sullivan, 
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 Moreover, Valencía Ramirez' (2007:121-139) study on the Chavistas shows that many do 
not fall into the stereotype prevailing in Venezuela.  
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2010:46)98, although non/anti-Bolivarian channels still exist, but these have 
been subdued (Ramos, 2008:59).   
Communication has also been an integral part of formulating and promoting 
21st century socialism.  Despite claims that the Chávez administration had 
taken control of the mass-media, in 2010, in terms of viewer shares, private 
terrestrial channels still represented 61.4%, cable and satellite 33.1% and 
state television only 5.4% (Weisbrot & Ruttenberg, 2010).  Nevertheless, the 
transmission of Aló Presidente! aside, it saturated the media with its keen 
use of blanket presidential broadcasts on all channels, which conveyed much 
more than urgent informational needs of public interest that constitute their 
official raison d’être.99  Given that most Venezuelans receive their news via 
television, non-objective news-telling has widened the social gulf, leaving 
little room for auto-critique or any attempt of universal solidarity100. 
5.2.1.3 Participatory democracy: elections and the balance of powers 
Elections are a key element of participatory democracy.  As Garrido 
(2003:84) writes, in Venezuela, "Hugo Chávez came to the presidency by 
means of democratic election, but he did so to install a radical, revolutionary 
government".  Certain authors used the frequent elections, referenda and 
government polling success to indicate the legitimacy, popularity and 
democracy of the Chávez government (Hellinger, 2007:157-185; Kornblith, 
2005).  Adrianzén (2009) argues that Andean socialist democracies have 
redefined democracy, simultaneously emphasising the votes that brought in 
change and their opposition to neoliberalism.  This is not unique to 
Venezuela as the regional trend has been of electoral/competitive 
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 Radio Caracas, which had opposed government policies, found that its TV station’s 
licence was not renewed; former President Chávez argued that it showed subversive 
material (IACHR, 2009:140).   
99
 The Andrés Bello Catholic University’s Centre for Communications Studies estimated that 
between February 1999 and July 2009, excluding Aló Presidente and the government's 
official publicity, the Venezuelan communications media transmitted a total of 1,923 blanket 
presidential broadcasts, equivalent to 52 days of uninterrupted presidential broadcasting.  In 
2008, the communications media transmitted 186 blanket broadcasts (172 hours and 55 
minutes), whilst in July 2009 alone, 75 messages were broadcast (88 hours and 19 minutes).  
The longest blanket broadcast of 7 hours and 34 minutes was aired on 13 January 2009 
(IACHR, 2009:104). 
100
 The principle of Universal Solidarity specifies that any human being can empathise with 
and come to an understanding of another and become one with something radically different 
from him/herself (Bhaskar, 2010:18). 
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authoritarianism, whereby the paradigm is shifting from a traditional 
Rechtsstaat based democracy to an electoral democracy (Cameron, 
2009:339; Dunning, 2008:31).   
Elections have not, however, been completely free.  The National Electoral 
Council (CNE), which oversees and guarantees electoral transparency, has 
been unrepresentative of the political spectrum, primarily composed of pro-
government representatives.  Opponents of Bolivarian socialism have faced 
active discrimination and have been fired or harassed (Jatar, 2006a) as 
evidenced by the appearance of the Tascón101, Maisanta and Russian102 
lists.  The Chávez’ government stated that businessmen and civil servants 
should be "rojos, rojitos" or resign (Uzcátegui in 24Noticias, 2007; IACHR, 
2009).  PDVSA’s politicisation (BBC, 2006; Malavé Mata, 2006:68; Philip & 
Panizza, 2011) was clearly articulated by Rafael Ramirez, then Minister of 
Energy and current President of PDVSA, prior to the 2006 presidential 
elections:  
“Here, we are backing Chávez, who is our leader, who is the leader of this 
revolution, and we will do everything we have to do to support out president 
[...]. Those who do not feel comfortable with that orientation, should give their 
jobs to a Bolivarian" (Ramírez in BBC, 2006).    
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 The Tascón List comprised the signatures of petitioners for President Chávez’ recall, 
which led to the (eventually defeated) 2004 Venezuelan recall referendum.  Accusations 
arose that the list, given by the CNE to Luis Tascón for a signature verification was used by 
the government to discriminate against the petitioners after the National Assembly member 
published it online.  Fear was fuelled by Chávez' statement that "Those who sign against 
Chavez are not really signing against Chavez... they are signing against the homeland, the 
future, and will go on record for history".  Petitioners were offered a chance to retract their 
names from the list.  Venezuelan NGO Sumate claims that people felt forced to remove their 
names to keep their benefits or employment.  The list was subsequently embellished with 
further data to form the Maisanta list, which compromises 16 million Venezuelans, their 
electoral preferences, participation in government social programmes and personal data.  In 
2005, Chávez ordered the list’s removal from the internet under increasing public pressure 
(Jatar, 2006b).  
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 The Russián list, compiled by the General Comptroller (financial controller), a well-known 
Chávista, disqualified around 400 citizens from standing in future elections due to an alleged 
misdemeanour, in breach of his powers under the Organic Law of the Comptroller's Office.   
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5.2.1.4 Participatory democracy: the communal councils and social 
restructuring   
The government has begun to restructure society in a Bolivarian drive to 
create more participatory democracy and to alter power-relations within 
Venezuela, purging US/elitist influence.  To this end, it has abandonned the 
liberal democratic reduction of civil society to an associative sphere in 
contrast to the state and the market for a Gramscian understanding of civil 
society as part of the state and an instrument of hegemony or of opposing 
hegemony (Wilpert, 2007; Harris, 2007).   
For MNOCs operating in Venezuela, they increasingly find themselves 
working alongside the communal councils (consejos communales), new 
social actors with their own expectations of MNOCs, both in the planning and 
execution stages of CSR projects.  The 2006 Law of Communal Councils 
introduced this new unit of social organisation to enhance popular power and 
offer a form of direct democracy to individual citizens who form the councils.   
According to the founding law, communal councils should empower 
Venezuelans to directly exercise public policy and project management, 
thereby responding to their communities’ needs and aspirations and 
increasing social justice (Ley Especial de los Consejos Comunales, 2006).  
20,000 communal councils were established nation-wide following the law's 
enactment and are composed of groups of families or neighbours (Ellner, 
2009).  The budget for financing council projects was set at USD 5 billion for 
2007, with each one allocated USD 14,000 to finance their initial projects 
(Mather, 2007).  These new structures of social organisation provide a pre-
determined structure of public participation, which should be supported and 
reproduced by Venezuelans, including formerly excluded agents such as 
women and teenagers (Ellner, 2009).  Having registered with the 
Commission for Popular Power (CPPP), and liaised with other local groups, 
they can propose needs-based projects and are entitled to receive public 
funds to meet these needs.  The CPPP decides which projects receive funds 
(León et al, 2009:4).  
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The Communal Councils’ parallel structure gives the president closer access 
to the people, sidestepping the bureaucratic layer of governors, mayors, 
ministers, officials and agents linked to the old system (Rodríguez, 
2006:223).  In parallel, the associative realm has been progressively 
weakened.  That some NGOs and political groups have received EU and US 
funds for democracy-building projects has tarnished them as Empire agents 
(Jatar, 2006b).  Indeed, many harbour neoliberal values that see the private 
sphere as a positive force of social development (Ramos, 2008) and some 
have anti-Bolivarian political views (Gollinger, 2010).    
Communal councils are part of a wider restructuring of society, through 
participatory policies.  Smilde (2009) discusses three stages of the 
Venezuelan government's participation policies: i) harnessing existing forms 
of participation until participatory democracy fostered groups that supported 
government actions; ii) sponsoring pro-government participation; and iii) 
centralising participation and neutralising the autonomy of citizen 
participation.  Sinergia, a group of Venezuelan NGOs, is concerned that this 
societal restructuration aims to streamline and control the associative sphere. 
Indeed, communal councils are replacing NGOs and local government, which 
are being systematically excluded as the government links them to 
US/neoliberal-thinking and puntofijismo respectively (Sinergia, 2010; Petras, 
1997).   
Whatever the government’s intentions, remodelling civil society offers great 
opportunities for reform (power1103), but equally, for power to be abused 
(power2) as the new actors are neither consolidated nor independent from 
the government.  According to Ellner (2009), the new Venezuelan social 
organisations display a relatively low degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state, 
many being openly pro-government.  Future attempts to create official forms 
of cooperation may, thus, be utilised by the state to monopolise community 
action (Sinergia, 2010).   
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 Bhaskar (1993) uses this distinction of power1 and power2 as a way to view complex 
power relations (see footnote 54 on page 145). 
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The risk is that if the government becomes the people’s ultimate 
representative, by claiming to have authority on the public good through its 
own direct channels of access to the people, it can effectively dismiss the 
views of other established actors and independent civil associations 
(Virtuoso, 2006:302).  Chambers and Kymlicka (2002) note that a strong non-
governmental public sphere is a precondition for effective participatory 
democracy.  However, the new format of civil society’s participation is not 
only predefined, but prescribed by the government.  Thus, whilst the essence 
of these reforms was horizontal and democratic, the social model created 
and resources to achieve it are vertically determined (Wagner, 2004).104   
Adrianzan (2009) asserts that there is a regional tendency to privilege 
substantive democratic themes, including inclusion, poverty and equality and 
to leave aside themes of formal democracy functioning such as the 
separation of powers.  Within Venezuela, the new democracy has placed 
greater value upon participation and mobilisation than on governability and 
good governance (Philip & Panizza, 2011).  It has been argued that the 
social, political and economic inclusion of previously excluded actors may 
have had a cost to democracy, so that the Bolivarian discourse of justice and 
values could be a way of legitimising hyper-presidentialist reforms, enabling 
laws and authoritarian governance (Malavé Mata, 2006:217; Adrianzan, 
2009).  I would note that that the latter were predominantly seen as a means 
to achieve revolution, but that they create worrying precedents for future 
action. 
5.2.1.5 Protagonistic democracy: Chavistas 
Chavistas belong to a heterogeneous conglomeration of groups such as 
community and neighbourhood organisations, some of which have 
historically clientelistic relations with the state, whilst others are more 
ideologically grounded (Ellner, 2008:142).  Raby (2006:190-191) notes that 
Chavistas and the Chávez government enjoyed a dynamic dialectic, whereby 
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 This centralizing, vertical trend is also visible in the frequent obstruction and instruction of 
governors and mayors, bringing powers back to central government (Penfold, 2010; 
Cameron, 2009:16; Corrales, 2009b:73; Romero, 2007:2).    
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Chávez could more sensitively respond to the people than a conventional 
party or government and better act in the peoples' interest.   
Conversely, however, these groups, which set-out to emancipate society of 
puntofijista inequality, have also formed less emancipatory, clientelistic links 
with the government, hindering the communal councils’ ability to act 
objectively and freely vis-á-vis the state, as chavistas have often controlled 
both these and the town councils (Ellner, 2009:6).  Corrales (2009b:69) notes 
that from within the new social structures, amongst the different groups of 
Chavistas, some have a duty to "watch citizens in local communities, and 
intimidate opponents".  Thus, as stated above, I argue that the communal 
councils are empowering, but equally in danger of being vehicles of false 
freedom. 
The bulk of the Chavista movement’s support comes from the poorer 
segments of the population, which Chavismo empowers by offering hope and 
a sense of solidarity with the poor and oppressed in other countries (Valencia 
Ramírez, 2007:122-3).  Ellner (2006) notes that certain larger ideologically-
minded groups, such as the Fuerza Socialista Bolivariana de Trabajadores 
(FSBT), have been weakened as their activists have been recruited by the 
state, which de facto weakens direct democracy.  Of the Chavistas, the most 
emblematic are the Bolivarian Circles, which Jácome (2006) notes were 
formed from above and are subject to differing levels of state control.  In his 
interviews with Harnecker (2005), Chávez noted that the Bolivarian circles 
are the new form of civil participation and that they should become even 
more present in society, building networks, "that form streams and together 
form the transformational river of our movement".   
The circles are often cells within larger organisations or groupings and are 
charged with disseminating Bolivarian ideology, mobilising political support 
against the opposition and helping to meet social needs, providing a direct 
link between the people and the President himself (Valencia Ramírez, 2007).  
If thought of in terms of the inculcation of new discourses, agents in these 
circles are positioned firmly within the new discourse, having come to own 
the government's emancipatory rhetoric.   
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The question arises as to whether the masses of new elite are becoming that 
which philosopher John Dewey referred to as a Great Community, educated 
about their society and solution-oriented vis-à-vis social problems, or whether 
they are in a platonic cave of ideological blindness.  As Chávez commented, 
some circles have sectarian views, even if they are not primarily sectarian 
groups (Chávez in Harnecker, 2005:138).  Oxhorn (2003) refers to 
"sometimes armed community organisations directly loyal to the President", 
whilst others have called them "paraofficials of violence" (Malavé Mata, 
2006:60).  Such physical violence is symptomatic of deeper causes and the 
political opposition has capitalised on the fear created by sectarian groups, 
associating all Chavistas with the sectarian acts of the few (Valencia 
Ramírez, 2007).   
5.2.1.6 Protagonistic democracy: reforming old judicial structures 
The balance of powers has also changed to fit the new Venezuelan 
democratic framework.  CRBV (1999) added electoral and citizen branches 
to the existent governmental branches, enshrining the new popular structure 
of people power.  Previous governments had eroded the separation of 
executive and judicial powers (Ellner, 2009) so that the government inherited 
a clientelistic and elitist judicial system (Ellner, 2001:39).  Whilst the spheres 
are theoretically independent, the Chávez’ executive penetrated the judiciary 
to reform it (Monaldi et al. 2004:31).   
Whilst not a regional exception, former President Chávez removed 
judges, who delivered displeasing verdicts or held different views of justice, 
denouncing them and their court decisions on television (IACHR, 
2009:72).  The appointment of non-regular judges, avoiding the open public 
competition required by CRBV Article 255, may enable the appointment of 
those with a Bolivarian sense of justice, nevertheless these judges are freely 
appointed and removable, which may influence their partiality or their 
perceived partiality (IAHCR, 2009:xi).  Thus, justice is more Bolivarian and 
less elitist, however, the rate of judge replacement and the executive’s ability 
to override judicial decisions threaten to undermine the judicial system’s 
workings and to establish a Bolivarian elitist, clientelistic judiciary to replace 
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the old one.  It remains to be seen whether such measures have been a 
temporary evil to fix a rotten system or represent a more serious threat to 
justice.  Notably, judicial fairness and contract stability are important criteria 
for MNOCs considering whether or not to invest within a country.   
5.2.1.7 Participatory democracy: the cooperatives and the missions 
The cooperatives and the missions were created to enhance social and 
economic democracy (García-Gaudilla, 2006; Alayón Monserat, 2005:219) 
under the banner of participatory democracy.  The former are part of the 
Bolivarian vision of a state-led economy and the missions are a social model 
that provides the poorest segments of the population with welfare.   
The Chávez’ government confiscated land for use by cooperatives (Navarro, 
2005; Stålberg, 2006:iv), actualising the Marxist idea of abolishing private 
property by confiscating it for communal use as a means of developing the 
economy.   Whilst still in its infancy, the Venezuelan cooperative movement 
is the world’s largest (Malleson, 2010).  The cooperatives are a radical break 
from capitalist production practices, not due to an inherent incompatibility 
between cooperatives and capitalism, but due to the way they are managed 
and their quantity.  Although Venezuela is still far from a centrally-planned 
economy, cooperatives have been supported alongside other interventionist 
policies, including nationalisations, price controls, foreign exchange 
restrictions, tax increases and an ambitious land reform to provide a form of 
endogenous development that can inclusively redress structural imbalances 
(Flores-Macías, 2008:81; Harris, 2007).   
Whilst the cooperatives were initially state dependent and a large number 
failed to take off, those that succeeded have become increasingly 
independent thanks to the training provided by the mission Vuelvan Caras 
and have allowed workers a direct say in running firms, reducing hierarchy 
and promoting new structures of popular sovereignty and workplace 
democracy (Ellner, 2009:82).  It is unclear whether cooperatives will continue 
to work outside of a radically democratic economy, especially given the lack 
of independent financial support available for the cooperatives and the lack of 
ownership of the projects displayed by some workers (Malleson, 2010).  
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However, they represent a coherent attempt to implement participatory 
democracy within the new socialist context. 
The missions are social programmes designed to emancipate the poor, 
funded using oil revenues that are directly overseen by the state apparatus.  
They resemble non-government, business or civil society run social initiatives 
in content and in their informal and non-systematic nature.  Compared with 
the total expenditure of the social programmes of 1989-1998, which never 
surpassed 1.5% of GDP in a given year, the missions’ expenditure was over 
three times higher in both 2006 and 2007 (Aponte Blank, 2010:53).  The best 
known missions are arguably: (i) Misión Barrio Adentro, providing healthcare 
to the poor; (ii) Misión Robinson I and II, tackling illiteracy; (iii) Misión Ribas, 
offering adults high school education; (iv) Misión Identidad, providing citizens 
with identification to enable them to access cash incentives and participate in 
educational social programmes; (v) Misión Mercal, providing subsidised food 
40% cheaper than market value; and (vi) Misión Vuelvan Caras, creating jobs 
in cooperatives.105  
5.2.1.7.1. The missions in practice: healthcare and education  
Healthcare and education are two key areas of oil-sector funded, state-led 
social welfare programmes (Aponte Blank, 2010:50).  The missions have 
been an efficient vehicle for delivering services to the country’s poorest, 
enabling them to receive treatments otherwise unavailable to them.  Barrio 
Adentro System I and II, created as parallel structures to the traditional health 
services, have provided comprehensive, free public health services, including 
urgent, preventive and outpatient care.  Whilst their success is difficult to 
quantify, Weisbrot et al. (2009) contend that there have been some 
significant achievements, including a twelve-fold increase in public sector 
primary care physicians between 1999 and 2007, with infant mortality 
dropping by a third, and post-natal deaths by half, between 1998 and 2006.  
Funding comes from the Fundación Oro Negro, which PDVSA created to 
channel oil revenues into social funds (Gomez, 2007:21-23).   
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The missions’ future development is uncertain as they are not being 
institutionalised into a wider system available to all; indeed, a parallel 
replacement of the traditional health and education sectors would be difficult 
to sustain long-term (D'Elia et al., 2006:223; García & Salvato, 2006:263).  
The fiscal burden needed to maintain these programmes has seen a number 
of Barrio Adentro establishments close due to insufficient medical staffing 
and inadequate infrastructure refurbishment, reducing their operational 
capacity whilst traditional hospitals have also suffered shortages (España, 
2010:20; D'Elia et al., 2008).  D'Elia et al. (2006) criticise the policy 
reorientation of only focusing social care on the poorest, thereby reducing the 
state’s welfare responsibilities from universalism to assistentialism.  The 
IACHR (2009) similarly notes that the missions, as a social policy, appear to 
constitute public assistance policies that fail to recognise rights, administered 
"at the discretion of the State, at will".   
For these reasons, the health missions could be seen as state philanthropy, 
falling somewhere between the traditional sectors and MNOCs’ irregular CSR 
programmes.  Nevertheless, I note that, pre-Bolivarian socialism, those 
outside of the defined poverty bracket had to rely on the market as a social 
welfare mechanism, which did not guarantee their treatment.   
Higher education has arguably seen the greatest success with an 86% rise in 
school enrolment between 1999-2007 (Weisbrot et al., 2009).  Oil-funded 
free education has enabled poorer Venezuelans to study.106  Torres del 
Castillo (2009) asserts in a UNESCO report that since 2003 education has 
been widely extended for youth and adults from literacy to tertiary education.  
Venezuela was the first country to use the Cuban Yo Sí Puedo (YSP) system 
on a major scale to eradicate illiteracy through Mission Robinson; its success 
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radically change Venezuelan values (EIU, 2007).  A Bolivarian curriculum was introduced in 
2007, with a political bias in history and the social sciences (Petkoff, 2008:12).  Moreover, as 
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Republic” (Gaceta Oficial, 2010:3).  Whilst, there is a danger of stifling critical thinking 
(Hillman, 2006:115-129), history shows that prohibition often drives its object underground to 




is being emulated in Bolivia, Nicaragua, Panama and Ecuador (Steele, 
2008).   
5.3 The oil sector in post-1998 Venezuela: from Empire to local 
communities  
In terms of two of the dominant paradigms that have framed US politics over 
the past half century, the Cold War and the War on Terror, which still inform 
the collective psyche to the present day, Bolivarian Venezuela comes up on 
the wrong side against the US in both counts.  Not only are Chávez and 
Maduro socialists, but Chávez in particular openly aligned Venezuela with 
Cuba and was a personal friend of the Cold War legacy of Fidel Castro (Orsi, 
2013).  Moreover, Chávez denounced global capitalism, free trade, 
neoliberalism, inequality, and US hegemonic aggression and purchased 
billions of dollars’ worth of defence goods from Russia (Bustamante & Sweig, 
2008). Additionally, Chávez provided cheap oil to the US to help its poor, 
echoing the Cold War–era competition between the United States and the 
Soviet communist blocs. At the same time, Chávez disputed the legitimacy of 
Bush’s War on Terror, building alliances with pariah states and supporting 
Iran’s right to develop nuclear capacity (Wilbur & Zhang, 2014:559).   
As noted above, since before the Cold War, the US has intervened to 
promote its version of democracy in Latin America, and the model developed 
by Chávez can be viewed as competition, under the same name of 
democracy, as it also has global ambition.  It is unsurprising therefore that 
the US has acted to discredit Chávez and Maduro.  It is also unsurprising, 
given the past role of MNOCs in promoting a vision of democracy that was in 
line with Western hegemony, that Chávez and Maduro should view them with 
suspicion, label them as agents of Empire and create a new dialectical 
relationship of state-MNOC relations.  Indeed, businesses were linked to the 
2002 coup, although the exact role of MNOCs remains unclear, as well as 
whether any of their motivations were non-business related. 
Oil companies’ reactions to Chávez’ reforms have indeed displayed a mixture 
of submission and refusal.  This has not only been the case of MNOCs.  In 
the early days of the revolution, the national oil company PDVSA actively 
213 
 
countered Chávismo.  This led to an oil strike, the 2002 coup and the 
subsequent reshaping of the company and of its top management.  MNOCs 
(or at least Western MNOCs) have not been neutral actors either in this 
process.  Some MNOCs voiced their refusal of the new mixed enterprises 
framework vocally, by leaving the country and suing the Venezuelan state in 
protracted arbitral and legal proceedings (see below).  Other MNOCs stayed 
in the country and accepted to review the terms of their operations in 
Venezuela, whilst continuing to attempt to improve their business case.  For 
example, the Wikileaks cables revealed in 2011 showed that Statoil 
Venezuela’s president reproached Chevron and Repsol for bidding for a 
licence in Venezuela despite an alleged agreement amongst MNOCs to 
boycott the bidding round to obtain better terms from the Venezuelan 
authorities (Bakken, 2011:48).   
This type of behaviour does not necessarily derive primarily from ideological 
considerations, unlike during the Cold war period, or from a desire to spread 
the gospel of neoliberalism with its promises of economic prosperity and 
modernisation, but appears to be founded upon business concerns.  
However, these concerns manifest a wider lack of MNOC confidence in, and 
support for, the Bolivarian revolution.  In any case, MNOCs such as ENI have 
now managed to find an agreement with the government for the payment of a 
compensation for the nationalisation of their Venezuelan business (ENI, 
2014).  MNOCs that have stayed have also benefited from new exploration 
rights in the Orinico belt and have invested significant sums in these 
ventures, giving them reasons to foster better relations with the government 
now that the production phase will soon start. 
Looking at the oil sector in post-1998 Venezuela, Venezuelan oil policy has 
actively and reactively sought to diminish its dependence upon external 
agents’ actions and limit their influence within Venezuela.  This is not the first 
time that MNOCs have faced hostility or seen extreme changes in 
government style in Venezuela, although industry resistance to this wave of 
nationalisation has been greater than in 1976.   From a historical perspective, 
the new Bolivarian paradigm introduces another turn in the dialectical 
relationship of state-MNOC conflict and interdependent bargaining.   MNOCs 
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offer valuable capital, skills and sophisticated technology and the state has 
the land and the ability to set contractual terms.  Both have objectives to get 
the most for their specific shareholders.   
The Bolivarian revolution, thus, constitutes the latest attempt to reverse 
external dependencies.  As under Pérez, it constitutes a struggle to move 
towards its own Gran Venezuela.  It similarly constitutes a popular attempt to 
use the oil revenues to bring greater equality.  Where it differs from previous 
attempts, is that it increasingly rejects the hegemonic logic of neoliberalism.  
By rejecting neoliberalism, the Chávez’ administration also rejected the 
former’s developmental fairy dust or CSR framed by a market logic.   
As with the organisation of society, the state has been centralising social 
action.  Indeed, the government offers an asymmetric partnership to MNOCs 
and traditional civil society in which most projects are placed within the remit 
of its responsibility.  The lines are blurring between different types of social 
action as the state not only appropriates ideas, but also vocabulary (such as 
missions) from civil and corporate arenas.  The state's emphasis on short-
term, grassroots social projects and the terms it uses to describe these 
projects make it difficult to distinguish corporate from government social 
action.  Nevertheless, the state has taken charge.   
As shown above, since the beginning of oil exploitation, great expectations 
have surrounded this natural resource’s ability to drive forward Venezuela’s 
socio-economic development.  The Bolivarian governments’ changes to 
PDVSA and MNOCs, and Chávez’ decision to increase the private sector's 
social welfare delivery, are based upon similar expectations.  Concerning 
corporate citizenship, whereas PDVSA now funds and executes social action 
and has become a nation-building actor, by contrast, the government has 
prescribed that MNOCs act as secondary social actors.  However, both 
PDVSA and foreign MNOCs further the Bolivarian agenda by providing the oil 
generated revenue needed to fuel the government’s revolution by acting as a 
panacea for domestic social ills and supporting aid-based foreign policy 
(Parker, 2007:64).  For MNOCs, social action has become a mandatory and 
customary business expense in Venezuela.  Indeed, it is increasingly a 
215 
 
modus operandi.  I will now look both actors in turn, PDVSA and then the 
foreign MNOCs in terms of their new social roles.  
5.3.1 PDVSA 
Rangel (2003:248) argues that post-1998 Venezuela had to either continue 
acting as an oil emirate or decide to become a nation.  Effectively the 
government has done both, continuing its oil dependence whilst pursuing its 
own ideological path both domestically and overseas.   
Domestically, the slogan oil for the people characterises oil as a common 
good and government policies convey this political message (Prensa Minci, 
2009).  Oil donations to Brooklyn and London indicate that Bolivarianism is 
being exported further afield (Chávez, 2006:4).107  In a display of solidarity, 
Chávez made preferential oil deals with certain Latin American and 
Caribbean countries (Petrocaribe), contending that the region would either 
unite or collapse.  As Simón Bolivar un-colonised parts of Latin America, 
equally schemes such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) 
herald unity and reject US imperialism (Guevara & Chávez, 2005:103; 
Chávez, 2006).108   
As Párraga (2010:8) writes, until Chávez' reformed PDVSA, Venezuelans 
had forgotten the company’s strategic value and that an aggressive power 
project would need an equally ambitious plan to take control of it and reshape 
its mission.  After Chávez’ took over the reins of government, a power 
struggle commenced between PDVSA and the government.  Whilst oil is not 
the only sector in which the Venezuelan government has fought to establish 
a socialist industrial complex (Malleson, 2010), it is the most important 
revenue-wise.   
In a September 2008 Financial Operational report, PDVSA estimated that 
Venezuela had 152.561 billion barrels of oil in certified reserves (PDVSA, 
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 Malavé Mata (2006:14) argues that the use of oil to show international solidarity ignored 
internal social need. 
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 The ALBA, founded in 2004 by Venezuela and Cuba, is an international organisation that 
supports the greater social, political and economic integration of Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  It was initially proposed by the Venezuelan government as an alternative to the 
US’ neoliberal proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) (Fritz, 2007).  
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2008).  By 2011, this had grown to 297.6 billion barrels, the world’s largest 
proven crude oil reserves (OPEC, 2012:22).  With its shares, reserves, 
production, refineries and sales, PDVSA is not only an important Latin 
American company (Azzellini, 2004:103; Mares & Altamirano, 2007), but in 
2007 it was the world’s fourth largest integrated oil company (Mares & 
Altamirano, 2007).  PDVSA owns the US company Citgo, with its US 
refineries and petrol stations and has significant shares in Veba Oil and 
Minas.   
The Chávez government brought PDVSA back to the nationalist agenda, 
which had characterised the company until 1983.  Between nationalisations, 
however, PDVSA had followed an internationalising policy, culminating in 
1989 with the apertura petrolera (a policy approach which encouraged the 
participation of private capital, technology and management in the oil sector) 
and had become a respected, market-oriented international agent and a key 
symbol of capitalist success (Mommer, 2003).  PDVSA's managers claimed 
that their objective was to immunise the company against the public 
administration’s clientelistic practices given high corruption levels (Parker, 
2007:62).   
However, the contrast grew between PDVSA's ever-rising profits and the 
worsening poverty and underdevelopment amongst oil’s citizen-owners 
(Mares & Altamirano, 2007).  PDVSA’s chairmen, most of whom had 
previously worked for foreign multinationals, were criticised for seeking 
greater autonomy, taking decisions concerning the oil wealth without 
consulting the Venezuelan people (Parker, 2007:62; Mommer, 2002; 
Mommer, 2003; Lander, 2005).  Since 1992, PDVSA had also sold 
exploration sites to foreign MNOCs (Medina & López Maya, 2003:26), 
behaviour that Mommer (2002) labels subversive.  PDVSA's secrecy added 
weight to the Chávez' government's discourse of reforming an entity that had 
become a profit-driven, meritocracy based, transnational "state within a state" 
and removed itself from the people (Mommer, 2003; Malavé Mata, 2006:59).   
The 2001 Hydrocarbons Organic Law set out to reverse patterns of 
neocolonisation by foreign MNOCs and to clarify existing law.  As established 
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in CRBV articles 206 and 211, all oil production and distribution activities 
became of state concern, with the exception of joint ventures targeting extra-
heavy crude oil production.  Thereafter, private investors could only own up 
to 49% of the capital stock in joint ventures involved in upstream activities 
(Pascal & Azpurua, 2008).  No prior consultations were sought with PDVSA 
and foreign MNOCs, who complained that foreign investment would be stifled 
(Lander, 2005; López Maya, 2002).  PDVSA employees manifested their 
opposition to government plans in a national strike, which started on 9 April 
2002, with executives demanding Chávez’ resignation (Lander, 2005).   
Only two days after the strike began, a coup attempt ousted Chávez from 
office for 48 hours.109  In his thirty-six hours as interim president, the former 
Venezuelan trade organisation leader, Pedro Carmona Estanga, reinstated 
former PDVSA President Guacaipuro Lameda, derogated the hydrocarbons 
law and altered energy agreements signed with partners such as Cuba, re-
instating a neoliberal agenda (Lander, 2005).   
PDVSA's role in the coup was unclear, as was that of the US Bush 
administration (Gollinger, 2010).  A subsequent general PDVSA strike, which 
began in December 2002 and lasted several months, led to the government's 
2003 firing of 18,000 of 45,000 PDVSA staff for having deserted their posts to 
strike, in particular top and middle management, to replace only around 
7,000 workers (Mares & Altamirano, 2007; Lander, 2005).  The company's 
performance dropped accordingly, the veracity of future PDVSA financial 
statistics came into question and the repercussions were felt at a national 
economic level (Mares and Altamirano, 2007; Párraga, 2010; Lander, 
2005).110   
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 Dunning (2008:175) writes that business elites linked to FEDECAMARAS deposed 
President Chávez, fearing his redistribution policies.  Buxton (2009:161) argues that the 
coup’s effects alongside US and domestic opposition to the government gave the latter 
impetus to radicalise its measures.  
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 Whilst it is claimed that drops in oil exports and higher oil prices resulted from Chávez' 
negotiations with OPEC, it is possible that as PDVSA lost capacity and productivity dropped 
following the mass redundancies, this policy became the only way for Venezuela to save 
PDVSA's credibility and offset inefficiency (Mares & Altamirano, 2007; Pascal & Azpurua, 
2008).  Some analysts argue that human capital, production and investment did not return to 
pre-strike levels (Philip & Panizza, 2011); notably government figures on reserves and 
production are not calculated in the same way as before the strike (Pascal & Azpurua, 2008).  
218 
 
Following the strike, the government regained control of PDVSA as part of its 
plan towards full oil sovereignty (Plena Soberanía Petrolera) (PDVSA, 2005).  
However, bringing PDVSA under tighter state control is not equal to direct oil 
revenue ownership by the people despite citizen-owner rhetoric.  Nor does 
PDVSA own the oil (Cuervo, 2010:674).  The 2006 Hydrocarbon Law does 
not even mention PDVSA and gives the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum 
the power to control state oil companies, leaving the oil wealth in the 
governing elite’s hands and leaving the door open to multinational investors 
and the private ownership of upstream activities (Cuervo, 2010:674).   
Venezuela is still a classic textbook Dutch disease sufferer with tax revenues 
from natural resources having risen from just over 30% to 50% of the total tax 
revenue between 1998 and 2008 (The Economist, 2010), constituting the 
dominant source of unearned income (Margonelli, 2007:145).  This is high, 
but not as high as in 1975.   
Indeed, whilst the Chávez administration recognised the destabilising and 
anti-developmental effects of oil dependency vis-à-vis the global markets, it 
blamed the markets for Venezuelan problems.  Thus, whilst it worked to 
strengthen OPEC and to establish bilateral relations with such countries as 
China and Iran to end the downward pressure from consumer countries and 
boom and bust conditions, and to stabilise revenues, it has failed to seriously 
focus upon reducing its own oil dependency (Buxton, 2009:159-160).   
Moreover, the Chávez government relied upon extra-budgetary mechanisms, 
mainly through FONDEN and PDVSA, to fund approximately 50% of its 
social missions between 2003 and 2007 (Aponte Blank, 2010).  Oil 
overreliance could negatively affect other sectors and thus non-oil related 
GDP, a criticism levied at previous Venezuelan governments as discussed 
above.   
PDVSA has implemented government missions since 2004, which arguably 
redefines corporate citizenship, especially as the missions as measured by 
size are one of the largest social fund experiments administered in Latin 
America (Penfold, 2006:5).  PDVSA is obliged to spend directly on social 
programmes and to spend on social programmes through a mechanism 
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called the National Development Fund (FONDEN), which is separate from 
the government's budget.  According to its website, in 2007, PDVSA spent 
USD 13.897 billion on social welfare.  It spent USD 5.693 billion on social 
missions, USD 1.443 billion on special social investment plans111 and USD 
6.761 billion on FONDEN112 (PDVSA, 2010)113.  Minister Ramírez stated that 
between 2001 and 2010, PDVSA spent over USD 83.834 billion on the social 
sector (Ramírez in MINCI, 2011).  
The president has direct decision-making power over part of PDVSA's 
revenues that go to a Social Fund, the Fondo Social Unico, created in 1999 
to receive 40% of funds allocated to the Investment Fund for Economic 
Stability, Fondo de Inversión para la Establización Económica, without 
legislative oversight (Cuervo, 2010:679).  The implications of such non-
transparent funds in terms of corruption are discussed below.   
Moreover, given PDVSA’s underinvestment in its oil operations to meet its 
political obligations and rising domestic consumption at subsidised prices 
(Philip, 2010:7), the sustainability of this arrangement is questionable.  
However, the sheer volume of money PDVSA spends on social welfare 
alongside its role in directly overseeing certain welfare projects make PDVSA 
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 Housing and environment fund to finance agricultural projects. 
112
 FONDEN was created to execute infrastructure works on the infant cardiological hospital 
Dr.Gilberto Rodríguez Ochoa, lines 3 and 4 on the Caraca Metro, Metros of Los Teques, 
Maracaibo and Valencia, trolley-buses in Mérida, railway in Caracas–Tuy Medio and 
electricity projects across the country. 
113 Figures are at the official exchange rate and are significantly higher than the Black 
market rate, which is more representative of the real exchange rate.  Nevertheless, the 
figures indicate that PDVSA is no longer an oil company per se, but rather has increasingly 
taken on a social policy role.  However, the fact that in 2010 the official statistics on PDVSA 
pertained to 2007 would suggest that as El Universal claims PDVSA’s spending on the 
missions decreased by 82% from 2007 to 2009, so that PDVSA designated USD 5.3 billion 
to the missions, USD 1.9 billion in 2008 and USD 942 million in 2009, when oil prices fell, 
although these figures do not contain the amount spent on other social projects (El 
Universal, 2010).    
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5.3.2 MNOCs and CSR: a new partnership with the state 
This subsection illustrates the difficulties of defining the nature and scope of 
CSR in Venezuela.  The most significant legislative changes in this regard 
were enacted in 2006.  A reform of income tax law in 2006 meant that 
companies formed under association agreements no longer had a maximum 
applicable tax rate of 34%, but rather 50%.  Moreover, the 2006 enactment of 
the Law for Regularisation of Private Participation in Primary Activities, under 
the Hydrocarbons Organic Law, meant the termination of private companies’ 
existing operating agreements.  New contracts granting rights to private 
parties in the exploration, production, storage and initial transportation of 
liquid hydrocarbons or a derivative product were also prohibited.   
This did not create a state monopoly of oil activities, but rather paved the way 
for mixed companies (Pascal & Azpurua, 2008:1).  It brought all oil fields 
under PDVSA majority control and all MNOCs were asked either to sign acts 
to participate in a jointly owned enterprise with PDVSA or to leave the 
country.  As of January 2007, PDVSA took control of 32 oil fields, 30 of which 
were in partnership with a private entity114.  On 1 May 2007, all crude oil 
deposits in the Orinoco basin were nationalised and oil companies had to 
accept a 60:40 profit split, with PDVSA as the principle shareholder (Azzellini, 
2004:105).  In many ways, this can be seen as a natural evolution from the 
nationalisation of the oil industry in 1976, even if it is a break from the 
neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s.  
For foreign MNOCs and investors, the legal instability surrounding oil 
operations in Venezuela has provoked different reactions.  In 2006, most 
foreign MNOCs decided to accept a subordinated role and less attractive 
commercial terms, delaying further investment (Pascal & Azpurua, 2008), 
whilst others contested the decision and withdrew from the country, rather 
than accepting the new, unilaterally imposed terms.  According to Cuervo 
(2010:641), "Venezuelan legislation is a model of what to avoid when 
structuring comprehensive and transparent oil and gas law.  Instead of 
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 A list of the mixed companies can be seen at: http://www.avhi.org/ 
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establishing clear guidelines that may be followed objectively, the system is 
full of ambiguous loopholes and contradictions".   
The withdrawal of two major oil giants, Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips, 
emphasises MNOCs precarious position in Venezuela.  Unlike in 1976, a 
friendly settlement was not found.  ConocoPhillips left its Orinoco projects 
and Exxon Mobil abandoned Venezuela completely following the reduction of 
its stakes in the Orinoco projects.  In 2007, ExxonMobil and Conoco Phillips 
both filed arbitration claims with the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Dispute against the Venezuelan government for having seized 
their facilities (ICSID, 2007a; ICSID, 2007b).  ExxonMobil claimed that 
injunctions were necessary to ensure PDVSA's payment if it prevailed in 
arbitration.  A US federal court froze USD 300 million of PDVSA’s assets, 
and subsequent court orders in London, the Netherlands and the Dutch 
Antilles froze an additional USD 12 billion in assets.  Energy and Petroleum 
minister, Rafael Ramírez, claimed that ExxonMobil was exercising judicial 
terrorism and Chávez threatened to stop US oil supplies.  Later Ramírez 
called for Exxon to return to the framework of international arbitration and a 
British judge reversed the injunction, ordering ExxonMobil to pay court costs 
(Pascal & Azpurua, 2008).  
Foreign MNOCs have lost oil field shares, but are expected to fund more 
social sector initiatives.  Under the recent government-MNOC agreements, 
social spending unrelated to core activities is compulsory.  Under the Mixed 
Company Contract Model approved by the National Assembly, mixed 
companies are requested to pay 3.33% of revenue gained in a mixed 
company with PDVSA to benefit community stakeholders (Gaceta Nacional, 
2009).  Originally 2.22% was directly allocated to municipal councils to 
replace payments previously received under the operating agreements and 
1.11% went to finance endogenous development projects pursuant to the 
National Development Plan.   
In 2009, however, in line with policies decreasing the municipal councils’ 
power, this 3.33% was redistributed between the municipal councils and a 
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new Special People's Fund (FOPO)115 (Gaceta Oficial, 2009).  This 
contribution is paid in addition to other standard taxes.  Moreover, a social 
investment tax obliges mixed companies to pay 1% of their earnings in social 
taxes and 2% of their gross annual income for science, technology and 
innovation (for a more detailed breakdown of taxes paid by mixed 
companies, see chapter 7, section 7.2.2.3).   
According to AVHI, the main MNOCs currently operating in Venezuela in 
partnership with PDVSA include Chevron, CNPC, Eni, Perenco Venezuela 
SA, Petrobras, Repsol YPF Venezuela SA, Rosneft, Shell Venezuela SA, 
Statoil Venezuela SA and Lukoil, a heterogeneous group in terms of origin, 
corporate structures, core values and philosophies.  Annex 1 contains 
financial and business information from the annual reports of MNOCs active 
in Venezuela.  For most of these companies, it appears that their Venezuelan 
production is relatively limited, generally no more than than 5% of their global 
oil and gas production.  Nevertheless, production is expected to increase 
over the coming years, when the projects under development in the Orinoco 
belt will have reached full production.   
As in Colombia, the annex also shows the differing levels of detail that 
MNOCs are willing to disclose relating to their Venezuelan operations and, 
incidently, their transparency in terms of disclosing country-specific 
information.  It indicates that some further levelling-up is necessary to 
improve comparisons between companies.  Indeed, the information disclosed 
in companies’ annual reports is not only relevant to analysts or shareholders, 
but it is also a relevant source of information for stakeholders, such as the 
growing middle-class in Latin America, which are concerned about MNOCs’ 
(and other extractive industries’) activities in their country and in neighbouring 
countries (BSR, 2013). 
A formerly US dominated industry also now reflects the end of the cold war, 
including Chinese and Russian MNOCs (i.e. CNPC, Rosneft and Lukoil) with 
their own business methods.116  As government antagonism towards the US 
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 Fondo Especial para el Poder Popular 
116
 Transparency International (2008:15) characterised both companies as having "low" 
revenue transparency, as does ExxonMobil when operating abroad.  
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has grown, this inclusion of new partners is in line with government policy.  It 
is noteworthy that the government has chosen to welcome companies that do 
not have a tradition of CSR and have low levels of revenue transparency (TI, 
2008:15).  Whilst tradition is being substituted by government diktat and 
revenues prescribed, I argue that, nevertheless, CSR-focused, project-based 
revenue transparency could help citizens better understand when corruption 
occurs.  
As noted above, Western-based MNOCs with allegiances to the market and 
their home countries are synonymous with capitalism and the ancien regime 
and, a minori, government enemies.  Paradoxically, despite the tumultuous 
Bolivarian discourse, MNOCs can only operate in Venezuela at the 
government’s behest.  Indeed, this same government expects companies to 
direct more resources to benefit their stakeholders, implying a greater 
domestic dependence on these resources and MNOCs.  I would argue, from 
this perspective, that MNOCs are a tolerated thorn in the flesh of the 
Bolivarian revolution. 
It is beyond this thesis’ scope to delve deeply into the consistency of Chávez' 
discourse on Empire or the viability of his proposals and policies.  As Price 
(2007) notes, ideological complexes are often characterised by performance 
contradictions.  Inconsistent policies exist in many different countries, 
however, in Venezuela, the Faustian pact with Empire is especially 
pronounced given the government's anti-liberal, anti-US, anti-capitalist 
rhetoric on the one hand and the reliance on US trade and integration in the 
global capitalist system on the other hand (Shifter & Jawahar, 2005:176).   
Politically, Venezuelan oil wealth enables a relative independence from US 
political pressures in comparison with its neighbours (Buxton, 2009:164).  
The Chávez government opposed the US promoted Free Trade Area of the 
Americas and befriended countries hostile to the US.  Equally, the US has 
claimed that Venezuela has terrorist links with the FARC, Hezbollah and 
Hamas and applied an arms embargo against Venezuela in 2005 (Cuervo, 
2010:682; Buxton, 2009:163).   
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Ironically, however, despite the anti-US rhetoric, in 2007 PDVSA was even 
more dependent upon the North American market than it was at the time of 
the 2003 strike (Mares & Altamirano, 2007:22).  Indeed, despite aiming to 
diversify exports, in 2011, 40% of exported Venezuelan crude oil went to the 
US, compared to 10% for China.  Moreover, 30.3% of its crude oil is refined 
in the US compared with 45.7% in Venezuela (EIA, 2013).  Such 
discrepancies and profound contradictions could be the undoing of lasting 
transformation.  
MNOCs' respective websites and brochures show their involvement in 
different social projects in one or more of the following areas: health, 
education, the environment, local economic development, infrastructure, 
culture and human rights.117  As such, corporate social interests have 
overlapped with the government’s mandate.  Whereas, in the 1990s, many 
social competencies were transferred to the regional level and MNOCs often 
ran their social projects with the regional authorities and civil society (D'Elia 
et al., 2006:206), the regional authorities are changing and MNOCs are 
predominantly expected to indirectly fund, rather than conduct, social projects 
through government established funds.  MNOCs’ taking the initiative to 
independently resolve local communities' problems is beyond the scope of 
what is expected by the government.   
As foreign companies tread a precarious line in Venezuela, it becomes 
important that they explicitly take what remains of their social responsibilities 
seriously.  Indeed, the government still allows MNOCs to claim part of the 
credit for social projects by increasing social taxes as opposed to royalties.  
This enables MNOCs to retain some community links and thereby to be seen 
to acknowledge the citizen-owners of the oil they drill.  In chapter 7, I will 
argue that this is a key feature of the Venezuelan model of CSR. 
Given the personalistic style of Chávez’ governance (Ellner, 2008:109), he 
assumed responsibility for most social programmes, even those which 
originated as company CSR or NGO-led programmes (Ramos, 2008:64).  
For example, the Chávez government took credit for the Petrohomes project, 
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 This is examined in greater detail in chapter 7.  
225 
 
which has constructed affordable housing using materials recovered from the 
refining process, although oil companies had conducted the project for years 
before the government came on board (Ramos, 2008:65).  This supports 
claims that the government is as concerned with short-term popularity-
boosting programmes as it is with long-term growth.   
The targeting of the poorest barrios also appeared both clientelistic and 
proselytic, establishing asymmetric relations, which have paternalistic 
dependency implications.  Indeed, anti-poverty measures become less 
effective as people fall into a cycle of clientelistic assistentialism, living from 
handouts (Virtuoso, 2006:307; Malavé Mata, 2006:14-22).  Ramirez Ribes 
(2003) claims that many Venezuelans do not associate work and wealth, 
believing wealth results from luck or state ties.  Coronil (1997:4) and 
prominent government critic Petkoff (2007:22) note that Venezuela’s vast oil 
wealth, which is concentrated in the state, allows the state to appear to have 
magical or religious powers, to accomplish great feats at no cost to the 
popular sectors, creating a paternalistic approach to their development.  
Margonelli (2007) states that: "People have been talking about the 
government as a cow since the 1920s.  The idea is that it’s a cow that 
provides milk to anyone in a place to catch it.  That’s the basis for 
corruption".   
Interestingly, in a 2003 ethical report on Venezuela, Statoil stated that "the 
task of protecting Venezuela’s fragile grip on democratic stability has fallen to 
all sectors of society in recent times – including the corporate world."  This 
implies a wider remit of responsibility than that outlined by cooperating on 
projects such as the missions.  It implies a long-perspective concern with the 
type of governance in Venezuela.  Such a statement can be read two ways.  
On the one hand, it could be argued that Statoil feels a responsibility to 
promote the instruments of democracy of which revenue transparency is an 
important factor and to denounce and oppose the use of power2.  On the 
other hand, its appearance in a corporate report following the coup attempt 
against former President Chávez could indicate that they do not support the 
Bolivarian revolution.   
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As will be further shown in chapter 7, I argue that MNOCs’ state support is 
convenient for both MNOCs and the state.  Indeed, companies are seen to 
be promoting power1118 and an emancipation of the people through their 
involvement with the exercise of direct democracy such as the missions, 
councils and cooperatives.  From a communications perspective, companies 
do not need to state that their royalties have increased by an extra 3.33%, for 
example, but rather that their CSR has increased by this amount.  From the 
state’s perspective, the government is holding MNOCs socially accountable 
and is sowing the oil wealth directly back to the people.   
Moreover, MNOCs exert some control over the programmes that they fund 
and by directly financing state welfare, they implicitly support the state.  
Whilst this is not new as companies have funded different types of 
Venezuelan government through their royalty payments and acts of (at times 
politically determined) philanthropy, they have embarked upon a more 
integrated approach to CSR in the context of a state/society/industry 
partnership.  In this environment of transitivity and centralisation, in which the 
associative sphere is evolving and social partners are changing, MNOCs 
may increasingly struggle to differentiate their social action from that of other 
actors, who are involved in determining and executing their projects.  Thus, 
should the state become less democratic (and it is an imperfect democracy at 
present), it appears unlikely that MNOCs would intervene, whatever their 
rhetoric, unless their interests are directly affected.  
5.3.3 Corruption and clientelism 
Despite the fact that Chávez came to power on a radical anti-corruption 
platform, corruption is rife in Venezuela and it is funded by oil revenues 
(Ortiz, 2006:87).  In 2009, Venezuela ranked 162nd of 180 countries in 
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, a trend which has 
not improved since 1999.  Indeed, the Chávez administration failed to shrink 
the clientelistic sector of previous administrations as new actors have fought 
for the old elite’s privileges (Agulló, 2006:322-3).  Borgia (2006) argues that 
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 Bhaskar (1993) uses this distinction of power1 and power2 as a way to view complex 
power relations (see footnote 54 on page 145). 
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social funds were increasingly politicised and linked not only to poverty, but 
also to governors’ loyalty.  Corrales and Penfold (2007) go further to suggest 
that former President Chávez used clientelism and offers to engage in 
corruption with impunity, thereby gaining political support.   
This comment is well grounded in the Venezuelan reality.  Transparency 
International's 2008 comparison of oil companies on their home territories 
scored the reformed PDVSA as low in terms of revenue transparency (TI, 
2008:15).  Corrales and Penfold (2007) assert that the special non-
transparent funds created by the Venezuelan government to spend on social 
programmes, free of legislative oversight, were believed to hold over USD15 
billion after the last significant oil windfall.  Indeed, FONDEN, created in 
2005, receives USD100 million deposits from PDVSA each week and drew 
USD10.2 billion from the Central Bank's reserves for discretionary 
presidential spending.  The Ministry of Finance's executive branch controls 
the fund and yet it provides little comprehensive information on how this 
money has been used (Corrales & Penfold, 2007:106).  
Amongst government supporters, there is serious concern that the state 
lacks the capacity to effectively oversee oil revenues (Penfold, 2006:23) 
given the public administration’s inefficiency (PROVEA, 2008).  Ellner 
(2009:4) notes that the government has not established mechanisms to 
penalise communal council and cooperative members that negligently handle 
funds.  In a clientelistic context, increased transparency is necessary in 
government interaction with those involved in natural resource extraction, 
regarding the contracts signed, the revenue received by the government, 
natural resource production quotas and the uses to which funds are put 
(Stiglitz, 2005).  It remains to be seen how President Maduro will deal with 
this problem.   
Chapter Conclusion: the nature and scope of CSR in Venezuela  
This chapter has contextualised the social action of the oil industry by 
providing a background to MNOCs’ operation in Venezuela, the decline of 
Puntofijismo, the rise of Bolivarian 21st century socialism and the challenges 
that MNOCs face in defining the scope of their CSR programmes in the new 
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context.  It has argued that former president Chávez increasingly sought to 
implement profound, emancipatory, cross-sectoral changes to include 
previously excluded agents in a way that previous governments failed to do, 
whilst noting that the dismantling of the privileges and aspirations of the 
former elite to enable the emergence of the popular class is a complicated 
and arduous task.   
It has illustrated the ways in which structures and generative mechanisms 
remain, or have emerged, that threaten the foundations of direct democracy 
and prevent true participatory and protagonistic democracy.  These include 
the centralisation of power in the executive and a weakening of other 
institutions, the implementation of certain aspects of democracy to the 
detriment of others, the politicisation and polarisation of social groups, 
continuing corruption and clientelism, bureaucracy and oil dependency.  
Looking at whether 21st century socialism is a complete break from the past, 
this chapter has shown historical continuity in several key ways, including: i) 
the attempts to reinforce governmental control over the oil industry (e.g. the 
nationalisation of 1976 and the creation of mixed companies in 2006); ii) the 
increase of the government’s share of the oil revenues at MNOCs’ expense; 
and iii) the reinforcement over time of the Dutch disease and oil dependence.  
However, certain discontinuities are also noticeable, including: i) an ambition 
to promote a new democratic model and international relations that are not 
that supported by Washington; ii) an explicit anti-US governmental position, 
at least in speeches; iii) the new role played by PDVSA in 21st century 
socialism, whereby the company has become an extension of the president; 
and iv) the institutionalisation of CSR, through the payment of mandatory 
social contributions by the oil sector.  As I will argue in chapter 7, the latter is 
a feature of a new CSR model, which I define as RCSR.  The election of 
Hugo Chávez was seen as many as the dawn of a new era.  However, the 
causal mechanisms were already in place for the ensuing changes and, as 
such, it would be reductionist to assert that there has been a complete break 
with the past.         
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Looking at MNOCs more particularly, since their arrival in Venezuela, and 
with the exception of the Apertura, the state has increasingly pressurised oil 
companies to provide more wealth.  The fact that oil multinationals have not 
always acted in the interests of their workers and the surrounding 
communities, despite their philanthropic actions, or that this oil wealth did not 
directly impact upon the lives of Venezuelan citizens, is not unique to 
Venezuela.  The desire that it fuelled for redistributive justice amongst the 
Venezuelan people has been very present in the rhetoric and social welfare 
approach of the current government.  The new relationship between MNOCs 
and the Bolivarian government not only attempts to maximise upon the 
revenues that companies can bring, but also heightens MNOCs’ need to be 
socially aware and affects their choice of potential partners.  This provides 
the government with popularity, which sustaining a welfare system would 
arguably not, but moreover, it has enabled the government to provide welfare 
to some of the country's poorest, previously excluded, citizens. 
The Chávez administration's large-scale mirroring of a philanthropic style of 
welfare (as had previously been undertaken by groups such as companies, 
NGOs and church groups), through programmes such as the missions, which 
involve various actors, make it harder to define CSR so that it arguably 
requires a new definition.  In chapter 7, I will argue that is still CSR, but within 
the realm of a new RCSR model in which there is less space for private 
initiative as centralisation circumvents traditional welfare actors.  MNOCs, 
which are rhetorically enemies of the state, are important state partners in the 
promotion of the states’ social objectives as they provide the government 
with funding for its new agenda.    
Before looking specifically in chapter 7 at how CSR is dialectically influenced 
by socio-political relations within Colombia and Venezuela, in chapter 6, I 
provide an analysis of MNOC’s CSR reports that looks at how MNOCs 
portray their CSR and how their CSR is dialectically influenced by socio-




Chapter 6  
How do MNOCs portray their CSR? An analysis of 18 CSR reports 
This chapter contains an analysis that I conducted based upon my survey of 
18 MNOC CSR reports.  These reports were selected as they were the most 
recent reports available in August 2011, when I began this analysis.119  I 
analyse these reports by applying elements of dialectical-relational critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2010a; 2010b).  Using information 
from the selected reports, I examine: i) how MNOCs portray themselves and 
their CSR; ii) the appropriation of global discourse in the reports and how 
discursive and non-discursive factors shape MNOCs’ agency; and iii) how 
MNOCs define their stakeholders and their stakeholder relations. 
Throughout this chapter, I argue that corporate CSR is influenced by global 
discourses.  Accordingly, I begin this chapter by describing the selected 
reports, their strategic design and messages, their implicitly assumed TINA 
formations and their inclusion of global discourse-generated norms.  
Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001:4) illustrate that neoliberal discourse has a 
“performative power” or an ability to “bring into being the very realities it 
describes”.   
In the context of MNOCs’ CSR, as praxis alters CSR’s meaning, appropriated 
global discourses concomitantly appear in MNOCs’ reporting and are shown 
to engender praxis-related institutional and material changes, even if such 
dialectical processes are unsystematic and complex.  Whilst MNOCs' 
community-based CSR is ultimately self-determined or a matter of soft-law, 
their intentionality is also informed by non-discursive internally and externally 
generated causal mechanisms, which can affect the content, the 
(non)identification of stakeholders and the operational diffusion of social 
programmes.  I show that corporate communications are often vague 
regarding internal decision-making on CSR and illustrate the importance of 
functionalism and evolutionary process in shaping CSR.  I also show that 
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 The reports are: BG Group (2011), BP (2011), Chevron (2011), CNOOC (2010), 
ConocoPhillips (2009), ENI (2011), Exxon Mobil (2011), Hess (2010), Lukoil (2011), Nexen 
(2010), Oxy (2011), Petrobras (2011), PetroChina (2011),  Petronas (2011), Repsol (2011), 
Shell (2011), Statoil (2011) and Total (2011).  
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local stakeholders’ needs and expectations impact different MNOCs' CSR in 
different ways. 
6.1 CSR reports: an overview  
Since Shell published the industry’s first socially-focused report in 1998, most 
major MNOCs have followed suit (Utting & Ives, 2006:18).  Whilst no set 
criteria exist of what constitutes a CSR report and titles vary, the reports 
examined here are mainly comprised of: i) a letter from the CEO to 
demonstrate top-level commitment to sustainable development;120 ii) 
mission/value statements; iii) statistics; iv) photographs, tables and graphs on 
meeting objectives; v) reporting/auditing information; and vi) 
stakeholder/external input.  Content-wise, they mostly cover: i) business data 
(i.e. business information and strategy, ethics, international reporting 
standards, certification, transparency, achievements and supplier and 
stakeholder relations); ii) the environment (i.e. global energy needs, climate 
change and sustainable practices); iii) employees’ wellbeing (i.e. health and 
safety, training, benefits, workforce diversity and equal opportunities); and iv) 
stakeholder relations (i.e. community investment, partnerships, human rights’ 
awareness, employee volunteering and mechanisms of community dialogue 
such as advisory panels).   
People read CSR reports for various reasons (FSC et al., 2010).  Readers 
include potential investors, current or prospective employees, academics 
trying to extract performance data, social/environmental activists, journalists, 
public officials and corporate managers looking to benchmark their own 
performance against their peers (Lydenberg et al., 2010).   
Reports vary in their content, depth and claims, but also in the effort placed in 
presenting readers with company information, with varying degrees of 
professional-polish and reader-friendliness.  Reports are expected to be 
factual.  However, as noted above, CSR is closely related to image, PR and 
company profitability; thus, these reports are also a form of advertising and 
tools of persuasion.  Therefore, value-laden facts are strategically selected 
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 Notably, Repsol (2011) uses an interview format and Statoil (2011) a video speech. 
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and displayed as impressive figures, statistics or statements, which are 
positioned throughout the report in text boxes, bold and/or larger-sized font, 
emphasising corporate values and conveying messages.  Equally, 
photographs of landscapes, scientists, employees or smiling citizens helped 
by CSR (of various ages, ethnicities and gender) add eye-catching colour to 
the report and reduce the gap between the stereotypically cold corporate 
culture and the reader, who identifies and draws meaning from such images.  
Indeed, stylistically, CSR-specific photographs often resemble those of 
development agency advertisements, implying the same social legitimacy.   
This storytelling is also conveyed by rhetorical devices in the text, for 
example, Chevron’s (2011:18,22) metaphorical subheadings, “sea of 
opportunity” and “oceans of promise”, or Statoil’s (2011) more business-
sounding “no silver bullet solution to the energy and climate dilemma”.  It is 
also conveyed in the use of engaging and innovative formats.  Whereas the 
BG group (2011) report notably stands out for its lack of visual storytelling 
with only two oil/corporate-themed photographs throughout its 41 pages, 
Total produced a report that resembles a newspaper magazine supplement.  
Whilst the content is standard for an oil report, Total organises it under the 
title: "In other words: Ten Questions You Asked Us" (Total, 2011:1), which 
directly addresses the reader.  Experts, who it is implied represent the 
readers’ interests, pose questions to Total on his/her behalf.   
Statoil’s (2011) report is equally innovative.  Instead of producing a 
downloadable sustainability report, Statoil created a user-friendly, online 
interactive CSR report with multi-modal text.  In an industry that places 
limited CSR information on websites, this is a notable exception to the trend.  
The use of compartmentalised videos ofexpert speakers to animate the text 
is especially novel and persuasive as speakers use facial expressions, body 
language and vocal tone to convey passion, interest and authority that builds 





6.1.1 The appropriation of global social trends and discourses in CSR 
policies 
This sub-section shows how global social trends and discourses influence 
the scope of MNOCs' CSR in terms of agenda-setting and promoting certain 
narratives, norms and standards.  Looking at CEO’s121 letters to stakeholders 
in 18 of the reports,122 these imply CSR commitment at the top of each 
company.  The main discourses are: i) business strategy; ii) ethical/moral 
leadership; and iii) (re)conceptualising/improving quality or quantity of 
sustainable practice.  A transversal theme was each company’s ability to 
meet future challenges.  In each letter, the knowledge/truth claims made are 
strengthened by the authoritative position of the (official) author (the CEO), 
whose photograph is displayed next to the written text, or in the case of 
Statoil, who delivers a video speech, adding greater authority to the 
knowledge conveyed.   
The financial crisis was evoked to explain underperformance (Petronas, 
2011) and to underscore progress to potential investors (Nexen, 2010, 
PetroChina, 2011).  I noticed that whilst referencing specific global 
challenges, CEO’s did not acknowledge the inequalities created by the 
business system, nor did they argue for fundamental systemic changes to the 
business system.  Most of the letters used descriptive statements to give 
credibility to contingent prescriptive claims.  For example, Statoil’s CEO 
evoked the EU’s emission reduction targets and then argued that the answer 
was the greater use of natural gas (Statoil, 2011).   
As such, in a Foucauldian sense, political discourses, as appropriated in 
company reports, serve to legitimise particular interests, placing these 
beyond question in a TINA formation and normalising what is actually 
contingent (Foucault, 1977; Fairclough, undated).  Indeed, the most common 
premise across the letters was that modernity needs energy consumption to 
increase, that MNOCs were not contingent, but necessary to the process of 
meeting growing energy demands sustainably and that they could help 
                                                          
121
 The CEOs are (mostly white) men. 
122
 ENI (2011) did not place a CEO letter in its report.  
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redress potential social and environmental imbalances.  Such discourses of 
“this is the way the world is, so this is what we must do” (Fairclough, 
undated:13) often indicate Bhaskarian TINA formations.  For example, 
Repsol’s (2011:5-7) CEO contextualises the problems of energy providers, 
the energy model and expectations upon modern companies in light of the 
gigatrend challenges to the current political economy, explicitly identifying 
these as causal of Repsol’s changing praxis.  This descriptive 
contextualisation enables TINA to strategically emerge in the prescriptive, 
therefore, “energy companies need to […]” followed by a four point plan.  
Interestingly, this is embedded in another TINA formation of a foretold future, 
where energy inevitably remains a core commodity and a cause of ever 
greater competition.   
Another trend in the CEO letters and the reports was to show a human facet, 
vulnerability and/or admitting selected mistakes, for which companies will not 
be held liable, thereby fostering credibility and empathy.  The Petronas 
(2011:11-12) and BG Group’s (2011:2) CEO letters mention worker deaths; 
these are mentioned further down in other reports (Repsol, 2011:24; 
PetroChina, 2011:33).  Other companies outline major challenges in their 
operational environment (i.e. Total, 2011).  The CNOOC (2010:5) CEO 
explicitly counters the perceived weakness of being a Chinese company: 
 “As an energy company headquartered in China, we have frequently faced 
skepticism from external parties during our overseas development. However, 
we know well how we should behave as a foreign company when we go 
abroad.”  
Given the widely-mediatised repercussions of BP’s Deepwater blowout, 
seven reports mention it, reminding readers that oil extraction is risky and 
that this is an isolated “incident”.  BP itself focused predominantly upon 
Deepwater to rebuild credibility: “after the Deepwater Horizon accident in 
2010, our communications strategy was to be as transparent as possible and 
keep the information flow constant” (BP, 2011:20).  Nexen (2010:3), Chevron 
(2011:3) and Exxon (2011:3) respectively describe it as the Deepwater 
Horizon/BP Macondo/isolated “incident”.  I would argue that catastrophe or 
accident better describe it, as the term incident implies minor.   
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BG Group’s CEO (2011), attempting to ensure that all companies are not 
tainted by Deepwater, states that: “our industry had an excellent record 
globally in safety performance and environmental protection.”  Shell’s CEO 
(2011) also emphasises accidents’ inevitability: “The incident became an 
environmental disaster that affected communities, but it began as a tragic 
accident”; whilst each of the reports highlighted their own risk management to 
prevent them.  For example, Chevron’s (2011:3) CEO notes, “We leave 
nothing to chance because we have a deep, personal stake in operating 
safely”.   
Ethical judgement of BP is limited however, as is moralising peer 
comparison.  An interesting variation by Total’s (2011:1) CEO appears to use 
Deepwater to show that nuclear energy is as safe/dangerous as oil by 
discussing the “two major industrial accidents related to energy production, 
the Deepwater Horizon explosion […] and the Fukushima nuclear power 
plant accident.”  The language choice (“explosion” and “accident”) is 
revealing given that both events could be described as accidents, if not, in 
journalistic terms, as disasters or tragedies.    
MNOCs are keen to show that they have operationalised specific 
international environmental and development-based discourses into 
corporate policies.  Of the 18 company reports reviewed, the majority of 
MNOCs mentioned having anti-corruption training in place and actively 
working to improve their record vis-à-vis transparency, climate change and 
human rights.  The issue of human rights appears in each report (by western 
and non-western MNOCs) and is discussed in varying depth, although not 
always linked to core business and more often linked to the field of 
international development.  International support for indigenous peoples’ 
human rights was also reflected in the reporting, despite their small numbers 
(BP, 2011; ConocoPhillips, 2009; PetroChina, 2011; Petronas, 2011; Repsol, 
2011; Total, 2011; Lukoil, 2011:118).   
MNOCs emphasised that such discourses presented new ways of interacting 
with each other, international institutions, civil society or the environment (i.e. 
new committees or events), engendering new ways of being/acting (i.e. new 
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corporate codes of conduct, areas of reporting, policies and programmes) 
and materialisation (i.e. technologies or even buildings).  The appropriation of 
external discourses on ‘sustainability’ and its incorporation into business 
strategy is most visible and seen in each of the 18 reports.  Lukoil (2011:97) 
is the only company to describe part of its CSR as charity.  As Chevron’s 
(2011:34) report shows this is a paradigmatic faux-pas:  “Microfinance is not 
charity.  It’s about building capability and empowerment, and it places the 
responsibility for success on the participants.”  Developmental buzzwords 
can boost MNOCs’ credibility as social actors, although as Brown (2010:81-
86) argues, companies use these words in a different way to civil society.  
For example, following a paragraph emphasising the importance of meeting 
stakeholders’ expectations vis-à-vis corporate citizenship and long-term 
sustainability of operations, Conoco Phillip’s (2009) CEO and COO assert:  
“To be truly sustainable, ConocoPhillips must return value to shareholders 
and supply the energy required to drive global economic engines, while at the 
same time providing responsible stewardship of natural resources and 
contributing to social and economic development”.  
As such, the depth of corporate change is questionable.  Welford (1997:x) 
claims that companies’ linguistic appropriation is in effect a hijack of civil 
society discourse.  Egels-Zandén and Kallifatides (2009:264) argue that 
businesses are paying lip service to CSR, whilst the espoused principles may 
be decoupled from actual practice.  As Dobers and Springett (2010:66) posit, 
it is easy to be distracted by laudable CSR discourses and narratives 
surrounding "political corporate social responsibility" that appear ambitious, 
but essentially advocate paramorphic changes at both corporate and global 
levels.  Others label this phenomena greenwashing (Schwarz & Tilling, 
2009:289; Doane, 2005:216).  Certainly using the right language is important 
for any interest group.  However, as such language is often linked to 
legislation, agenda-setting and norm-establishment, some companies appear 
to have taken it very seriously in determining the scope of their CSR.  Nexen 
(2010:23), for example, use their report to communicate that they have taken 
CSR-related predictive financial risks:  
"Nexen has taken early voluntary action to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.  However, we have not been rewarded for getting ahead of 
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regulation.  In fact, we face the risk of stranding capital in investments that 
may not fit within future regulatory frameworks and carbon pricing regimes. 
We do our part, but we need to understand the rules under which we'll be 
operating".  
From a selfish shareholder perspective, this raises the question as to why 
Nexen’s management tried to anticipate unknown regulation in this area.   
Sixteen MNOCs' reports referred to the GRI, but only seven ranked 
themselves using the GRI framework; others used selected elements of the 
GRI in conjunction with other standards.  Ten MNOCs used the IPIECA/API 
reporting guidelines alone or in conjunction with another standard.  Fourteen 
MNOCs indicated their Global Compact membership, displaying its logo 
prominently and ten MNOCs mentioned the EITI, actively supporting this 
initiative financially or promoting it in non-affiliated countries.  Most 
companies referred to the ISO 14001 standard, whilst only Petrobras (2011) 
and Repsol (2011) mentioned the social responsibility related ISO 26000 
standard.  Other standards cited include the G8 Transparency Initiative, the 
UN protect, respect, remedy framework, the ILO Declaration of Human 
Rights, the FCPA, the UK Bribery Act, OHSAS, the AA1000, stock exchange 
indexes and certain country specific standards.  As some companies rate 
themselves by mixing the GRI and IPIECA, it is difficult for readers to 
ascertain what MNOCs’ involvement with these reporting standards 
practically means.   
Of itself, reporting does not change practice.  Thus, it is difficult to understand 
where reporting has encouraged a levelling-up of corporate responsibility 
amongst the more progressive MNOCs.  Regarding the third party verification 
of their ratings, this was a Western-based trend.  The following MNOCs 
include auditors’ letters confirming their reliability: BP (2011), Chevron 
(2011), ExxonMobil (2011), Total (2011), BG Group (2011), Petrobras 
(2011), Hess (2010), Nexen (2010), ENI (2011), Repsol (2011) and Conoco 
Phillips (2009).  Lukoil (2011:163) includes a letter of public verification by 
The Non-Financial Reporting Council of the Russian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs.  Oxy (2011) uses the GRI and API/IPIECA indexes, but 
the lack of an external auditors’ letter may cast doubts about its reliability 
given that this appears to be becoming the new norm.  However, it could be 
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interesting for future studies to analyse the addition of reporting categories 
and companies’ performance from one year to another to understand the 
impact of this trend on corporate praxis.   
6.2 MNOCs’ descriptions of their CSR decision-making  
Corporate culture and behaviour are influenced by such factors as their 
origins, relationship between subsidiaries and headquarters, individual 
employees, interaction with external actors, material considerations and 
longitudinality; these factors can intrasubjectively dispose companies to 
favour particular standards or certain CSR approaches (Teegan et al, 
2004:476; Doane, 2005:217; Kourula, 2009:396-7).   
Regarding internal decision-making, corporate governance and accountability 
structures, especially vis-à-vis finance, are increasingly important.  The trend 
is to limit individuals’ decision-making powers in company matters, based 
upon the development of principles outlined in the 1992 Cadbury Report 
(Martin Curran, 2005).  Several companies, including ENI (2010), Exxon 
(2011), Hess (2010), Nexen (2011), Oxy (2011), Petrobras (2011), Repsol 
(2011) and Statoil (2011), thus, outline their corporate governance structures 
in their sustainability reports with varying amounts of detail.    
Regarding community-based CSR, it can be difficult to determine agency or 
processes, although each sustainability report offers concrete examples of 
actions.  Most MNOCs indicate that one or more senior executives are 
responsible for CSR without identifying them, by using the all-inclusive we for 
the structures and agents that wield decision-making power; this does, 
however, indicate that their CSR is self-determined.  Certain companies 
mention CSR departments, a board member responsible for CSR or CSR 
committees on the ground, although their decision-making power is not 
explained and their functions are poorly defined.  Thus, how companies 
arrive at CSR decisions is often unclear.   
Companies acknowledge that legal requirements constrain their decision-
making.  By stating that they abide by legal requirements, they challenge 
assumptions of what can be taken-for-granted and what constitutes CSR.  
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Indeed, companies such as BP (2011), CNOOC (2010), Lukoil (2011) and 
Petrobras (2011) inform the reader that they pay taxes and CNOOC (2010), 
ENI (2010), Exxon (2011) and PetroChina (2011) note their compliance with 
host countries laws.  Repsol (2011:100) and Shell (2011:19) also mention 
that they pay mandatory social contributions as a result of legal, regulatory or 
contractual requirements in such countries as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela, so that certain elements of non-core CSR are 
contractually agreed.  In this regard, certain countries have somewhat 
institutionalised and normalised CSR so that it is not an added extra, but 
taken-for-granted.  However, such assertions may also serve to remind 
readers that these categories cannot be presupposed as not all companies 
meet their requirements (Juhasz, 2010), which may be further evidenced by 
absences in reporting.  Furthermore, these assertions could indicate 
companies’ reluctance to being confused with the state, whereby paying 
taxes is part of their being a responsible corporate citizen in line with 
corporate citizenship narratives.    
Although decision-making procedures are often unclear, most MNOCs signal 
in their sustainability reports that CSR is a company value or pillar, referring 
to their own sustainable development codes or standards as if CSR 
permeates each company level.123  Most reports offer a business-style 
quantification of social and environmental social action.  For example, under 
the subheading “Social Investment”, Hess (2010:27) begins: “In 2010 we 
invested more than $18 million in social programs around the world, an 
increase of more than 40 percent from 2009.”   
In framing why they conduct CSR, companies illustrate a consideration of 
internal and external needs.  Rationales for CSR include a sense of 
responsibility on the part of large MNOCs to help smaller agents or to fix 
global problems (i.e. climate change) (Repsol, 2011:6) and for MNOCs to 
compensate those affected by operations and environmental offsetting (i.e. 
Petrobras, 2011:32; Nexen, 2011:36; Repsol, 2011:96).  Both imply an 
                                                          
123
 McKinsey (Browne & Nutall: 2013) predicts that CSR will increasingly be a matter of 
integrating external engagement into core business decisions at each company level.  This is 
a good indication of the discourse being created by professional consultants for their MNOC 
clients and is, thus, likely to increasingly appear in the wider CSR discourse. 
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asymmetry of power relations between companies and local communities.  
ConocoPhillips (2009) and CNOOC (2010) link their profits to their ability to 
conduct projects, indicating a business style win-win scenario for 
communities and companies alike; although the stakes are different and I 
discuss the asymmetry of information between MNOCs and their 
stakeholders below.  Whilst some companies support a wide variety of 
environmental and social projects (i.e. Lukoil, 2011), others consistently link 
project choices to their standards or values (i.e. Shell).  Certain companies 
are keen to be seen to go the extra mile.  Oxy (2011:25), Repsol (2011), 
Lukoil (2011) and Petrobras (2011) explicitly detail plans to build equitable, 
symmetric stakeholder relations.  Total (2011:56) argues that they have been 
able to "move beyond the "handout" mentality to a co-development approach 
marked by community ownership of the processes, projects and programs".  
Shell (2011:18) notes that, in January 2011, "we launched a public website 
which tracks our response to, and investigation and clean-up of, every spill 
from SPDC facilities, whether operational or the result of sabotage".   
A functionalist perspective of MNOCs, whereby their characteristic functions 
or structural principles should dictate their social role (Levitt, 1958), suggests 
that MNOCs should focus upon these elements.  Each of the reports place 
the environment and workers' protection as part of a company's core CSR as 
illustrated by their internal decision-making procedures.  Indeed, MNOCs' 
business case depends upon attracting the best employees and upon host 
countries giving them access to the natural environment, as they need to 
convince investors that they uphold the best environmental practices.  The 
workforce’s functional importance is evidenced by sections in each CSR 
report, dedicated to how companies address concerns over workers' health 
and safety whilst promoting diversity and equality of opportunity.  This thesis 
does not focus upon measures to improve companies’ internal CSR; 
nevertheless, the importance of functional considerations in MNOCs 
determination of CSR policy is important.   
Functionally, regarding the environment, MNOCs rely on access to land from 
host countries, but run high environmental risks, potentially causing direct 
and indirect environmental damage and pollution in oil-producing 
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countries.124  Each of the reports reviewed dedicates a section to discussing 
environmental performance as CSR in both habited and uninhabited areas.  
Thus, companies' discuss an awareness of the environmental issues at stake 
including waste reduction, spilling less, discharging less and protecting 
biodiversity.  Lobbying on environmental standards, particularly following 
Deepwater, has also increased companies’ PR need to be seen to meet 
environmental targets.  Nevertheless, a functionalist view is too reductive, as 
MNOCs also impact fields unrelated to their core function.  For example, the 
superimposition of an oil culture upon local cultures or the emergence of rent-
seeking or corruption are other side-effects that can result from oil industry 
presence as discussed in the previous chapter.  
Lastly, the 18 CSR reports define stakeholders and their decision-making 
input differently.  However, the concept of stakeholders has expanded from 
Friedman's person who voluntarily enters into exchange with business to 
permission theorists’ definition, whereby societies that allow companies to 
operate in their midst are stakeholders (Friedman, 1970; Martin Curran, 
2005:17).  Where defined, stakeholders generally include: shareholders, 
investors, employees, government agents, suppliers/contractors, 
communities/society, customers and civil society/NGOs.   
Extra categories covered include the scientific/academic community, 
media/press (i.e. Petrobras, 2011; Shell, 2011:36) and unions (i.e. Statoil, 
2011; Repsol, 2011).125  Practically, Exxon (2011), Chevron (2011), 
Petrobras (2011) and PetroChina (2011) differentiate between, but include, 
both involved and affected stakeholders (Teegan et al., 2004:475).  ENI is 
one of the few companies to categorise and name each principle stakeholder 
included, stating the nature of the relationship (ENI, 2010:9).  Repsol 
(2011:90) also provides detailed information and discusses the problems of 
ensuring that legitimate stakeholders and suitable mechanisms for 
stakeholder dialogue are identified.  Interestingly, Total (2011:8) and Oxy 
                                                          
124
 For example, the UNEP’s 2011 report on the Ogoniland in Nigeria highlighted MNOCs’ 
problematic interaction with their surrounding environment.   
125
 Interestingly, PTTEP’s report (2010:23), which is not included in this analysis given its 
focus on larger MNOCs, adds SH&E, law, human rights, local culture and tradition to its 
stakeholders’ list.  This appears to show that discourses can be appropriated without 
companies necessarily understanding them. 
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(2011:7) refer to both stakeholders and (local) communities, showing that 
they have not moved everyone in a surrounding community into the 
stakeholder category.  Whereas companies have some duty towards 
stakeholders, however unclearly defined, this is not the case for non-
stakeholders.      
Company-stakeholder and stakeholder-stakeholder interests may conflict.  
Exxon (2010:8) states that: “It can be challenging to address certain 
stakeholder issues that directly conflict with our business practices. 
Additionally, it is not uncommon for us to encounter opposing stakeholder 
views.”  Indeed, as Cleaver & Frank (2005:4) argue, natural resources are 
not simply commodities, but are invested with social and symbolic meaning, 
so that decisions regarding their optimal use are often subject to negotiation 
and messy compromise (see chapter 3).   
Where there is a conflict of interests between stakeholders, certain 
stakeholders may have more leverage vis-à-vis the company than others.  In 
practice, companies not only have to consider stakeholder legitimacy and the 
urgency of their needs, but also the stakeholders’ power to influence the 
company (Freeman et al., 2004:365; Dobers, 2009:188; Mitchell et al., 
1997:853).  Company-stakeholder disputes are rarely mentioned.  Repsol 
(2011) is one of the few companies to provide concrete accounts of disputes 
that arose between communities and the company and how they are trying to 
tackle them.  BG Group (2011:14), however, highlights the inequality that can 
exist between companies and society, their key challenges include: “seeking 
to ensure access to land is secured using approaches that are sensitive to 
local concerns and values in order to avoid alienating communities”.  Thus, 
reading between the lines, CSR can be used to appease communities.   
Whilst CNOOC (2010) does not list NGOs as stakeholders, the other 
companies mention NGOs as partners in discussing social problems (i.e. 
Lukoil, 2011) and/or in executing CSR, for example, delivering social welfare, 
poverty relief and environmental protection (i.e. Total, 2011:9).  In certain 
countries, MNOCs have created their own foundations to determine and 
execute CSR programmes.  Indeed, MNOCs such as Exxon, Oxy, Shell and 
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Total have created their own foundations that are separate from their main 
businesses.  Whilst this approach reduces opportunities for value creation 
between the company and society (Porter & Kramer, 2002:267-268), I would 
argue that this compartmentalisation enables a more targeted focus upon 
CSR than to position CSR within PR departments.   
Another innovative approach used by Chevron and Shell in Nigeria is that of 
Global Memorandums of Understanding (GMOUs).  These agreements with 
governments and communities give the latter the ability to determine and 
execute their own development projects and aims to enable the communities 
to establish their own foundations, for which the companies provide funding 
and engage NGOs or other experts to aid them in their projects (Chevron, 
2011:30; Shell, 2010:19). Certainly, if properly implemented, such an 
approach addresses concerns that the poorest segments of local 
communities, who are often most affected by the MNOCs' operations, are 
underrepresented or are left out of such discussions (Newell, 2005:543).  
However, despite nominal specifications of rights to participate in dialogue, 
given the existing power imbalances within most societies, MNOCs may find 
it difficult to truly include all community stakeholders (Cleaver & Frank, 
2005:10). 
Chapter Conclusion: what do MNOCs’ CSR reports reveal about their 
authors? 
In this chapter, I have analysed MNOCs’ portrayal of their CSR based upon 
18 MNOC CSR reports.  My conclusions are as follows:  
1. Paradoxically, whilst CSR is closely linked to corporate communication 
and is an essential part of their communication strategy, nevertheless, 
in terms of disclosure, most MNOCs are not forthcoming in sharing 
important financial details.   
2. MNOCs appropriate language from both IFIs and civil society 
discourses to promote their corporate strategies.  Certain terms are 
integrated (e.g. sustainability) or avoided (e.g. charity) within the 
reports, so that a CSR-related language emerges that, paradoxically, 
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emphasise the importance of the terms over their meaning.  
Nevertheless, this language does affect practice, as shown in the 
subsequent chapter; the language on sustainability has led companies 
to promote projects with sustainable features.  
3. MNOCs pick and mix elements from across the specific reporting 
standards to which they adhere, hindering a clear understanding of 
how certain standards affect certain companies’ actions. 
4. Each MNOC identifies its own relevant stakeholder groups.  This has 
implications as to whom is included in/excluded from discussions. 
5. As a part of a company’s communication package, the reports also 
serve to establish and protect the company’s reputation; however, 
they also serve to project the business vision of the company. 
6. The reports analysed rarely adequately disclose CSR decision-making 
processes and who ultimately takes CSR-related decisions within 
companies. 
